177. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China1
305. Request you convey following message urgently to President Chiang Kai-shek from Secretary:
“I have received and considered most carefully the views of your Government, as presented to Mr. Robertson by Ambassador Koo2 and also as transmitted to Ambassador Rankin, on the situation which may arise over Outer Mongolia during Security Council voting on the membership problem. The issue is so serious for both our Governments that I wish to give you my views fully.
Our opposition to the Soviet satellites has been expressed repeatedly and there can be no doubt that we share your views as to their lack of qualifications. It has, however, become increasingly apparent that some solution must be found for the UN membership problem. In an effort to break the membership deadlock and meet the increasing pressures for the admission of qualified candidates to the UN excluded by Soviet vetoes, we announced on November 13 our willingness to refrain from use of the veto on the satellites. This position is in accord with the general spirit of the Vandenberg Resolution which was overwhelmingly approved by the U.S. Senate in 1948 and which looked toward a general agreement among the permanent members not to use the veto on membership questions. As Ambassador Lodge indicated, we then believed that Outer Mongolia would receive so little support that the question of a veto would not arise.
Negotiations on membership are now in progress in New York. While it is possible that the USSR may not stand in the way of the admission of other applicants if Outer Mongolia is not assured admission, or that the necessary votes for its admission may not be forthcoming in the Security Council, our estimate is that the USSR will make the admission of the qualified applicants turn upon admission of Outer Mongolia. In such circumstances we believe that the intense desire of the overwhelming majority of UN members for a solution of the membership problem, and specifically for the admission of such candidates as Austria, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ceylon, Ireland, and others, will be so great that the needed votes will probably be forthcoming for Outer Mongolia.
[Page 390]In view of this probability I feel that I must in frankness inform you that in these circumstances the US would not use its veto to stand in the way of the will of the great majority on this issue. If, in this situation, China were to cast a veto, thus preventing the admission of the qualified applicants, the consequences for China’s continued position in the UN would be of the utmost seriousness. While the Chinese representation question was carried successfully at the beginning of this General Assembly under the moratorium arrangement, you can, I believe, foresee the disastrous consequences which might be expected, perhaps at once, if China’s veto were to be decisive to prevent solution of the membership issue when every other Permanent Member will be renouncing its right to veto despite its strong objection to one or more of the candidates.
I believe that world opinion will understand and respect the position of our two Governments if, in the interests of the whole, we do not permit the hoped-for goal of admission of 13 qualified applicants to be blocked over Outer Mongolia. Accordingly, I express my strong hope that you will see your way clear to instruct the Chinese Delegation not to employ the veto to obstruct a solution of the membership problem. Your Delegation could, of course, explain its position fully as the US Delegation would also expect to do, so that we would not seem to be giving moral support or approval to these satellites.
I am, with best regards,
Very sincerely yours,”
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–2255. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Brown and Bacon. Cleared by Wilcox, Robertson, and Phleger. Approved for transmission by Dulles.↩
- See Document 168.↩