Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume XI

185. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations¹

Washington, November 26, 1955—6:33 p.m.

374. Eyes only Ambassador Lodge. Chinese Embassy today delivered President Chiang Kai-shek’s reply to President Eisenhower’s letter (Deptel 304 to Taipei²) regarding Chinese position on admission Outer Mongolia to UN. Following is verbatim text:

“I have the pleasure in acknowledging the receipt of your telegraphic message and a separate message from Secretary Dulles, both of which were transmitted to me by Ambassador Rankin on November 22. I must thank you for the views you have expressed in the message regarding the admission of new members to the United Nations. I agree with you that the issue is of such importance to both our countries that we should try to avoid division in this matter.

As a consistent supporter and loyal member of the United Nations, my Government, apart from its responsibility toward its people, has the responsibility and obligation of upholding the principles of the Charter. Only two days ago, I explained in detail to Ambassador Rankin in the presence of my Foreign Minister our position regarding the admission of Outer Mongolia and requested him to convey my views to the State Department. In reply to your message, I wish to further clarify my position and sincerely hope that you will give it the most sympathetic consideration.

Outer Mongolia had been a part of the territory of the Republic of China until it became detached from her as a result of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, which we entered into on the well-intentioned advice of the United States Government. Without the Sino-Soviet Treaty, there would not have been an independent Outer Mongolia and the question of the admission of Outer Mongolia to the United Nations may not have arisen. When we agreed to the independence of Outer Mongolia, it was our hope to trade for thirty years of amity and peace with Soviet Russia so that we could devote ourselves to the task of national rehabilitation and reconstruction. Subsequent events, however, dealt a blow to such hopes. Soviet Russia, using Outer Mongolia as the base of operation, committed further aggression against the Province of Sinkiang and the North Eastern Provinces and later openly aided the Chinese Communist rebellion resulting finally in the Communist occupation of the mainland. To this day the Chinese people recall the Government’s decision in agreeing to the independence of Outer Mongolia with censure and reprobation. Since the admission of Outer Mongolia became an issue in the United Nations, official views and public sentiments have been firmly opposed to the possibility of such admission. Should our representative on the Security Council fail to prevent the admission of Outer Mongolia, the whole nation as well as the loyal Chinese overseas would not only lose faith in the Government, but would also feel sadly disappointed at their long trusted ally.

Since the abrogation of the Sino-Soviet Treaty, the circumstances in which the Republic of China had agreed to the independence of Outer Mongolia no longer existed. It is therefore our view that the ultimate disposition of Outer Mongolia should be deferred to the future. If under Soviet pressure it is now admitted to the United Nations, it would amount to collective recognition and perpetuation of its present status, thus precluding the possibility of any other settlement. This is a matter which concerns our vital interests. It is analogous to our claim to sovereignty over the Chinese mainland.

The regime of Outer Mongolia is in every way a Soviet creation. Both in domestic and foreign affairs it is under rigid Soviet control. It is far from possessing the membership qualifications as provided in the Charter. As you are well aware, Soviet Russia has in the past few years made repeated attempts to secure the admission of the Peiping Communist regime. Thanks to the leadership of the United States and the support of the democratic countries, such attempts have so far been defeated. Soviet Russia has now changed its tactics by insisting on the admission of Outer Mongolia in order to pave the way for the eventual admission of the Peiping puppet regime. The success of this new maneuvre would lead to serious consequences. I am not unaware that if Outer Mongolia is prevented admission by our use of veto in the Security Council, it may adversely affect our position in the United Nations. But should we fail to block the admission of Outer Mongolia, the consequences would be equally, if not more, disastrous to us. For us thus to recognize the fruits of aggression is to abandon our basic stand as a nation. For the United Nations to admit to membership such a puppet regime in total disregard of the principles of the Charter would further undermine its prestige.

With regard to the problem of the admission of new members as a whole, we are prepared, in consideration of the keen desire of the United States to reach an early settlement and the wish of the free applicant nations, to adopt a conciliatory and tolerant stand. We are even prepared not to oppose the admission of the four Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe and to agree to the admission of thirteen free nations in spite of the fact that some of those nations have in fact recognized the Peiping Communist regime. I hope you will agree that despite the extremely difficult position in which we are placed, we are making a genuine effort to cooperate with your Government to the best of our ability.

Collective admission of new members is clearly a violation of the relevant Charter provisions; it further contradicts the advisory opinion rendered by the International Court of Justice. It may be recalled that both our Governments have in the past registered opposition to such a procedure. It is apparent that your Government is now prepared to change its stand out of consideration for the need to enable a number of nations to be admitted to the United Nations. We have no desire to block the admission of all the applicant nations. Our only objection lies with Outer Mongolia. Soviet Russia, on the other hand, now threatens to bar the admission of all the thirteen free nations unless Outer Mongolia is simultaneously admitted. Therefore it is Soviet Russia and not the Republic of China that indulges in the abuse of the veto. As the leader of the free nations and a loyal member of the United Nations, it is for the United States to rally other member States in exerting pressure upon Soviet Russia to desist from making the admission of all the other applicants turn upon that of Outer Mongolia. Should that fail, the Republic of China, in order to safeguard her own interests, would be forced to employ the only means at her disposal to prevent the admission of Outer Mongolia.

I have always placed Sino-American friendship above other considerations in our conduct of foreign affairs. Our two countries should maintain closest cooperation, especially at this critical juncture. I have repeatedly told Secretary Dulles that the Republic of China is always prepared to accede to the proposals and requests of the United States regarding the settlement of international problems if by so doing it would be beneficial to the United States without affecting China’s vital interests. In fact, the Republic of China has even more than once compromised her position in order to achieve a common stand with the United States, as evidenced by the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty, the evacuation of Tachen Islands, and concessions made on other occasions. But the question of the admission of Outer Mongolia would so seriously affect the vital interests of the Republic of China that I deeply regret that I am unable to comply with your wish that our Delegation to the United Nations be instructed to refrain from using the veto against the application of Outer Mongolia for membership unless some other solution is found.”³ End verbatim text.

Hoover

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–2655. Secret; Niact.
2. Document 176.

3. Telegram 494 from Taipei, November 26, reads: “Assume Department has already received Chiang’s replies to messages on Outer Mongolia from President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles which were sent through Chinese channels. Foreign Minister Yeh and President Chiang urgently request that text of Eisenhower–Dulles messages be made available to Chinese Embassy Washington.” (Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11-2655)

   Delga 363 from USUN, eyes only for Dulles, November 27, reads: “In light of response from Chiang Kai-shek, I suggest Robertson and Wilcox go to Taipeh. This would show other countries that we have left no stone unturned. In making this suggestion I make assumption that it will become well known Chinese intend use veto.” (Ibid., 310.2/11–2755) )