Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume XI

169. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, November 18, 1955—3 p.m.

Delga 309. Eyes only for the Secretary and Wilcox from Lodge. Subject: Membership, re Dulte 74.² Before a formal meeting of the Security Council on admission of new members is held (which must be next week), we should have explored and be fully prepared for possible procedures in the Council so as to protect our basic objectives regarding membership. I understand these to be:

(1) The admission of 13 countries (under the conditions the Secretary has already prescribed) which we consider qualified and which include Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Japan;

(2) The exertion of all feasible efforts to prevent the admission of Outer Mongolia;

(3) To secure recognition and credit for the United States in bringing an end to the UN membership deadlock;

(4) To prevent the US being blamed for a failure;

(5) To avoid repercussions from the membership question which would adversely affect our efforts to ensure the continued seating of the Chinese Nationalists; for example, to prevent a situation arising in which Chinese Nationalists veto torpedos the membership deal, thus creating a demand to seat the Chinese Communists with consequent disruptive effects on Anglo-American relations and US opinion.

Certain immediate problems in the membership situation which have tactical consequences for US are: (a) the reported French intention to veto all applicants except Italy, unless the Assembly rules are amended to require a two-thirds vote for inscription of items; (b) the Chinese threat to veto Outer Mongolia, which if carried out, and if it were the last obstacle to Outer Mongolia’s admission, could result in collapse of the whole effort to admit new members—with serious repercussions on the issue of Chinese representation, particularly for the United States; (c) Soviet unwillingness to agree to the dropping of Outer Mongolia, except possibly in return for the rejection of Spain, coupled with the Soviet fear that somehow there will be insufficient votes (particularly in the Security Council) to elect Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania; and (d) the inclination of many UN members to vote for 18 applicants, out of fear that rejecting Outer Mongolia will result in no admission at all, or in the exclusion of Spain.

The course of action outlined below can minimize and perhaps even avert the worst dangers inherent in these problems. It aims to save the United States from the charge and onus of preventing a solution of the membership problem and at the same time is an effort to give effect to the position announced in my statement of last Sunday. It would also make clear to the world the arbitrariness and intransigence of Soviet policy in contrast to the reasonableness of our own, and would bring us credit for making possible the entry into the UN of a number of valuable new members, with some of whom we have very close ties and who as you have said would hold the US accountable if they are not admitted.

Subject to prior consultation with France and other SC members and a firm agreement with Chinese Nationalists not to veto stage 5, I propose following procedure:

(1) That the United States introduce in the Security Council (early enough to gain priority in voting) a resolution recommending the admission of 17 countries;

(2) If the Soviets propose an amendment to add Outer Mongolia to the list, that we move for a Council decision that the vote on the amendment shall not be taken until after the rest of the list has been voted upon;

(3) If the French or Belgians move to divide, we resist;

(4) That we seek the adoption by the Council of the resolution recommending 17 countries, and that the amendment on Outer Mongolia be defeated by arranging for at least 5 abstentions;

(5) If, as we must probably anticipate, the resolution on the 17 fails because of the Soviet veto, that a member of the Council introduce a proposal to recommend 18 countries, including Outer Mongolia; the United States would make a statement and vote for this proposal.

The course outlined above obviously entails certain disadvantages. For one thing, in presenting a proposal to admit 17 countries, we would be appearing actively to support 4 satellites, rather than abstaining and remaining benignly neutral. Such a distinction, however, seems not to be real with public opinion. For the United States to introduce a resolution recommending the admission of 17 countries together would emphasize the “package” character of our approach (as against the point we have made since 1946 that each applicant must be considered on its individual merits). But, here again the realities of the situation are pretty well known.

Other disadvantages are: difficulties with France and charge that in view of known Soviet attitude on Outer Mongolia we were using membership question as political football in cold war.

These drawbacks seem to be outweighed by other considerations. Introduction by the US of a resolution to recommend 17 applicants would abolish any Soviet fear that the 4 European satellites would get lost in the shuffle. It would also maximize whatever difficulties stand in the way of a French veto, since France would be having to veto all 17 countries covered by the resolution, including Italy, although she could move to divide. It protects Spain and Japan by preventing these countries from being eliminated in a series of individual votes.

