Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, American Republics: Central and South America, Volume VII

450. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 88–56

Washington, April 10, 1956

PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN COLOMBIA²

The Problem

To estimate the current situation in Colombia and probable developments through mid-1958, with particular reference to the character and stability of the Rojas Pinilla regime.

Conclusions

1. The present Colombian government is an authoritarian regime under military control. President Gustavo Rojas Pinilla has failed in his efforts to organize a broad political base and is maintained in power only by the backing of the armed forces. (Paras. 22–24)

2. The traditional Conservative and Liberal parties constitute the principal opposition. They are hampered by internal weaknesses, and are harassed and restricted in their activities by the government. Their principal leaders show no taste for militant political action. Nevertheless, the parties are able to apply sustained pressure upon the Rojas Pinilla administration. (Paras. 25–30)

3. About 6,000 guerrillas are active in parts of the nation’s mountainous areas and main river valleys (see map).³ Present guerrilla capabilities are limited to harassment of government forces and to brigandage. Guerrilla operations have no over-all centralized direction, but the Communists have extended their influence in the guerrilla movement and probably now exercise effective control over the leaders of possibly as many as half of the active guerrillas.⁴ (Paras. 31–36)

4. The Colombian Communist Party (PCC) was declared illegal in March 1956. There are probably not more than 5,000 Communists; their political and labor influence has been declining over the past decade. The guerrilla movement is subject to Communist exploitation, but it is not likely that the PCC could, by this means, become a serious contender for political power in Colombia during the period of this estimate. It might, however, become able to exact political concessions as the price of a cessation of guerrilla activities, particularly if and when the Rojas Pinilla regime were overthrown by other political forces. (Paras. 37–38, 61)

5. The Colombian armed forces firmly support Rojas Pinilla. They are capable of either maintaining the President in power or deposing him. Better organized, trained, and equipped than at any other time in their history, they are capable of defending the country against its adjacent neighbors, but their limited efforts have thus far failed to eliminate guerrilla activities. (Paras. 39–42)

6. Colombia’s current economic position is fairly healthy. Coffee exports remain at high levels, and prices are relatively good. The government is successfully maintaining a vigorous economic expansion program, abetted by sizable inflows of foreign capital. Inflationary forces have been kept under control. (Paras. 43–49)

7. Colombia has been among the most cooperative of the Latin American nations in support of United States political and defense objectives, both Hemispheric and worldwide. However, like other Latin American nations, it often opposes the US on economic and colonial issues in the UN and the OAS. The anti-Protestant policies of the government and the Catholic Church, which affect US missionaries, remain a thorny issue in US-Colombian relations. (Paras. 50–52)

8. We believe that Rojas Pinilla will remain in office at least through 1956. The military will almost certainly continue to support the regime. It is unlikely that the opposition parties will overcome present weaknesses or adopt more militant tactics, or that the guerrillas will be able to increase their capabilities significantly during this period. Furthermore, based on the outlook for coffee prices, 1956 will probably be a relatively good year economically for Colombia. (Paras. 55, 58)

9. Beyond 1956 the President’s prospects are less certain. The irreconcilable issues between the traditional parties on the one hand, and the government on the other, will probably increase political tension, in which case the chances for violence and public disorder will be greatly magnified. In this climate, the armed forces might oust Rojas Pinilla in an attempt to restore stability and preserve their continued control of the government. (Paras. 56, 60.)

10. The armed forces will remain united in their support of Rojas Pinilla only so long as the officers generally remain convinced that his leadership is effective and that he has not become a political liability. A great increase in political tensions accompanied by a serious deterioration in the economic situation would probably lead the armed forces to depose Rojas Pinilla. In this event, the nature and orientation of any successor government would almost certainly be determined by the armed forces. We are unable to estimate whether a successor government would be able to re-establish orderly political processes. (Para. 59)

