Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

183. Memorandum From the Special Representative in Vietnam (Collins) to the Ambassador-Designate to Vietnam (Reinhardt)¹

Saigon, May 10, 1955.

SUBJECT

• Status of Ely–Collins Seven Point Program.

1. You are familiar, I believe, with the seven point program which General Ely and I developed some months ago, outline of which is contained in Embtel 2004, November 29, 1954 (see attached).² Both General Ely and I feel that the implementation of this program is essential if South Vietnam is to be saved from the Viet Minh.

2. Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons, very little actual progress has been made in converting these programs from paper plans into actual achievements. The primary reason, in my judgment, has been the failure of Diem to organize an effective cabinet of strong and able men and to decentralize to these men the power to act within their assigned ministries.

3. I would suggest that you continue to use every legitimate pressure that can be brought on Diem to implement these programs.

4. The current status of the programs is as follows:

a. Armed Forces

(1) Reorganization and Reduction of the Armed Forces.

(a) The agreed structure of the Vietnamese Armed Forces as officially proposed by Defense Minister Minh, with the approval of President Diem, is contained in a letter to me from the Minister of Defense Minh dated January 19, 1955.³

(b) The approved structure will have to be modified somewhat to take care of the integration into the Army of a larger number of Cao Dai and Hoa Hao forces. A study of the necessary changes has just been completed and is contained in outline form in Embtel 4373, April 6.⁴

(c) Because of difficulties with the sects, the rate of reduction of the Army has been considerably slower than originally planned. Furthermore, the internal situation in the country will prevent the early initiation of a revised selective service system. It had been planned to initiate on September 1, 1955, a system of drafting 10,000 men each four months. These men were to undergo an intensive period of training before being passed into the ranks of the active forces. As each group of 10,000 entered the active ranks, an equivalent number of old soldiers, now paid at a very high rate of pay, were to be discharged. During their period of training, the recruits were to receive pay at the rate of 50 piasters a week. Thereafter, their base pay in the Army was to be 100 piasters a week. It appears now that this system cannot be initiated before January 1, 1956.

(d) In consequence, although current plans call for reducing the total strength as of the end of the year to 100,000, of whom 10,000 were to be inducted recruits drawing the reduced pay, it may be necessary to retain in the active service until December 31, 1955, approximately 110,000 officers and men all paid at the present high rates of pay. These necessary changes, together with plans for demobilizing all sect forces not inducted into the National Army, will require approximately $40 million additional US funds above the figure planned for CY 1955. When I was in Washington recently, I initiated arrangements with FOA to secure these additional funds with the tacit approval of the Secretary of State. Formal approval has not yet been received. On 10 May I sent a formal request to Washington for the necessary funds (see Embtel 5173, May 10, 1955⁵).

(2) Training.

As the US component of TRIM increases and the US MAAG builds its strength toward the 342-man ceiling to which the US has agreed, more US officers are moving out into the field to advise Vietnamese units on the ground. This program is proceeding satisfactorily. There are US officer-advisers in all three field divisions, with all three regional headquarters, and with the schools and training centers thus far established.

(3) Autonomy of Armed Forces.

It is still contemplated that the French will grant full autonomy to the Armed Forces by 1 July of this year. They will have removed by that date all French officers in command and staff positions, and Vietnamese officers will replace them. French advisers, a part of the TRIM organization, will continue to assist in development of the Vietnamese Armed Forces.

(4) Orientation of the Armed Forces to Support of the Government.

When I first arrived in November 1954, the Chief of Staff, General Hinh, was, in effect, in open rebellion against President Diem, and although no actual fighting of any consequence had taken place, the situation was quite critical. Shortly after I arrived, due to various pressures applied on Hinh the latter was recalled to France. Since that time, until the recent fighting, the loyalty of the Army was somewhat in doubt. As a matter of fact, the French did not believe that, in the event of fighting against sect forces, the Army would support the Government. The latter prediction, however, did not turn out to be correct, for the Army, up to the present, has given the President its complete and wholehearted support, with but few minor exceptions. By doing so, the Army has supported the legal Government of Vietnam. Where its loyalty will lie in the event that Bao Dai were to remove Diem from office, is a moot question. However, I believe that the Army would remain loyal to the President of the Council. There might be some tense moments of indecision amongst the leaders of the Army if such eventualities were to arrive, but I believe that the inherent dislike of Bao Dai and the possibility of the return of a type of French colonalism if he were to regain power, would influence the Army to back the President of the Council.

