Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

144. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 1, 1956¹

Washington, February 1, 1956

SUBJECT

• Reaction of Chinese Government to Johnson-Wang Talks at Geneva

PARTICIPANTS

• V. K. Wellington Koo, Chinese Ambassador
• Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
• Walter P. McConaughy, Director, CA

Ambassador Koo, who returned on January 30 from consultations in Taipei, remarked that he had had five or six conferences with the Generalissimo and other key members of the Government during the six days he was in Taipei. The conferences had included, besides the Generalissimo, Vice President Chen Cheng, Foreign Minister George Yeh, Premier O. K. Yui, and Secretary General Chang Chun.

Ambassador Koo said the current misgivings of his Government as to the continuation of the Ambassadorial talks at Geneva were fully summarized in the Chinese Aide-Mémoire of January 25.² The Generalissimo had made statements to him which confirmed the Generalissimo’s personal association with these misgivings. The Generalissimo was unhappy with the situation and very much concerned. The Generalissimo had charged the Ambassador with the mission of conveying his apprehensions frankly to the Department. The current conversations with the British in Washington were an additional source of uneasiness.

The Ambassador said that, regardless of what was actually going on at Geneva, the very fact of the continuation of the talks gave rise to misunderstandings. This was a bad situation. It seemed in the Far East that the U.S. did not object to the sort of de facto recognition of the Chinese Communist regime apparently implied in the protracted talks. The proposals of the two sides as to renunciation of force as revealed in the press releases from Peiping and Washington were disquieting to the Chinese Government. The United States draft seemed to place the two parties on an equal footing. A mutual declaration or exchange of pledges, bilateral in character, was sought by the United States Government with the Chinese Communists. The Ambassador said he knew that the United States wanted to commit the other side to peaceful methods, but the proposed form of the commitment gave rise to uneasiness in Taipei. The Ambassador thought it was not realistic for us to put an emphasis on “peaceful settlement” when we knew that the Communists would not respect any peace pledge unless it suited their purposes. He recalled that the United States Government was pledged not to discuss anything at Geneva concerning the claims, rights or essential interests of the Government of the Republic of China in its absence. His Government considered that the official Chinese Communist and United States statements on the talks of January 18 and January 21 showed that matters which involved the claims, rights and essential interests of the GRC had in fact been discussed. His Government took the view that the United States Government apparently did not care what claims the Communists put forward, or how they prosecuted those claims, so long as the Communists did not resort to war. It seemed that the United States Government did not even object to the Chinese Communist claim to Taiwan, if it were peacefully pursued. He said the Chinese Government thought it discerned “some sort of a lurking intention to pursue the theory of two Chinas”. This the Chinese Government must always oppose. The Generalissimo actually feared that the United States might be veering around toward a one China—a Red China—concept.

The Generalissimo said that his people—especially the two million from the Mainland now in Taiwan—still lived for the day when they could go back to the Mainland. Many of the overseas Chinese regarded the Mainland with the same sort of longing. This attitude was also found among the great majority of the Chinese Armed Forces, although he conceded that the native Taiwanese now being recruited into the Army in growing numbers did not particularly have this feeling. When the Chinese who have ties to the Mainland read of statements by United States leaders which throw cold water on the possibility of a free Mainland being reestablished, their hopes become more remote and it is harder to keep alive their will to resistance. The people of Free China are “on the front line” and it is important to nourish their fundamental hopes. As the Chinese Government has informed Ambassador Rankin, a very high degree of sensitivity exists in Taiwan to external developments affecting the prospects of Free China. Maybe their growing apprehensions are not well founded, but it is important for the United States representatives to know that these apprehensions exist. He wanted to convey with frankness precisely how the responsible officials of the Chinese Government feel on this issue.

The Ambassador declared that President Chiang was very upset by the omission of any reference to the Government of the Republic of China in the Department’s official statement of January 21. It was almost as if the United States did not wish to take public cognizance of the existence of the Chinese Government. The Ambassador said that he thought he knew the reason—desire in principle to avoid provocative matters which might jeopardize the talks. But the Chinese Government was bound to notice the omission, especially when the United States Government took pains to call the Chinese Communists the “Peoples Republic of China”. The Ambassador said he had tried to explain this to President Chiang, but it was difficult to explain.

The Ambassador said that the Generalissimo looked to the United States as China’s most trusted friend and ally. He was deeply grateful for the large measure of material support extended by the United States. But he hoped also for moral support. From the psychological standpoint the recent developments participated in by the United States had constituted the worst possible blow to the Chinese Government. The more the Chinese Government read and studied the official statements and proposals related to the Geneva talks, the less hope they saw in the situation.