11. Neither the Rojas Pinilla regime nor any probable successor is likely to alter Colombia’s policy of close cooperation with the United States in resisting Communism and maintaining peace in the Hemisphere. Colombia will almost certainly continue to support the West against the Soviet Bloc in the UN. However, Colombia’s current small volume of trade with the Soviet Bloc probably will expand somewhat, and diplomatic relations may be revived. (Para. 62)

Discussion

I. Introduction

12. The strategic importance of Colombia to the United States derives from its proximity to the Panama Canal. With over 12 million inhabitants, it ranks fourth in population (behind Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina) among the Latin American republics. About two-thirds of the population is of mixed blood (mestizo and mulatto). A large proportion is poverty stricken and illiterate. Political and economic power is in the hands of a small white elite. Agricultural pursuits occupy three-fifths of the employed. The axis of the economy is coffee production. Although Colombia has abundant land, mineral, and power resources, its economic development has been seriously handicapped by some of the most rugged topography in the world. Among Latin American nations, Colombia is the most intensely Catholic. Until 1948, it was also noted for the relative maturity and stability of its political institutions.

13. Until recently, control of Colombia’s institutional life by the landholding, merchant, military, and ecclesiastical elite was virtually unquestioned. Since early in the twentieth century constitutional successions had become the rule, with political office alternating between the traditional Conservative and Liberal parties, the former supporting strong central government and the temporal influence of the Church, the latter opposing both. Although local feuds often resulted from the deep-seated bitterness between the traditional parties, national politics were for the most part orderly and stable.

14. In terms of general Latin American politics, two institutions—the Church and the army—occupied peculiar positions in Colombia. The Church, largely through its association with the Conservative party, was politically more active and influential than in other countries of the area. On the other hand, the Colombian army, unlike those of most other Latin American republics, had generally refrained from active intervention in politics and had acquired a reputation as a guardian of constitutional processes.

15. From about the time of World War I, economic and social change began to modify the general political environment. Colombia took the first major steps towards economic development and diversification by encouraging consumer industries and by establishing a foreign-financed petroleum industry. The pace of economic growth and change was greatly accelerated from the thirties onward. Increasing industrialization brought about migration from rural areas to Colombia’s cities, and there began to emerge a more class-conscious urban labor force. The changing social pattern intensified existing party cleavages and began to undermine the old political order.

16. Liberal politicians led by Alfonso Lopez⁵ were the first to bid for the support of these new urban elements. The Liberal party, which promoted social reform along with industrialization and encouraged the organization of labor, was able to maintain itself in power as the majority party from 1930 to 1946. However, when labor elements led by Jorge Eliecer Gaitan demanded a larger voice in party councils, the old-line Liberal politicians refused. The result was a split in the Liberal party which enabled the minority Conservative party to win the election of 1946. Two years later Gaitan was assassinated and leftist elements within the Liberal party became splintered and ineffective.

17. The Conservatives, once returned to power, showed themselves even less capable than the Liberals of adapting to a changing social and political environment. Serious rifts in the Conservative party developed around the rivalry between the moderate President Ospina Perez (1946–1950) and Laureano Gomez, who held extremist authoritarian convictions. The latter won the Presidency in 1950 without united Conservative support in a controlled election in which the Liberals refused to participate.

18. The election of a minority Conservative government in 1946 ended the period of relative order and stability in Colombian political life and introduced a period of increasing violence and instability. The tension between Liberals and Conservatives resulted in an increasing number of political murders in the countryside. Against this background, the murder of Gaitan, in April 1948, touched off the famous “Bogotazo,” the spontaneous reaction of the leftist Liberal mob of Bogota against the Conservative regime, which was rendered the more spectacular because the ninth Inter-American Conference was then in session in Bogota.

19. Severe restrictions on constitutional liberties, pursuant to the state of siege declared in November 1949, provoked further violence in the countryside. Guerrilla fighting, supported by political die-hards, adventurers, outlaws, and some Communists, spread throughout most of the settled rural areas and into the sparsely populated llanos (plains) east of the Andes. President Gomez countered by further curbing political liberties and by converting the armed forces into instruments for the preservation of Conservative rule. By 1953, the conflict between the opposition and the government had reached a deadlock, with neither side capable of defeating the other and with tension so extreme as to preclude truce negotiations.

