Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume XI

186. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, November 28, 1955—noon.

Delga 368. Eyes only for Secretary and Wilcox from Lodge. Re membership. If no solution membership question present GA session, there is strong possibility that Tenth Session will be resumed or special session convened, possibly shortly after first of next year. Moratorium on Chinese representation expires on December 31. If membership solution has been prevented by Chinese veto to Outer Mongolia or organized abstentions (which will be readily recognized as US effort get Chinese off the hook), there will be terrific pressure at resumed or special GA to exclude Chinese Nationalists (although not necessarily to seat Chinese Communists). Strong feelings of UN members and applicants will make it most difficult (and maybe impossible), whatever we do, to prevent action inimical position Chinese government. I think such a development, particularly at present juncture, would be so serious that we must again make strongest high level effort change Chinese position on Outer Mongolia.

I recommend the reply from President Eisenhower to Chiang Kai-shek include substance of following:

1. We will continue to take every feasible step to prevent the admission of Outer Mongolia into the UN.

2. We believe the best way to do this and to levy as much blame as possible on the Soviet Union is to cause a vote to be taken en bloc in the Security Council on the 17, and we expect that such a proposal will be placed before the Security Council very soon. If the Soviet Union then vetoes this en bloc 17-nation proposal as expected, we would undoubtedly next be faced with a vote on a proposal en bloc to admit 18. We ourselves do not like the idea of en bloc voting as such. However, since such a resolution listing 18 includes so many applicants which we both favor, we are hopeful it would be less difficult for the Republic of China to forebear using the veto in an en bloc vote than it might otherwise be if the applicants were voted on individually. We believe the vital interests of both the US and the Republic of China are involved and that we would be held responsible by large segments of world opinion if a membership solution was to fall as a result of the veto of the Republic of China. We urge that the Chinese not use the veto on such an en bloc proposal for 18.

3. Failure to achieve a solution of the membership question in the short time available to present session (December 10 or shortly thereafter) will undoubtedly lead to irresistible pressure for a resumed or special session of the GA after the first of this year. As the Republic of China is aware, the moratorium arrangement with respect to Chinese representation in the GA, which was adopted once again in September of this year, expires on December 31. While the US will continue actively to make every effort to insure the continued seating of the Republic of China in the GA under such circumstances, the Chinese government must bear in mind that the feeling of many countries, generated by the reactions of the applicants themselves, will be so strong that it may not be possible, whatever we do, to hold the line on the question of Chinese representation.

We do not share your view that if we fail to block the admission of Outer Mongolia the consequences would be equally, if not more disastrous, than if Outer Mongolia is prevented admission by the use of the Chinese veto in the SC. In this connection the willingness of the Chinese government not to use the veto on Outer Mongolia will strengthen its position in the UN rather than weaken it. This is not only because there will be greater support as a result of the admission of new members on the question of Chinese representation but also because it will be known to such countries as Spain, Italy, Austria and others that it was the willingness of the Chinese government to abstain on Outer Mongolia, in light of Soviet insistence on 18 or nothing, which permitted their entrance into the UN. Finally, we are convinced that use of the veto by the Chinese government, which would undoubtedly lead to the undercutting of its international position in and out of the UN, would have graver consequences among the Chinese people in Formosa and overseas than an abstention permitting the admission of Outer Mongolia.

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–2855. Secret; Niact.