Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume XI

168. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Chinese Ambassador (Koo) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson), Department of State, Washington, November 17, 1955¹

Washington, November 17, 1955

SUBJECT

• Chinese Position on Outer Mongolia’s Candidacy for Admission to the United Nations

The Chinese Ambassador, during a call at his request, stated under instruction his Government’s position on Outer Mongolia’s candidacy for the United Nations.² He said that Outer Mongolia’s independence was a consequence of the Yalta Agreement and of the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty, with respect to both of which the US had a measure of responsibility. His Government was opposed to the admission of any of the satellites. China would, however, abstain on the four Eastern European satellites if Outer Mongolia were not included in the deal. If, however, Outer Mongolia came up for a vote in the Security Council, China would use its veto if necessary to prevent Outer Mongolia’s admission. In that case, China would also vote against the admission of the four European satellites but would ask that its negative votes not be considered as vetoes. His Government strongly hoped that it could count upon the publicly expressed support of the US Government in this position with respect to Outer Mongolia.

Mr. Robertson, after stating that the US shared China’s views with respect to the satellites, explained the reasons underlying our position on membership along the lines of Ambassador Lodge’s press statement of November 13. He commented that if the four European satellites obtained seven affirmative votes, China’s negative vote would constitute a veto and that in these circumstances China would have to abstain if it were to avoid vetoing the satellites.

The Ambassador asked whether the US would be prepared to support China in vetoing Outer Mongolia. Mr. Robertson replied that we were opposed to the admission of Outer Mongolia; that we were now doing all that we could in New York to ensure that Outer Mongolia would not be included; and that we found it difficult to believe that Outer Mongolia would have sufficient support to make the use of the veto a practical question. If Outer Mongolia did not receive the necessary support, we also hesitated to believe that the USSR would stand in the way of the admission of the other applicants but so far the USSR was insistent. The whole membership question was at present under active discussion in New York. Mr. Robertson continued that he was inclined to believe that the spirit of the Vandenberg Resolution would preclude our using the veto on membership. He realized, however, that the question was whether, the Chinese Government having decided to use its veto if necessary to prevent the admission of Outer Mongolia, the US would let China bear the full brunt of world opinion alone. This situation presented serious problems both for China and the US and the matter should be placed before the Secretary after his return. Mr. Robertson emphasized that we continued to hope that the use of the veto on Outer Mongolia would not be a practical problem but the possibility could not be entirely ruled out that in certain circumstances we might have to ask the Chinese Government to consider whether it might not abstain rather than veto Outer Mongolia’s application. He added that he hoped that we would not have to make any such request of the Chinese Government.

Ambassador Koo urged strongly his Government’s hope that whatever course we took we would make clear publicly our opposition to Outer Mongolia and our sympathetic support of the Chinese Government’s position.

He then turned to another topic which is reported separately.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310/11–1755. Confidential. Drafted by Bacon.
2. A paraphrase of the instructions sent Ambassador Koo by the Government of the Republic of China was transmitted to the Department in telegram 462 from Taipei, November 17. This telegram reported that a copy of the instructions to Koo were “supplied to Embassy this morning” by the Republic of China. (Ibid., 310.2/11–1755)