Office of the Historian

182. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in Vietnam1

Paris, May 9, 1955—10 p.m.

Polto 28. For Collins. This morning Robertson, Young and Gibson met with Laforest, Berard and Risterucci at French request. Friendly but forthright discussion laid out frankly differing attitudes of French and Americans on various aspects Vietnamese crisis, except, of course, basic desire work together if possible for common objective of preventing Communist take-over.

Much of meeting spent by French in complaining about specific unfavorable U.S. press articles and in alleging U.S. subordinate officials [Page 387] in Saigon can be proved to have aided and abetted Diem‘s attack on Binh Xuyen and government’s anti-French propaganda campaign. Robertson refuted these charges and enumerated some complaints about French behavior. Both agreed mutual recriminations would not be helpful and turned to immediate problems.

Following seemed to be main points of Laforest’s exposition:

(a)
If U.S. insists on Diem, primary requirement is to reinforce Diem Government and make it really government of national union according to one of principles of original Ely–Collins seven-point program. French Government remains prepared to carry out its terms.
(b)

French Government had tried to support Diem, but present hostility to Diem grows out of increasingly violent press attacks against the French. Diem himself has provoked this hostile attitude in France.

(Comment: While claiming Diem himself is using anti-French themes to build up his own strength, French officials, when pressed, admitted some of the anti-French activities are probably done without Diem’s knowledge. French officials seem to be most upset over sound trucks moving around Saigon.)

(c)
He took up question of FEC withdrawal by referring to Faure’s proposition of last Saturday for “progressive reduction of FEC” which would allow Diem to say Vietnam is independent. If FEC should leave Indochina it would be in response to requests from various Vietnamese elements surrounding the government. If the FEC should leave and the requests of the Vietnamese be met in this respect, would the U.S. give assurances that it would take over responsibility for protecting European lives and property? Robertson reminded Laforest of Secretary’s reply in trilateral meeting. Matter dropped.

Robertson informed Laforest of conclusions in Saigon’s 5074,2 paragraph 8(1)(a) to (g), para 8(2), and final paragraph of reftel. Laforest and Risterucci, in particular, reacted against suggestion French should make all-out declaration for Diem government. They also thought broadening of government should be carried out before other recommendations considered.

Robertson also told Laforest that Diem had told Collins ammunition and other shortages which French had refused to supply had prevented National Army from pursuing Binh Xuyen. French knew nothing about this and discounted Diem’s statement entirely.

Dulles
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/5–955. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. The source text is the copy repeated for information priority to the Department of State.↩
  2. Document 173.↩