20. In this situation the army, under the command of General Rojas Pinilla, ousted President Gomez and took over the government in June 1953. This action was generally and enthusiastically welcomed by the populace which had lost confidence in its civilian political leadership. Rojas Pinilla, capitalizing on this reservoir of good will, virtually halted guerrilla activity through offers of amnesty and rehabilitation to guerrillas willing to surrender their arms. In addition, the new regime formulated a broad new program calling for economic aid to areas affected by civil strife, re-establishment of civil liberties, constitutional reform, improvement of living standards, and elections as soon as possible.

21. Despite this auspicious beginning, the new regime failed to alter the process of political deterioration. Rojas Pinilla showed little inclination to return power to the civilian parties, and instead displayed intentions to perpetuate himself in office. The state of siege was maintained, elections were postponed, and the civilian politicians were harassed by unprecedented radio and press controls, while administrative positions progressively passed into military hands. The promised economic and social benefits for large groups of the population were not forthcoming, and the pacification of the country was only temporary. A determined effort by the regime to organize its own political following among dissident members of the traditional parties and labor elements proved futile. The chief consequence of Rojas Pinilla’s increasingly authoritarian and politically ambitious policies has been a widening of the gap between the military government and the traditional civilian parties.

II. Present Situation

Political

22. The present Colombian government is an authoritarian regime under military control. Under Rojas Pinilla, army officers play a major role in the determination of national policy. The general staff, rather than the Cabinet, often decides affairs of state. Increasingly, the military are taking over both national and local administrative posts. Eleven of the sixteen governorships and many municipal mayoralties are already held by officers of the armed forces.

23. Rojas Pinilla’s tenure of power is dependent on the backing of the armed forces, including the police. Most of the officers have Conservative backgrounds, but they are loyal to Rojas Pinilla rather than the Conservative party. Although minor dissension in the armed forces has resulted from the regime’s methods of handling political, subversive, and corruption problems, disaffection has thus far been insufficient to threaten Rojas Pinilla’s control. Rather, military support has been for the most part firm, conditioned by realization of the ineffectiveness of civilian political leadership, by fear of possible chaos should Rojas Pinilla fall, and by appreciation of the material benefits and special privileges granted the armed forces by the regime. Under Rojas Pinilla, the armed forces have acquired virtually the status of a privileged caste.

24. Civilian support for the Rojas Pinilla regime is generally confined to disparate groups of political opportunists and labor malcontents. The President retains backing in the Conservative party only from one minority extremist faction and a scattering of personal followers. He also has some support from a dissident Liberal minority, chiefly of leftist orientation, and from a handful of socialists and labor leaders, including some Communists. Rojas Pinilla has persistently tried to use most of these groups to build up a popular following in the manner of former President Peron of Argentina. This endeavor has thus far been checked by the strongly adverse reactions of the traditional parties, labor, and the Church. Since Rojas Pinilla remains reluctant to force the issue in the face of this opposition, he has refrained from carrying out various schemes for the formal organization of a government-controlled third party or labor confederation.

25. At the same time, the traditional political parties remain incapable of exercising any effective political initiative. The Conservatives are split into four rival factions incapable of united action. The Liberals lack forceful leadership; the party is rendered ineffective by the tendency of its members toward either apathy or dissidence. Neither party has anything to propose, except a generalized demand for a return to representative constitutional government. Their activities are effectively controlled by the regime. Even the unrepresentative Constituent Assembly has not been allowed to meet since it elected Rojas Pinilla president for a four-year term in 1954. Consequently there is no legislature and no prospect of any elections. Party assemblies are prohibited, except for a few specially controlled occasions; political leaders are prevented from touring the countryside to revive party loyalties, as has been customary; political propaganda in the press has been suppressed. The government responded with violence to a recent spontaneous popular demonstration at the Bogota bull ring in recognition of Alberto Lieras Camargo,⁶ former president of Colombia and present chief of the Liberal party.

