167. Memorandum From the Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs (Meeker) to the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge)1
SUBJECT
- Admission of New Members
Problems
In pursuing the admission of 17 rather than 18 new members, the US is confronted by the following problems among others:
- (1)
- Soviet fear that somehow there will be insufficient votes, particularly in the Security Council, to elect Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania;
- (2)
- the reported French position to veto all applicants except Italy, unless the Assembly rules are amended to require a two-thirds’ vote for inscription of items;
- (3)
- the inclination of many UN members to vote for 18 new members for fear that omitting Outer Mongolia will result in no deal; and
- (4)
- the Chinese threat to veto Outer Mongolia, which if carried out, and if it were the last obstacle to Outer Mongolia’s admission, could result in collapse of the effort to admit new members—with serious repercussions on the issue of Chinese representation, particularly for the US.
A possible tactic
The dangers inherent in these problems might be minimized and even averted by the following course of action, assuming continued lack of agreement with the USSR that Outer Mongolia may be dropped from the package: one or more members of the Security Council (perhaps preferably seven members, including the US) would introduce a proposal to recommend the 17 for admission. This would be done early enough to give the proposal priority over any others. The US would stand back of this proposal, and make it clear that we proposed to have Outer Mongolia considered separately—on its own, with the US abstaining and not vetoing, and with the US and USSR competing in the open market for votes on Outer Mongolia.
Probable consequences of this tactic
Disadvantages. For the US to follow this course would involve us in active support of four satellites (rather than abstention and benign neutrality); however, this distinction would probably not be important to the American public or opinion elsewhere. This course would emphasize the package character of the whole membership arrangement (in contradistinction to the point we have made that each applicant must be considered on its individual merits; but, here again, the realities are too well known to make a purist position really important for the United States.
Advantages. The tactics described above would abolish any Soviet fear that the four European satellites would get lost in the shuffle. It would maximize whatever difficulties stand in the way of a French veto; France would be having to veto all 17, including Italy. Admittedly, the tactic would facilitate a Chinese veto of Outer Mongolia by separating out this one applicant. However, the reasonableness and appeal of the US proposal might be sufficient to induce enough abstentions on Outer Mongolia in the Security Council to make a Chinese veto academic and even unnecessary.
Procedure in the Council
If a resolution to recommend 17 applicants were introduced in the Security Council, the USSR might counter by (a) an amendment to add Outer Mongolia to the package, or (b) a resolution to recommend 18.
- (a)
-
Theoretically, an amendment could be shelved by a decision to postpone consideration under paragraph 30 of Rule 60 in the Security Council Rules. But such a decision would require seven affirmative votes (and not merely five abstentions). Also, a move of this kind could evoke an unfavorable reaction by letting it appear [Page 372] that the US would not allow the USSR its day in court on Outer Mongolia. However, the possibility should be kept in reserve, if postponement appeared more practically possible, vote-wise, than defeating the amendment through abstentions.
Five abstentions would defeat an amendment to add Outer Mongolia, if the amendment were directly voted on.
- (b)
- If the Soviets introduced a resolution to recommend 18 applicants, we should meet this by having our proposal voted on first. If it carried, the Soviet proposal could be allowed to fail through abstentions, as its only substantive effect would be to add Outer Mongolia.
Conclusion
An affirmative resolution to recommend 17, backed and even sponsored by the US, would have the fundamental advantage of requiring the Soviets to veto the whole list if they insist on Outer Mongolia and cannot get enough votes in the open market. The onus would then be put, dramatically, where it would belong.
- Source: USUN Files,IO, Membership. Secret.↩