(5) Pacification and Rehabilitation.

In addition to basic reorganization and training of the Army, our MAAG has had an active part in developing plans for pacification of the country and reoccupation of areas formerly occupied by the Viet Minh. The physical reoccupation of former Viet Minh territories will be completed shortly. The Vietnamese National Security Action Program, which is the name of the pacification operation, is being monitored for our Agencies in Vietnam by the National Security Division of TRIM under Colonel Lansdale. Although the operation at the Camau Peninsula last March was the first operation of this type conducted by the National Army, it was carried out quite effectively and the recent reoccupation of the Binh Dinh area is proceeding even more successfully. However, although these two actions have been conducted satisfactorily, I would advise you to keep your finger closely on the overall Pacification and Rehabilitation program throughout the entire country. Much needs to be done in the actual reestablishment of controls, both civil and military, over these regions. I would suggest that you have the TRIM staff of MAAG give you a briefing on these plans.

b. Resettlement of Refugees and Displaced Persons.

(1) Generally speaking, the reception and temporary housing of refugees from Tonkin area has progressed satisfactorily. By the time you arrive in Saigon the period set for wholesale evacuations will have been completed. However, a trickle of refugees across the 17th parallel will probably continue for some time to come.

(2) Something over 200,000 of the 650,000 refugees have been settled in areas where the Commissioner of Refugees believes they can reside permanently. The bulk of the others are earning a scanty living in the vicinity of temporary villages where they are now sheltered.

(3) Plans had been laid to settle the bulk of the refugees in the rice-producing areas of Cochin-China. Unfortunately, the action of the “United Front” of the sects and the covert opposition of the sects to the settlement of Northern refugees in the areas under their feudal control, has greatly interfered with this program.

(4) Aside from the opposition of the sects, a larger obstacle has been the failure (until last week) of Diem to appoint a Minister of Interior, and to press the establishment of sound local governments throughout the newly-freed areas. I had originally urged Diem to designate a Vice-President to coordinate the operations of the Ministers of Defense and Interior in the pacification program, but this he refused to do. Unfortunately, in the new Government, he has personally retained the Ministry of Defense which will continue to make it difficult to obtain this essential coordination. Perhaps you can persuade him to give some real authority to Mr. Cung, in the personal entourage of the President, the man who is supposed to be exercising this coordination.

(5) The appointment in the new Cabinet of [name and title deleted], is a hopeful sign. I have already instructed Colonel Lansdale, who has been acting as my coordinator under MAAG, for the implementation of the pacification program, to brief [name deleted], in the presence of [name and title deleted] and Mr. Cung on the details of the program and point out things that need to be done. This must be followed up also by representatives of the other Chiefs of US agencies involved in the pacification program.

c. The Agrarian Reform Program.

(1) Closely related with the problem of the resettlement of refugees is the agrarian reform program on which I would suggest you have a briefing by Mr. Barrows and his Assistants.

(2) This program has been interfered with by the actions of sects, and the lack of action on the part of appropriate Vietnamese governmental agencies.

(3) I regard this program as one of the key elements in the cold war fight against the Viet Minh. If the sects accept the broad program we have developed for their integration into the normal life of Vietnam, this agrarian reform program can be made to go forward. Much still needs to be done. I highly recommend that you read Mr. Ladejinsky’s excellent report on this subject.⁶

d. Formation of a National Assembly.

(1) One of the essential weaknesses in the governmental structure of Vietnam is the absence of any National Assembly. Without such an Assembly the only legal authority in the Government rests with Bao Dai who has the tenuous power of being able to appoint the President of the Council of Ministers and exercise many other controls.

(2) Unfortunately, the recent revolt of the Binh Xuyen has completely upset plans for a Provisional National Assembly which was to have been elected on the 15th of this month. These plans have been suspended indefinitely.

