181. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State1
490. Deptels 304, 305, 308.2 President’s and Secretary’s message re Outer Mongolia were in President Chiang’s hands one o’clock this afternoon. He expressed thanks and said he would reply as soon as possible.
Meanwhile I had further discussion with Foreign Minister after he had read above messages and was given substance of Department’s 308.
Yeh3 indicated GRC position adamant. Chiang is influenced largely by domestic considerations, he said, particularly reaction in Legislative Yuan. Foreign Minister’s own opposition to Outer Mongolia equally strong on international grounds. In fact would continue oppose even if President Chiang should relent, of which there is no indication.
Foreign Minister admitted Chinese are “emotionally involved” in present case. But he has given it most careful study during past week and is convinced GRC has no alternative but to veto if necessary to keep Outer Mongolia out. At worst, he said, effect on GRC would be no more that to shorten somewhat prospective time during which Free China can remain in UNO. Trends established past year or so make entry of Chinese Communists regime into UNO inevitable, he believed unless reversal takes place of which no present prospect. Yeh noted Chiang remarked yesterday that GRC might as well get out of UNO and avoid giving US so much trouble.
Minister fails to understand how Soviets could be allowed to get away with making entry of free nations contingent upon actual acceptance of Outer Mongolia. GRC was taking no such extreme positions; it was simply opposing the entry of one puppet for which Soviets were applying. Also he could not understand how Ambassador Lodge’s November 13 statement4 could have been made without previously establishing whether Outer Mongolia could in fact “make the grade”. Moreover, he did not believe all was necessarily lost if US made sufficient effort to line up votes; Turkey, Peru and France should be willing to go along with US and GRC.
Last two sentences in previous paragraph illustrate frame of mind with which Foreign Minister returned from recent extended [Page 395] American visit. He has distinct impression US interest in and willingness to support GRC definitely waning. That present impasse over Outer Mongolia was permitted to come about he regards as further evidence in that direction.5
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–2355. Secret.↩
- Telegrams 304 and 305 are printed as Documents 176 and 177. Telegram 308 is not printed, but see footnote 2, Document 178.↩
- George Kung-chao Yeh, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China.↩
- See Document 160.↩
- Delga 357 from USUN, November 25, reported that T.F. Tsiang visited Lodge at Tsiang’s request. It reads: “He has been asked to transmit his views on membership situation to his government in order to help Chiang decide how to answer President’s letter. After studying all the pros and cons he has decided to recommend that if by abstaining on four European satellites a membership deal could be made, he would abstain on the four satellites but would veto Outer Mongolia. If this is not possible he wants to veto all five communist countries because that would put him on the ‘ground of principle’ whereas vetoing Outer Mongolia alone would appear merely ‘expedient.’ In any event he wants to veto Outer Mongolia.” When Lodge noted all the dangers inherent in the situation, Tsiang admitted them while maintaining his position that this decision would certainly weaken his government’s position in the United Nations, but that it was necessary to keep faith with anti-communist Mongolians. (Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–2555)↩