Office of the Historian

143. Memorandum of a Conversation, The White House, Washington, January 31, 1956, 1 p.m.1

ETW MC–4
Washington, January 31, 1956, 1 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

  • US
  • President Eisenhower
  • Secretary Dulles
  • Ambassador Aldrich
  • Mr. MacArthur
  • Mr. Merchant
  • Mr. Allen
  • Mr. Robertson
  • Colonel Goodpaster
  • UK
  • Prime Minister Eden
  • Foreign Secretary Lloyd
  • Ambassador Makins
  • Sir Harold Caccia
  • Sir Leslie Rowan

[Here follows a list of subjects discussed, a brief summary of Secretary Dulles’ report to the President and Prime Minister on his discussions that morning with Foreign Secretary Lloyd, and a record of discussion concerning Vietnam and the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations (scheduled for inclusion in the United Nations membership compilation in a forthcoming volume).]

Offshore Islands

The subject then switched to the off-shore islands. Prime Minister Eden said he was particularly worried about this situation and that he had hoped the US would persuade President Chiang Kai-shek to evacuate these islands. President Eisenhower replied that he could [Page 294] not desert Chiang Kai-shek. He said that the Nationalist Government considered the islands to be of great importance. He explained Chiang’s position that to lose the islands under attack after a stiff fight was one thing but to abandon them without a fight would cause great consternation and deterioration in morale not only in Taiwan but also among the millions of overseas Chinese scattered through Southeast Asia. Mr. Eden asked what the United States would do if the Communists attacked the offshore islands. He emphasized the British view that Formosa was one question and the offshore islands quite another. The President said he understood the British position. He did not say what he would do.

Secretary Dulles reviewed Communist preparations on the mainland opposite Taiwan citing particularly the building of ten new airfields which would accommodate jet planes and the military railroad now under construction between Yingtan and the port of Amoy which was expected to be completed by the end of the year.2

  1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 648. Secret. Prepared in the Department of State. The source text, dated February 7, bears no indication of the drafter, but a draft indicates that it was drafted by Robertson. (Ibid., ROC Files: Lot 71 D 517, Offshore Islands, 1956) The conversation took place during a luncheon.↩

  2. The conversation was also recorded in a memorandum by Goodpaster, attached to the source text, which bears handwritten interpolations in Merchant’s handwriting and in an unidentified handwriting. A notation in Merchant’s handwriting states, “This is more complete than MC–4. LTM” Goodpaster’s memorandum records the discussion of the offshore islands as follows:

    “Sir Anthony then took up the situation with regard to the off-shore islands, and said he was worried about this problem. The President said he had given a great deal of personal thought and attention to this whole problem and the situation was simply that if we tried to press Chiang too hard to give up the islands, Formosa might be lost and the whole position in the Far East might crumble. He had tried to have Chiang persuaded that it is a military mistake to place such strength and stake his prestige on the off-shore islands in this manner, but that the effort had not been successful. In his opinion, they should be considered as an outpost, but Chiang had said that abandonment of the islands would result in loss of face and of any hold over Chinese not only on Formosa but also in Malaya and elsewhere in the Far East. Secretary Dulles said that while the situation with regard to these islands flares up occasionally, he is inclined to think that large-scale attack in the near future is unlikely, and said that he understands this to be the opinion of top U.S. Military people. While airfields have been built opposite Formosa, they have not been equipped or provisioned for operations, and that there has been no build-up or massing of the forces which might be used for assault. There is, of course, the danger of interdiction of the islands with artillery, preventing their support and supply. Sir Anthony said that the question which was uppermost in their minds is, if Chiang has built up the islands with a large part of his forces, and is attacked, what then happens with regard to U.S. action in the area? He also enquired if the islands were attacked and fell would not the effect on morale in Formosa be disastrous? The President said that Chiang Kai-shek apparently believed to lose after a hard fight would be less damaging than a voluntary withdrawal.”

    The last two sentences were a handwritten addition by Merchant; the words “not only on Formosa but also” were added in an unidentified handwriting.

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