Ambassador Koo said that the Chinese Communists are very quick to exploit any opening given them by the United States. Immediately after the recent exchange of public statements on the Geneva talks, the Chinese Communists had stepped up their psychological campaign to induce defections on Taiwan. They had called on the Chinese in Taiwan to transfer their allegiance to the Communists. The Communists had held out a guarantee of safety to all Chinese on Taiwan who defected to the Communists. They had invited them to come to the Mainland to see their relatives and had assured them of freedom of travel. They had offered positions to Chinese intellectuals on Taiwan. The Chinese Government was doing what it could to counter these pressures and inducements, but the task was not easy.

Mr. Robertson observed that of course the Communists would try to obtain defections, regardless of the talks at Geneva. Naturally they would prefer to obtain their objectives by subversion if they could without having to fight.

Ambassador Koo said that the Communists were certainly stepping up their subversive attempts and their prospects seemed to be improving. He thought that from a logical standpoint we might have pushed the Communists into a corner at Geneva, but the Communists had from a psychological standpoint come out pretty well in the public exchange of statements.

Mr. Robertson said that the Ambassador’s remarks indicated the Chinese Government had misunderstood by 180 degrees the position the United States Government was taking in the conversations at Geneva. The United States thinks it has maintained a good position in Geneva. The declaration renouncing force which we are still seeking from the Chinese Communists is no more or less than what the 60 members of the UN subscribe to. We are not seeking anything of the Chinese Communists at Geneva which goes beyond that.

The United States Government has not asked the Chinese Government to give up anything. We think the talks may actually serve the interests of the Chinese Government by reducing the likelihood of an attack on the off-shore islands. We want to save the off-shore islands for the Chinese Government if we can. So far the Chinese Communists have refused to agree to a renunciation of force in the Taiwan area. This refusal certainly does not improve the international standing of the Chinese Communists, or undermine the position of the GRC.

Ambassador Koo said that his Government was unhappy with the form of the renunciation of force declaration proposed by the United States.

Mr. Robertson said that the conversations at Geneva had nothing to do with recognition—de facto or otherwise. If the Generalissimo understood how firmly the United States Government supports the position of the Chinese Government, his attitude would be different. If the Generalissimo could have heard the President speak on this subject to Prime Minister Eden, the Generalissimo would have been delighted. The President branded the Chinese Communists as aggressors and oppressors who are a threat to the peace of the world. The President said he was not prepared to see them shoot their way into the UN. He had informed Eden that the great majority of the American people and Congress were strongly opposed to any such proposal.

Mr. Robertson said it seemed the Chinese Government representatives did not want to accept the very explicit assurances they have repeatedly received from United States representatives. He did not know what more could be done to reassure the Chinese Government.

Ambassador Koo said his Government was unable to see why it was necessary for the United States Government to try to join in an agreement with the Chinese Communists.

Mr. Robertson said it was not a joint agreement, but separate declarations or announcements that were proposed. Furthermore the United States insisted that any declaration specifically include the general area of Taiwan. The Communists want to exclude Taiwan. The United States insistence that any renunciation of force must include the Taiwan area is in the best interests of the Chinese Government and the free world.

Ambassador Koo said, “Suppose the Communists accept your no force proposal. Would the United States then consider the Chinese Communists as peace loving?” If the United States insistently presses for a declaration from the Chinese Communists some significance presumably would have to be attached to Communist compliance with the United States request. The United States would have to accept the consequences of the agreement. There would be more pressure from other nations for UN membership for Communist China and the pressure would be harder to resist.

Mr. Robertson said there could hardly be more pressure along this line from certain other nations than we are already encountering. We have resisted these pressures and will continue to do so.

Ambassador Koo asked what the United States would do next if the Communists agreed to the United States proposal? There would have to be something in return and the Communists would press hard for concessions.

Mr. Robertson said the Chinese Communists still had 350,000 troops in North Korea. Their aggression was not terminated. The Ambassador said this was a good point. He said Indo-China might also be mentioned in this connection.

Ambassador Koo said his people thought British Far Eastern policy was making a lot of trouble for the United States as well as for Free China. The British appeared to be pushing in the opposite direction from the United States in the Far East. The Generalissimo thought the British were pursuing a very unrealistic policy. He thought their policy toward Communist China had two motivations: (1) to salvage the large British investment in Mainland China; (2) to recover the lost China trade. The Generalissimo had observed that obviously neither objective was obtainable so long as a Soviet-affiliated Communist regime remained in power in China, and the British should not deceive themselves.

Ambassador Koo recalled that the British have now had diplomatic relations with the Chinese Communists for six years. During that time the British have lost all their large economic stakes in China. The Communists always treat trade as a political instrument. It should be apparent to the British that they cannot salvage their China investments or their China trade unless the National Government is reestablished on the Mainland. The Ambassador thought that some British businessmen are beginning to realize this, but not the British Government. It might be possible for the Generalissimo to give a pledge or some sort of assurance to the British Government that British commercial interests would be restored when the Chinese Government regained control of the Mainland, although such an assurance might seem academic at this time. He did not know whether the United States Government had ever thought along this line. If the United States Government should convey some intimation to the foregoing effect to the British Government it might start the British officials to thinking.