26. Neither of the traditional parties has advocated the overthrow of the regime by force. It appears that some prominent Liberals are planning to provide support to selected guerrilla groups, but most political leaders, including the top leadership of both parties, are inhibited by their memories of the destruction of life and property in the 1949–1953 civil disturbances, their awareness of the overwhelming military support enjoyed by the government, and their fears of bringing into play uncontrollable popular forces. Nevertheless, the traditional parties have been able to maintain political pressure upon Rojas Pinilla. Through propaganda and proposals for the restoration of political activity they have kept the government on the defensive. The acute sensitivity of the Rojas Pinilla government to criticism and the severity of its restrictive and punitive countermeasures are a measure of the effectiveness of this opposition political pressure.

27. The resultant political situation is a deadlock. The government is unable to broaden the base of its political support and unwilling to restore constitutional processes. The traditional parties, on the other hand, remain incapable of any effective political action except the denial of political support to the government.

28. Although the Catholic Church generally supports the present regime, it has been strongly critical of certain major government policies. The hierarchy has expressed disapproval of the government’s secondary school reforms, which it regarded as infringing on Church prerogatives in education, and it has denounced restrictions upon the freedom of expression, which have affected Catholic media of information. The most determined clerical opposition to the regime has come in response to Rojas’ efforts to build up a popular following in opposition to the traditional parties and to the Church-influenced labor unions.

29. The Colombian labor movement, always closely allied with the political parties, has never developed independent leadership. Liberal-oriented unions, formerly in the majority, declined and disintegrated. The Conservative-oriented and Church-influenced Union of Colombian Workers (UTC), which controls about one-half of the nation’s 500,000 organized workers, is the nation’s only important labor confederation. Though harassed by the government’s restrictions and controls, the UTC has nevertheless effectively opposed the organization of administration-sponsored unions. In the face of government discouragement of independent labor activity and the breakdown of the traditional political system, the majority of organized workers have become increasingly apathetic and are union members in name only.

30. Colombia’s propertied and commercial interests, which cut across party lines, are for the most part organized into functional associations which act as pressure groups and have a considerable voice in the determination of national policies. These special-interest organizations, most important of which are the National Federation of Coffee Growers, the National Association of Industrialists, and the National Federation of Merchants, are generally consulted by the government on legislation and policies affecting their interests. Although the influence of these groups is limited to economic issues, the sum total of their action tends to circumscribe the freedom of the government in matters of broad policy planning.

Subversive

31. Political unrest under the Rojas Pinilla regime has been accompanied by a resumption of guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla groups comprise a wide variety of elements with disparate and even conflicting aspirations: dissident members of the traditional parties intent upon undermining the Rojas Pinilla regime, Liberals and Conservatives waging the traditional partisan battle against each other, veterans and victims of the 1949–1953 civil war, bandits, and some Communist party members and sympathizers. There is no overall centralized direction of the guerrilla movement.

32. The real extent and seriousness of the guerrilla movement are difficult to assess. So far, only some 4,500 troops have been committed to guerrilla-infested areas. On the other hand, army officers have tended to exaggerate both the number of guerrillas and army successes in combatting them. Government officials, including the President, have also exaggerated guerrilla activities both to justify maintenance of the state of siege and to “prove” the regime’s progress towards restoring order. In addition, press censorship, official radio controls, and the very nature of the fighting make a precise assessment of the civil disorders impossible.

33. There are probably about 6,000 active guerrillas. The principal concentrations are in central and western Tolima and the adjacent mountainous regions of southern Caldas, Valle del Cauca, Cauca, and Huila, where almost 4,000 guerrillas are now operating (see map). Various small bands also operate in the Cauca and Magdalena River valleys and on the western edge of the llanos. The Colombian army claims that order has been restored in eastern Tolima and southern Cundinamarca, where guerrilla warfare assumed major proportions early in 1955, but sporadic outbreaks of violence still occur in those areas. A band of guerrillas in southern Boyaca appears to have been reduced.