By having a vote taken first on the 17, we would compel the Soviet Union to veto them (if the USSR goes through with its threat of a veto) before the fate of Outer Mongolia’s application had been decided. Of course, it might have proven necessary to move and decide that the Council should pronounce itself on Outer Mongolia’s application after the 17 and not before. I am hopeful that 7 votes could be obtained in the Council for reaching a procedural decision that a Soviet amendment on Outer Mongolia should be voted on after the Council’s vote on a resolution recommending 17 countries. If, as we must probably expect, the USSR would veto the 17, there would be no problem in defeating Outer Mongolia on a subsequent vote. The question of a Chinese veto here would be academic.

As to the last stage in the course of action outlined above, there might be no occasion for a Council member at that time to introduce a resolution recommending 18 countries including Outer Mongolia; the USSR might already have introduced such a resolution, which under the rules would be voted on after the US resolution to recommend 17. Regardless of the manner in which such a proposal came before the Council, the United States would make a statement attacking the Soviet position, emphasizing the reasonableness of the United States attitude, and pointing to the desirability of admitting to membership in the UN a large number of qualified countries whose entry should no longer be delayed.

In the vote on the resolution proposing admission of 18, we would, of course, be faced with the problem of a Chinese veto. However, the Chinese attitude might be a little different on a resolution covering 18 countries than on a vote concerned with Outer Mongolia alone, where China has said it will veto (Taipei’s 462³), although she too can move to divide. It would also by that time have been demonstrated to China that we had gone as far as we dared in jeopardizing a solution of the membership problem in trying to prevent Outer Mongolia’s admission. It would be of the greatest importance—and to safeguard the Republic of China’s continued existence—that the contemplated procedure be taken up in advance with the Republic of China urgently on the highest level, with a view to securing Chinese abstention on a resolution covering 18 countries, which would be the very last resort in efforts to break the membership deadlock.

If the Soviets introduced a resolution for 18 before we introduced a resolution for 17, we could try to gain the same effects as those described above through the following procedure:

(1) A move to have Outer Mongolia considered by the Security Council after the rest of the list; in effect a motion to divide;

(2) A vote on the 17, which we must assume the USSR would veto;

(3) Rejection of the Outer Mongolian application; and

(4) A vote on a new resolution covering 18 countries.

The Soviets, particularly for Latin American consumption, have indicated that Spain could not be admitted if Outer Mongolia were not admitted. This may be essentially a device to stimulate Latin votes for Outer Mongolia. It may not represent a serious Soviet proposition to delete Spain in return for the deletion of Outer Mongolia, as the Russians are doubtless aware of the Latin threat to wreck any membership arrangement if Spain is not included.

Would like your views just as soon as possible on the above strategy and tactics. In light of Kuznetsov press conference yesterday doubt that it is possible to reach agreement with Soviets on package of 17 even with US introducing and supporting proposal of this sort. For this reason, and because approach to Soviets along this line might only serve to indicate to them that US is over-anxious, I would prefer to move quickly in SC without letting Soviets know what we plan to do. Some confusion for Soviets may result, in which their blackmail, if they stick to it would appear in worst light because they would be vetoing the 17 at a stage when the fate of Outer Mongolia was not certain; US might emerge in not too bad a light. We should not show our hand on last stage of proposal until this was reached in SC; to do otherwise would obviously undermine earlier phase of operation directed against Outer Mongolia.

To sum up: I believe that plan described above is the most auspicious way for extricating ourselves from a very prickly situation. For a Chinese veto to be generally regarded as being the cause of failure to solve the membership deadlock could raise the issue of Chinese representation in a more acute and difficult form than we have ever known. Apart from the very serious impact of such a development on the United States, we must not be held responsible for the failure of a number of free world countries to secure entry to the UN. There are indications that China is fully aware of the dangers in this situation, and that the Chinese may therefore not wish to carry to its extreme the threatened veto of Outer Mongolia which would jeopardize Republic of China’s whole future status in the UN. Particularly if the ultimate vote is a single vote on a list of 18, China might be willing to refrain from a veto. I believe it of great importance that our plan for handling the membership situation should be urgently taken up with President Chiang Kai-shek, to persuade him the common interest of our two countries requires us to follow this course.

Request authority to introduce 17–nation motion now, so that it will have priority of voting in SC. I can later withdraw motion if after further study you deemed it undesirable. I propose public statement somewhat as follows:

“The United States is proposing a motion covering 17 nations because we believe, after careful study, that this is the most effective way to be sure that none of the free nations in whom we are interested is left behind, and because it prevents any question of bad faith in carrying out the membership plan.”

Press officer can background the newspaper men to the effect that we are thinking of Italy, and Spain and Japan and so on.

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–1855. Secret; Niact.
2. Document 159.
3. See footnote 2, supra.