Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, American Republics: Multilateral; Mexico; Caribbean, Volume VI

27. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Gray)¹

Washington, October 7, 1955.

Dear Mr. Gray: A suggestion has come to the attention of the Department of State on several occasions that consideration be given to lending, for a stated period of years, to those Latin American republics that maintain naval establishments, a limited number of naval vessels from the Naval Reserve Fleet to be used to perform Hemisphere defense missions. I am informed that this suggestion may have already received some consideration within the Department of the Navy and that that Department is sponsoring legislation to loan two submarines to Brazil. I understand that this suggestion arises out of the apparent dilemma of attempting to implement on the one hand the established policy of encouraging the Latin American military establishments to adopt standard United States equipment and training methods but on the other hand of having no United States naval vessels available to sell to Latin Americans to satisfy their requirements and being unable to compete with European prices on new construction.

Some of the reasons which have been advanced in support of this proposal are:

1. The transfer of such vessels would be consistent with the national policy of promoting standardization of military equipment in Latin America. It would act as a deterrent to the type of procurement now being undertaken by Venezuela, Ecuador and other countries which have placed orders with European shipbuilders for the construction of non-standard naval vessels having limited utility for Hemisphere defense and would be of questionable value in time of war because of the non-availability of replacement parts from the United States. Moreover, European procurement may stimulate the desire of Latin American governments for European naval missions technically competent to provide instruction in the repair and maintenance of European equipment.

2. Latin American countries capable of operating and maintaining naval vessels consider that they have a legitimate Hemisphere defense requirement for ships, and there would appear to be some military justification for this point of view. The military importance of the inter-American maritime routes is emphasized in the General Military Plan for the Defense of the American Continent, prepared in 1951 by the Inter-American Defense Board as a result of United States military leadership and initiative, and approved by the United States and most Latin American countries.² The General Plan states: “In order that the war may be conducted with maximum efficiency, it is necessary to maintain the arsenal of the free world in full production. This emphasizes the strategic importance of the transportation of essential materials produced in the various countries of America, which, in large part, will be processed in the industrial centers of the United States.” The General Plan further states that defense of the Hemisphere will include: “A coordinated defense action by all the American States, for the purpose of counteracting the efforts of enemy forces that may succeed in infiltrating into the Continent. The principal effort in this defense south of the Tropic of Cancer falls to the Latin American countries.” It is reasonable to expect Latin American countries to note, on the one hand, that the United States military has endorsed a relatively large delegation of Hemisphere defense responsibility to them, and on the other hand, to note the exceedingly small amount of United States assistance provided them for Hemisphere defense, compared with the vast amount of United States assistance provided countries outside this Hemisphere.

3. The recent extension of $15 million in credit to Peru for the construction of submarines is virtually certain to stimulate Latin American countries maintaining navies to request credit for the procurement of vessels. In view of their poor economic condition, it would not appear possible, on economic grounds, to justify the extension of credit to most countries, including Brazil, Chile and Ecuador. Countries denied credit are certain to charge the United States with discrimination. The ill-will created by our inability to comply with Latin American requests for credit will adversely affect the whole range of our military relations with Latin America including the prestige and effectiveness of United States armed services missions in Latin America.

4. It would seem especially desirable and logical to consider the loan of naval vessels to Latin American countries, inasmuch as the naval assistance provided them to date in the grant aid program has been limited exclusively to assistance for the rehabilitation and repair of vessels and facilities which they possessed prior to the initiation of the program.

5. The vessels would not be lost to the Navy’s mobilization reserve which has been the objection to the sale of naval vessels, but by lending the vessels they would still be available within the Hemisphere to the mobilization reserve and would at the same time be providing certain Latin American navies with desirable and much needed training.

Because the proposal seems to me to have a great deal of merit, I wanted to bring it to your attention for consideration by your Department and I would appreciate receiving your views on it.

Sincerely yours,

Robert Murphy³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 720.5–MSP/10–755. Secret. Drafted by Sayre.
2. See the editorial note, Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. ii, p. 1028.
3. Printed from a copy which bears this typed signature.