34. In addition to the 6,000 active guerrillas, approximately 6,000 “ex-guerrillas” live quietly in southern Tolima and control their own affairs. The army is not attempting to reduce this area. Another largely inactive group is located along the Magdalena River valley.

35. The guerrillas are armed only with rifles, carbines, submachine guns, home-made hand grenades, and machetes. These weapons have been obtained in part from government sources, by theft or capture, and in part by smuggling from neighboring countries. The guerrillas normally operate in small bands, but on occasion groups of a hundred or more have clashed with army units. The guerrilla areas are isolated and rugged. The guerrillas control no lines of communication and are apparently incapable of dislodging army units from their present positions. Present guerrilla capabilities are apparently limited to the harassment of government forces and the pillaging of local farmers.

36. High government officials, including the President, contend that a large percentage of the guerrillas are Communist and are directed and assisted by the international Communist apparatus. While there is no reason to believe that any considerable number of the guerrillas are ideologically Communistic, there is evidence that the Colombian Communist Party (PCC) has been active in supplying certain guerrilla bands with arms, food, clothing, medicines, and money, as well as with political propaganda. By these means, it has extended its influence in the guerrilla movement and probably now exercises effective control over the leaders of possibly as many as half of the active guerrillas. Present Communist strategy, in connection with the guerrilla movement, is to develop local civilian “self-defense” committees. These committees are to take control of areas with good defensive possibilities, set up a relatively independent economy, carry out agrarian reforms, and eventually establish a “democratic government of national liberation” in such areas.

37. There is also evidence that certain Liberals are concerned regarding the trend toward Communist control of the guerrilla movement, which they attribute solely to Communist activity in supplying the material wants of the guerrillas, and are seeking to counter Communist influence by developing Liberal sources of supply for the guerrillas. Liberal influence among the guerrillas is potentially greater than that of the Communists, but the present Liberal party leadership is not disposed to sanction strong Liberal support of the guerrilla movement, for fear of expanding and intensifying civil disorder and violence.

38. Apart from potential leadership of the guerrilla movement, Communist capabilities in Colombia are extremely limited. In 1945 Communist candidates polled 27,000 votes (three percent of the total), but since then Communist political prestige has sharply declined. The PCC probably now has no more than 5,000 members and almost no political influence. In 1954 the government outlawed the “political activities of international Communism”; in March 1956 it declared the PCC itself illegal. Similarly, Communist influence in organized labor has declined. The Communist labor confederation (CTCI) does not now constitute an effective base for political action. Important influence in certain unions in the Barranquilla area is exercised by dissident Communists, most of whom currently support the Rojas Pinilla regime. We have no evidence of Communist influence in the armed forces.

Military

39. The Colombian armed forces are better organized, trained, and equipped than at any other time in the history of the country. The government continues to improve the effectiveness and prestige of the armed forces. To this end it has maintained US Army, Navy, and Air Force training missions, and has concluded a bilateral military assistance agreement with the US, thus making Colombia eligible for grant aid under the Mutual Security Act of 1951. Colombia has committed one infantry and one AA battalion, and four naval vessels for Hemisphere defense.

40. The army, numbering some 32,000 men, dominates the armed forces. Control of the navy, the air force, and the 18,000-man police force is traditionally vested in the top army leaders. The navy has 4,200 men and 32 vessels, of which the largest are two recently modernized escort destroyers. Delivery of two new destroyers from Sweden is expected in 1957. The air force has 3,200 men and 220 aircraft, the most effective of which are 37 piston fighters and 9 piston light bombers.

41. Most of the armed forces officers come from Conservative party families. Purges, retirements, and controls over appointments to the Military Academy have virtually eliminated officers with Liberal sympathies. Despite their Conservative background, armed forces officers are loyal to brother-officer Rojas Pinilla, rather than to the Conservative party. The President, in turn, looks out for the officers’ interests. Together, this “Government of the Armed Forces” rules Colombia.

