95. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State1
Secto 221. Tito Brioni Talks2—Communist China.
At Secretary’s request Tito gave his views about Communist China saying that while Yugoslavia had not known too much about the country they were in a position to study it first-hand since the establishment of diplomatic relations.3
Tito insisted Communist China was not a Soviet satellite. Although the Soviets had exercised great influence over Chinese Communists, Stalin had complained Mao was difficult to deal with during the partisan period. Soviets adopted a rather cautious attitude towards the Chinese. While they were helping China economically and technically, it was wrong to think the USSR was pushing China as its spearhead for Asian penetration.
Tito was sure Soviets exercised at times a restraining influence on Chinese, commenting that regime was young and in full flush of revolutionary fever which sometimes caused it to run a bit wild. He believed the Chinese have learned some lessons and were now wiser. Tito advocated Communist China’s admission to UN on grounds it was important for it to have wider political and economic contacts and not to be forced into position whereby having relations [only] with USSR. China also could provide a wide market for many countries including the US. Tito commented that just as China had showed some elasticity in its international affairs so it might show similar elasticity in foreign policy which would not exclude difficulties with the USSR.
According to Tito the Chinese Communist Party while having relations with Soviet Communist Party was quite independent and certain pro-Russian elements had been largely eliminated. Party relationships were equivalent to government relationships between the USSR and China. Tito added his conclusions corresponded with views he had received from Burmese and Indians during his trip East. At this point Kardelj4 said he knew from Stalin that latter was opposed to Mao taking over China by open revolution. It was paradox [Page 167] that Yugoslav and Chinese Communist revolutions which were completely successful were carried out against Stalin’s wishes, because Stalin wanted all countries engaged in revolution to be dependent on Soviet Union.
Secretary explained US feeling against Chinese Communists deriving from their Korean intervention and efforts take over Indochina. Present situation in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia was such that these areas had good prospect of remaining free. Threats against Taiwan were another cause of American sentiment. Secretary briefly outlined Johnson’s Geneva talks with Chinese Ambassador Wang. If satisfactory progress could be made by two Ambassadors regarding a reasonably dependable renunciation of force, we would all be much better off. A change of American sentiment, however, would depend on actions and words of Chinese Communists. Secretary felt Geneva talks between Ambassadors were useful but they would take time to arrive at result we hoped for and he was therefore, not disturbed at their leisurely pace.
In conclusion Secretary emphasized our loyalty to Chinese Nationalists who stood with us against Japanese. We have obtained Chiang agreement not act against Mainland except in agreement with us, thus giving us power of control over Chinese Nationalist action. Last January risk of war had been grave because of Chinese Communist attitude. Secretary referred to congressional resolution empowering President to use US armed forces to assist in Taiwan defense; said situation had improved since then but Chinese Communists must realize American people still harbored strong feelings not because they were Communist regime, since we had good relations with Yugoslavia which was a Communist regime, but because of Chinese actions and threats in Far East.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396. 1–GE/11–855. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated for information to Belgrade.↩
- Secretary Dulles visited Yugoslavia on November 6 for talks with Yugoslav President Josip Broz-Tito near the island of Brioni. The discussion recorded here took place during a conversation on the afternoon of November 6, and is recorded in more detail in a memorandum of conversation, November 8. (USDel/MC/24; ibid., Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 577)↩
- In January 1955.↩
- Yugoslav Vice President Edvard Kardelj.↩