Mr. Robertson said we had conveyed our views on China policy to the British many times. He feared that British thinking had not been influenced thereby and would not be influenced now. He thought the British Government had been pressured by the large British business interests in China to recognize the Communists in 1950. British business had hoped to save its China stake of a billion dollars thereby. But British recognition had only helped the Chinese Communists. The British say they want to promote free and independent Governments throughout the Far East. But their Far Eastern policies have had the opposite effect. He feared that the China policy of the UK had been extremely stupid.

Returning to the misgivings expressed by Ambassador Koo, Mr. Robertson said he would again state that the United States Government does not intend to recognize in any way the Communist regime in Peiping. Nor would the United States agree to the admission of Communist China to the UN. United States sentiment was overwhelmingly opposed both to recognition and UN membership. This was the situation, whether the Generalissimo and Foreign Minister Yeh believed it or not.

Mr. Robertson said at the same time he wished to put the Chinese Government on notice that we do not intend to break off the Geneva talks. The United States wants to get the American prisoners out of Red China and it wants to obtain a renunciation of force declaration from the Chinese Communists. The United States will continue to pursue these objectives, even if its efforts are misunderstood.

Mr. Robertson referred to recent statements by the Generalissimo about return to the Mainland. He did not understand what the Generalissimo hoped to accomplish by such statements. Mr. Robertson recalled that the Secretary had expressed doubts about the wisdom of these repeated threats to regain the Mainland by force, which could not be carried out. The Generalissimo had a larger mission, as the head of Free China, than that of making promises and threats which he could not implement. He should keep in a position to capitalize on any major turn of events on the Mainland. But he must know that he cannot hope to recapture the Mainland with his relatively small army alone. And he also knows that the United States will not join in an offensive war—against the China Mainland or any other place. The United States Congress certainly would not sanction a war to overthrow the Communist regime and put the GRC back on the Mainland. We would not be drawn into an offensive conflict in Korea or Vietnam either. The United States was not going to war, except defensively. We have only defensive treaties. This fact should be realistically accepted. The Generalissimo was a brilliant military strategist and he must realize that he can not do the job alone. At the same time a lot of things might happen. If the Chinese Communists should attack in Korea or Indochina it might be a good thing for the GRC forces to strike on the flank. If so, the GRC forces would receive assistance. If there should be an internal collapse of the Communist regime, or if the Communists should engage in military adventures somewhere else, the Chinese Government should be in a position to capitalize on the event. Preparedness for any such development was reasonable, but the Generalissimo’s invasion statements were hard to understand. It alienated support here and created anxiety generally. It tended to make the Chinese Government seem irresponsible and to weaken its international position. The GRC lost some standing every time such statements were made. As an admirer and supporter of President Chiang, Mr. Robertson said he could not help but be distressed by such statements. Just as President Rhee in Korea could not go north on his own, the Generalissimo could not cross the Taiwan Strait alone.

Ambassador Koo said that the Generalissimo fully understood all this. Although the Generalissimo had not stressed his desire for peace, this love of peace was very real with him. But he wanted a real, honorable and lasting peace. The Generalissimo felt he must do everything possible to preserve the legitimate aspirations of his people and to keep up morale.

Mr. Robertson remarked that it should always be remembered that the American people cannot and will not let President Chiang or President Rhee declare war for them. Only the United States Congress could do this.

Ambassador Koo said this was very clear to all concerned. President Chiang would certainly respect the undertaking he had made not to engage in offensive warfare without the concurrence of the United States.

Mr. Robertson said he was fully convinced of that. He knew that President Chiang was a man of integrity and honor, but the Mainland invasion statements which had been issued lately were difficult to rationalize.

Ambassador Koo said it was merely an effort to counteract Communist propaganda designed to undermine morale on Taiwan. The Generalissimo felt he had to keep hope alive.

Mr. Robertson wondered whether it was wise to mislead. The creation of illusory hopes could be counterproductive. It would seem preferable for the Generalissimo to counsel patience. The references to recapturing the mainland lost force if exposed as bluff. If the Communists violated the truce, it would be a different situation.

Ambassador Koo said that when a pall of gloom descended, it was necessary to do something to dispel it.

Mr. Robertson said that the Generalissimo must know that his army of say 400,000 could not alone buck a Communist army of 3.5 or 4 million. It seemed bad psychologically to imply that it could be done. But it was not for him to judge the Generalissimo’s speeches.

Ambassador Koo said there is a constant need to reaffirm that hope still exists.

Mr. Robertson said that nothing had been done at Geneva which would extinguish any hopes.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 211.9311/2–156. Secret. Drafted by McConaughy. Initialed by Robertson, indicating his approval. A separate memorandum of the same conversation by McConaughy, on the subject “Eden Talks”, is not printed. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 648B)
2. See Document 138.