42. The armed forces are capable of defending Colombia against invasion by the forces of any neighboring country and of maintaining the regime in power against any internal opposition. However, they have done little more than contain the guerrilla movement. At their present strength, it may be beyond their capabilities to eliminate guerrilla activities in the relatively inaccessible areas in which the guerrillas now operate. The small scale of the antiguerrilla effort (only 4,500 troops) appears to reflect a policy decision that it is both unnecessary and inexpedient to send major forces into the mountains in pursuit of them. The guerrillas cannot seriously threaten the regime without coming out into areas where the armed forces could operate against them with greater strength and effectiveness. Some consideration is being given to a plan to recruit a special force of up to 6,000 to hunt down the guerrillas. However, the Tolima governor’s recent proposal for a political rather than a military solution to the problem indicates a continued reluctance on the part of the government to take aggressive action against the guerrillas.

Economic

43. Coffee is the mainstay of the nation’s economy. Colombia is the world’s largest producer of mild coffee which is essential for commercial blending. It supplies 16 percent of all the coffee that moves in international trade, being second only to Brazil. It depends upon the export of coffee, and to a lesser extent petroleum and bananas, to obtain most of its requirements of industrial raw materials and manufactured goods. Because coffee accounts for one-half of the value of Colombian agricultural production and supplies over 80 percent of the country’s foreign exchange receipts, the nation’s economic situation has been highly sensitive to fluctuations in the international coffee market. In an effort to reduce this dependence, the post World War II governments have pursued vigorous policies of industrialization.

44. From 1945 to 1954 Colombia’s rate of economic growth steadily remained among the highest in Latin America, with an annual four percent per capita increase in GNP. The latter was estimated in 1954 at $3.4 billion of which industry accounted for 16 percent and agriculture 36 percent. Industry’s rate of growth was twice that of agriculture.

45. Colombia’s rapid growth was stimulated and maintained by a climate favorable to the expansion of foreign and domestic private investment and by an energetic public investment program. In the 1945 to 1954 period, an annual average of 18 percent of the gross income was devoted to investment. Approximately 11 percent of gross investment derived from foreign capital inflow, about half of which came from Eximbank and IBRD sources.

46. Between 1945 and 1953, Colombia was able to maintain an increasingly high level of imports. This was due to improvement in the terms of trade resulting largely from rising coffee prices, to the spending of international reserves accumulated during World War II, and to foreign loans and investments. During this period, while the annual volume of exports rose only 1.4 percent, the volume of imports expanded by 10 percent annually.

47. An abrupt drop in the world price of coffee in August 1954, however, posed a threat to Colombia’s development aspirations. In one year (June 1954–June 1955) spot prices in New York for Manizales coffee dropped one-fourth ($.85 to $.64 per pound). Receipts from coffee exports dropped from $524 million in 1954 to $465 million in 1955. As a result, Colombia’s foreign exchange position weakened. Arrears on foreign commercial obligations at the end of 1955 amounted to between $125 and $150 million.

48. Despite the reduction in earnings from coffee, the Rojas Pinilla regime has decided to maintain its development activities at a high level and to adhere to a large public works program and expansion of industry, even if this involves deficit financing. A domestic steel plant, constructed despite recommendations to the contrary by the IBRD, was opened in 1955, and plans were being made for the development of complementary industries. The government’s program for electrification, road, and railway building, as well as its ambitious Cauca Valley project, also continued apace. These expansionist operations were reflected in a sharp rise of the government’s internal debt from 489 million pesos at the end of 1954 to 880 million pesos by the end of November 1955. Moreover, the government is committed to support coffee prices to growers regardless of world prices which, it is estimated, will decline over the next few years.

49. Although these economic policies increased inflationary pressures, the country’s economic position remained fairly healthy in 1955. Relatively stable prices were maintained in large part by price controls and an absence of wage increases. Domestic producers were able to supply an increasingly large part of the demand for agricultural and manufactured goods. Coffee prices, though reduced, were still good. Early in 1956 the government began reducing its internal debt by selling its steel mill to private operators and by refunding operations. It also planned to restrict imports—but not so much as to hinder seriously its economic expansion—in order to liquidate outstanding commercial arrears accumulated as a result of expanded imports and reduced foreign exchange earnings during the last half of 1954 and 1955.

