239. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 27, 19571
SUBJECT
- Military Problems on Taiwan
PARTICIPANTS
- General Yu Ta-Wei, Minister of National Defense, ROC
- Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
- Walter P. McConaughy, Director, CA
General Yu Ta-Wei called at his request, following three months of medical treatment in this country, and on the eve of his return to Taipei. He said that he was concerned at the rapid increase in Chinese Communist capabilities for attack against Taiwan. He did not know whether a Communist assault against Taiwan or the off-shore islands was probable. But the capability was there and it was growing every month. The Chinese Communists had made great sacrifices in order to expedite completion of the railroad into Amoy and Foochow. They had also exerted themselves in order to speed completion of the system of forward air bases in the coastal area of Fukien Province. These bases were not now occupied, but they could be occupied almost overnight. He thought these forward bases would be used for fighter planes which would be used to protect the heavy bombers which, with their longer range, would come from rear bases around Nanching and other places farther west. The Minister thought that the Chinese Communists had sacrificed part of their industrial mobilization [Page 489] scheme in Manchuria, and in Yumen and elsewhere in west China in order to accelerate the build up of military capabilities opposite Taiwan. The Communists must have something pretty definite in mind in order to give this high priority to the South China build up in the face of strong competing demands elsewhere.
The Minister said it would be very useful to the commanders of the garrisons on Quemoy and Matsu if more could be known of the U.S. military plans in the event of a Chinese Communist attack on the off-shore islands. The Chinese Commanders would plan differently for a one-week campaign without assistance than they would for a holding action of indefinite duration without assistance.
Mr. Robertson reminded General Yu that the President was fully empowered under the Joint Resolution of January 29, 19552 to make this decision, and the President alone could make it. The President would have to make a decision in the light of all the circumstances at the time as to whether an attack of that sort were related to the security of Taiwan. The Chinese Government should not anticipate any decision in the matter in advance, because it could not be forthcoming. Mr. Robertson offered to give the Minister a copy of the Joint Resolution of Congress, but the Minister said the Resolution was his “Bible” and he did not need to see a copy of it. Mr. Robertson expressed some skepticism as to whether a Chinese Communist attack was probable, but agreed that it was a possibility which the GRC had to reckon with.
General Yu said that he felt that his work of rebuilding and expanding the Chinese Army was now about finished, enabling him to concentrate on strategic problems. He felt that his work of converting the Chinese Army from a poorly organized group of mercenaries into a modern well-trained force was his greatest achievement. He felt he would be remembered for this after everything else he had done was forgotten. He described how the conscription system worked. All 20-year old men, both Taiwanese and Mainlanders, were automatically conscripted for 2 years. They were given 4 months of basic training in nine combat regiments, then 20 months of active duty in the 21 regular divisions. After the completion of the 2 years of active service, the draftees were placed in the active reserve for several years. The active reserve maintained 9 reserve divisions. He said that this system of training had brought the average age of the soldier down to 26 years, and it would soon be further reduced to 24 years. Morale was excellent and the Taiwanese were serving without complaint, on a basis of friendship and non-discrimination, with the Mainlanders. The system had enabled the Government to bring the 21 active divisions almost to full strength. The seven divisions on [Page 490] Quemoy and Matsu were at full strength or slightly over, and the 14 divisions on Taiwan would soon be at about 95%.
General Yu said that he felt it was essential to expedite the completion of the Matador missile project. His Government had regretted the premature publicity which came from American military sources. Since the information had been released, he felt it was important to get on with the exchange of notes and the actual installation. He had been told at the Pentagon that the project had been given complete approval there, and that the next move was up to the State Department.
In response to a question from Mr. Robertson, Mr. McConaughy stated that no agency was holding up the project. Both Defense and State agreed that the project should be pushed vigorously. There had been some technical obstacles to be overcome. We were working on the formal exchange of notes, and we expected to be able to move rapidly from this point on.
General Yu said he was also anxious to see the Kung Kuan airfield project pushed more aggressively. He said this air base actually would be principally for American use, and he thought it was in the U.S. interest to proceed with the construction with a minimum of delay. He feared that budgetary problems might have caused some loss of valuable time.
Mr. Robertson assured him that we were fully committed to pushing the undertaking with all possible speed. No serious financial difficulty was anticipated.
General Yu said that he felt Taiwan was seriously deficient in defense against air attack. The 90-mm aircraft guns could not reach the high altitude modern Communist planes, such as the Soviets were supplying to the Chinese Communists. He said that the best U.S. anti-aircraft devices were needed to protect Taiwan. He expressed the hope that “Nike” missiles could be installed in the near future. He said that electronic equipment on Taiwan needed to be modernized and expanded. The modern war plane was sustained by electronic aids just as completely as the sailing ship of old was supported by the water. The best electronic equipment would be needed both to track and intercept enemy planes and to support our own. He included better radar in this reference to electronic equipment.
Mr. Robertson told General Yu that the matters he had dealt with fell largely in the military sphere, but we too were of course interested in improving the defense capabilities on Taiwan. We were confident that these matters would receive thorough consideration in the Department of Defense.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/2–2757. Secret. Drafted on March 5 by McConaughy and approved by Robertson.↩
- See vol. ii, Document 56.↩