(3) It is too early to say what will be the outcome of the actions by Bao Dai, the Revolutionary Committee, and the Estates General. Diem’s present plans appear to call for the election of a National Assembly sometime within the next three to six months. I have instructed Mr. Meloy, the Chief of the Political Section, who has been monitoring this program, to keep in touch and establish contact with the appropriate officials of the new Cabinet, and to aid in every way in the development of plans for the election of a National Assembly as promptly as possible.

e. Financial and Economic.

(1) Under this heading a National Bank has been established, a sound budgetary system is being developed, and plans are underway for a system of export and import controls.

(2) The necessary formal papers have been signed covering the commitment of US funds.

(3) There are still gaps in this program, however, and I would suggest a briefing at an early date by Mr. Gardner Palmer, who has been monitoring this program.

f. Education and Cultural Assistance Program.

(1) This program was suggested by the French primarily, I fear, as a safeguard to French cultural interests in Vietnam. The French are very sensitive on this subject. They fear that the English language may displace French, and American methods of administration and education will gradually displace French procedures. In consequence, they have tried to restrict the number of officers and men to be sent to American military schools, and opposed the introduction of American advisers into the various ministries.

(2) Nonetheless, they reluctantly agreed to the establishment of an Institute of Public Administration in Saigon to be operated under the direction of the Michigan State University. Considerable delays developed in Washington in consummating this contract, but it has finally been signed and the Director and small staff will arrive in Saigon shortly.

(3) The French have also finally agreed to the establishment of an International Center for the teaching of foreign languages, including English. This program is being supported by the USIS.

(4) In addition, through USOM, we are furnishing assistance along with the French to develop normal schools and otherwise improve the Vietnamese educational system.

g. Reorganization and Increased Effectiveness of Vietnamese Government.

(1) The original Diem Cabinet contained very few men of ability and had a very narrow political base. Unfortunately, every effort to persuade Diem to take into his Cabinet men of ability has met with failure. Instead, because of the President’s method of operating, he has lost practically all of the able men who were in his Cabinet.

(2) It is too early to say how the new Cabinet will function. Very few of its members have had any experience in public life, and their capabilities are unknown. Fortunately, a Minister of Interior has finally been appointed but the President retains the Ministry of Defense, a condition which in the past has been a detriment to the operations of this key Ministry.

(3) Another essential weakness in the Government structure has been the hodgepodge of administrative arrangements between the National Government and the regional, provincial, and community governments. One of the functions of the Institute of Public Administration, under the direction of Michigan State University, will be to make a study of these relationships.

(4) Finally, a decision must be reached by the Vietnamese people as to the ultimate structure of their Government and its relationship to the French Union. You are familiar with the current struggle between Bao Dai and Diem and their respective adherents, with the French actively engaged in the background.

5. Rather than discuss, in this report, our plans (a) for reorganizing the National Police establishments and (b) for integrating sect forces into the National Army, I have attached drafts of both,⁷ so that, if you desire, you may become well acquainted with them prior to your arrival at Saigon. I would advise that you review these plans, together with the conscription program for the Armed Forces, with your advisers in Saigon and then discuss them with President Diem and the appropriate members of his new government at an early date.

6. Thus, though you can see much has been accomplished to assist Vietnam to establish a strong viable government and economy, much remains to be done. The problems involved are full of so many unpredictable factors and the situation is so volatile that anything can happen. You have a formidable task awaiting you and I wish you the very best of success in your mission.

J. Lawton Collins

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/6–255. Secret. According to a covering letter to Young from Collins’ executive officer, June 2, Collins gave this report to Reinhardt in Hawaii on May 20. This copy was given to Young because it was the final version of Collins’ last official report on Vietnam.
2. Telegram 2004 was not attached to the source text; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. xiii, Part 2, p. 2315.
3. The text of this letter is in telegram 2876 from Saigon, January 21. (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.5–MSP/1–2155)
4. See footnote 2, Document 105.
5. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/5–1055)
6. Apparently Collins is referring to Wolf I. Ladejinsky’s “Field Trip Observations in Central Vietnam”, April 2, and/or his “Field Trip in South Vietnam”, undated, both of which are ibid., S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5519.
7. Neither of these draft plans is attached to the source text; a discussion of these issues and recommendations of action is in despatch 358 from Saigon, April 28. (Ibid., Central Files, 751G.5/4–2855)