International Relations

50. In the first two decades of the twentieth century, relations between Colombia and the United States were strained because Colombia attributed the loss of Panama to US intervention, but ties have been cemented in the past generation. The role of the US in Colombia’s economic development has expanded rapidly; both as a trading partner and as a source of investment, the US is more important to Colombia than all other countries combined. Colombia has shown strong support for the inter-American system and has ranked high among the Latin American nations in backing the US position in the East-West struggle. Colombia was the only Latin American nation to contribute forces to the United Nations Command in Korea (one infantry battalion and one escort vessel).

51. However, in the United Nations, Colombia, along with other Latin American nations, has often opposed the US in voting on economic, colonial, and trusteeship issues. In the Organization of American States, although Colombia has generally supported US political and defense objectives, it has also been critical of US economic policies, and like the other Latin American republics, it resents the fact that US assistance programs have favored European and Asian nations.

52. The most serious issue in Colombian-US relations arises from the anti-Protestant policies of the government and of the Catholic Church. Several instances of violence to the life and property of US Protestant missionaries have recently occurred. Despite formal protests by the United States, the Rojas Pinilla government has neither reprimanded the guilty nor taken action to insure freedom of worship as guaranteed by the Constitution. The US-Colombian Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, signed in 1951, has not been ratified because of the Colombian Catholic hierarchy’s fears that it would give Protestants equal rights with Catholics.

53. Colombia’s ties with the Soviet Bloc are not close. It severed relations with the USSR in May 1948 following the Bogota rioting. In 1955 Colombia and Czechoslovakia agreed to establish consular relations. Trade with the Bloc is insignificant. There are no official trade and payments agreements and only a limited exchange of goods with Czechoslovakia and East Germany.

54. Colombia’s relations with other Latin American countries have been generally friendly. It has taken the initiative in attempts to strengthen economic ties with neighboring Venezuela, Ecuador, and Panama, all of which originally formed part of Gran Colombia. Colombia and Ecuador maintain particularly close ties based upon historical and economic considerations and their mutual distrust of Peru. Colombia’s antagonism toward Peru dates from 1931, when Peruvian troops attempted to seize Leticia, Colombia’s remote port on the Amazon River (see map). It became more acute as a result of Peru’s efforts, in violation of Latin American custom regarding political asylum, to force Colombia to surrender Haya de la Torre, a Peruvian opposition leader who took refuge in the Colombian embassy in Lima in 1949. That affair was finally settled in 1954, but tension between the two countries continues in consequence of Colombia’s demonstrated sympathy with Ecuador in Ecuador’s boundary dispute with Peru. Colombia’s generally amicable relations with Venezuela have been ruffled in the past several years by rival claims to a small group of offshore islets and by Venezuela’s friendly attitude towards Peru.

III. Probable Future Developments

55. We believe that Rojas Pinilla will remain in office at least through 1956. The military will almost certainly continue to support the regime. It is unlikely that the opposition parties will overcome present weaknesses or adopt more militant tactics or that the guerrillas will be able to increase their capabilities significantly during this period. Furthermore, based on the present outlook for coffee prices, 1956 will probably be a relatively good year economically for Colombia.

56. Beyond 1956, Rojas Pinilla’s prospects are less certain. The irreconcilable issues between the traditional parties on the one hand, and the government on the other, will probably increase political tension, in which case the chances for violence and public disorder will be greatly magnified. The traditional parties are likely to maintain and even to increase pressure for the re-establishment of the constitutional process. In response to this pressure the administration is likely to resort to increasingly repressive measures against its critics from either of the two parties. The political isolation of the government is likely to become accentuated. In this climate the armed forces might oust Rojas Pinilla in an attempt to restore stability and preserve their continued control of the government.

57. The Rojas Pinilla regime will probably be unable to eliminate the guerrilla movement although, by increased effort, it may be able to restrict further the area of guerrilla activities. Further deterioration of the political situation would tend to increase the number and activity of the guerrillas. Communist influence among the guerrillas is likely to increase, and, with Communist coordination and direction, guerrilla operations may become more effective, but the guerrillas cannot seriously threaten the regime without coming out into areas where the armed forces could operate against them more effectively. Only if the Liberals were to give the guerrilla movement substantial support and leadership would it be likely to become a serious danger to the regime within the period of this estimate.

58. On the economic front, it is unlikely that the price of coffee will decline sufficiently to force the government to curb substantially its expansionist policies during 1956. We also believe that the nation’s development boom has enough momentum to insure continued increases in foreign investment, domestic industrial growth, and GNP. Assuming judicious use of available exchange resources and barring any reckless increase of deficit financing by the government, the monetary authorities will probably be able to maintain a fairly stable balance of payments position and keep domestic inflationary forces under control. However, the regime will eventually face additional problems if, as anticipated, world coffee prices decline appreciably over the next few years. In this case, the government would be faced with the problem of either continuing expansionist policies by increasing taxes and reducing subsidies to coffee producers, or of effecting an unpopular retrenchment.

59. The armed forces will remain united in their support of Rojas Pinilla only as long as the officers generally remain convinced that his leadership is effective and that he has not become a political liability. A great increase in political tensions accompanied by serious deterioration in the economic situation would probably lead the armed forces to depose Rojas Pinilla. In this event the nature and orientation of any successor government will almost certainly be determined by the armed forces. We are unable to estimate whether a successor government would be able to re-establish orderly political processes.

60. Rojas Pinilla has announced that the state of siege will not be lifted and that elections will not be held during his tenure of office. These policies will almost certainly precipitate a political crisis as the expiration of the President’s term of office on 7 August 1958 approaches.

61. Increasing Communist influence in the guerrilla movement could have great political significance in the very long run, but it is not likely that the Communists could, by this means, become a serious contender for political power in Colombia within the period of this estimate. They might, however, become able to exact political concessions as the price of a cessation of guerrilla activities, particularly if and when the Rojas Pinilla regime were overthrown by other political forces.

62. Neither the Rojas Pinilla regime nor any probable successor is likely to alter Colombia’s policy of close cooperation with the United States in resisting Communism and maintaining peace in the Hemisphere. Colombia will almost certainly continue to rank high among the Latin American republics in support of the West as against the Soviet Bloc in the United Nations. However, Colombia’s current small volume of trade with the Soviet Bloc probably will expand somewhat and diplomatic relations may be revived. Although it is unlikely that the Rojas Pinilla regime will withdraw its support of the Church’s campaign against Protestant activity, it is almost certain that the generally friendly diplomatic relations and close economic ties between Colombia and the United States will continue.

1. Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) were high-level interdepartmental reports presenting authoritative appraisals of vital foreign policy problems. NIEs were drafted by officers from those agencies represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), discussed and revised by interdepartmental working groups coordinated by the Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), approved by the IAC, and circulated under the aegis of the CIA to the President, appropriate officers of cabinet level, and the National Security Council. The Department of State provided all political and some economic sections of NIEs.
2. According to a note on the cover sheet, “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff. Concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on 10 April 1956.” W. Park Armstrong summarized NIE 88–56 in a memorandum to Secretary Dulles dated April 27. (Ibid., Central Files, 721.00/4–2756)
3. Not printed.
4. In a memorandum to Bernbaum and King of ARA, dated April 11, Gerberich commented on this paragraph regarding Communist control of guerrilla forces in Colombia. He stated, “I do not believe our Embassy’s reporting is in agreement with the inference made in that [final] sentence. I have written the Embassy to request a more precise statement on the subject, and until I receive it I am still going on the assumption that Communist control over so great a number of men is far from proved, and probably incorrect.” (Department of State, Central Files, 721.00/4–1156) No record of a response from the Embassy in Colombia has been found in Department of State files.
5. Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo, President of Colombia, 1934–1938.
6. Lleras Camargo, President of Colombia, 1945–1946.