Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

48. Message From the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles)¹

Washington, January 29, 1956.

1. I have been following the traffic between Mr. Anderson and the Department and have been in constant contact with State Department chiefs who are personally and hourly following the situation. This message contains my own intelligence conclusions but I have shown it to Mr. Hoover.

2. It is quite unrealistic to believe that this situation can be maintained in status quo for a period of months either three or six. Before then Israel will either have moved to destroy Nasr or pressures for resumption of arms shipments to Israel will have become so impelling as to be irresistible. Not only American opinion but the general feeling of fair play will make it impossible to sit by and see a vast military build up of Egypt by USSR take place and our arms embargo of Israel remain. Furthermore British will not stand still long in getting into this act and in other area operations.

3. While it is probable that aggressive action by Israel in the long run would result in the destruction of Israel and they realize this, it will almost certainly also end in the destruction of Nasr and in grave jeopardy to, if not the loss of, Western oil interests and military bases in the Middle East.

4. Thinking as I do I have welcomed the Department’s messages of 28 January 1956² and³, urging a decisive effort with Nasr so that he will give a tangible token that he is making a start on a course of action which may prevent the disasters I fear are impending. Action along lines of Mr. Anderson’s Message No. 44⁴ would help if something tangible added.

5. The Department and we believe our best chance of obtaining early agreement which would give Nasr in some degree land contact between Egypt and rest of Arab world lies in his authorizing Anderson to state to Ben Gurion what Egypt would be prepared to agree to on eight or ten principal issues, mentioned in previous traffic between Anderson and the Department so that we can exert appropriate available pressures on Israel to make reasonable concessions on Negev and on repatriation issue. Unless Anderson has such authorization from Nasser to Ben Gurion he has no basis for taking position with Ben Gurion that settlement depends on Israel making such concessions.

6. Events in the entire Middle East and North African area have possibly been moving faster since you left than either you or Nasr realize. The influx of bloc missions, experts, and their pressures are having cumulative effect on both our friends and the neutrals in the area. It is absolutely imperative that some change in this trend come promptly. The prospect of later resumption of Anderson operation with maintenance of present excellent security is dim.

7. Ref your Message No. 43⁵ I have the fullest realization of the obstacles but fear that what you feel is slight delay might in fact prove to be long enough to set in motion a chain of events which will impair prospect of resumption.

1. Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Outgoing Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Secret. Repeated to Jerusalem and Cairo.
2. Message dated 28 January 1956 beginning “1. The Secretary and I feel it vital for you etc.” [Footnote in the source text. The message informed Anderson that “The Secretary and I feel it vital for you to carry present conversations forward for next week to ten days.” Ibid.]
3. Message dated 28 January 1956 beginning “1. For reasons I have mentioned in previous telegrams etc.” [Footnote in the source text. The message is printed supra.]
4. In Message 44, January 29, from Anderson at Athens to Cairo, Anderson asked for a report on the feasibility of suggesting to “Nasser that we believe it in his interest we resolve his positions on all secondary questions in order to make up package that could be implemented at psychological time …. This would avoid any embarrassment on his part if the right moment should arise and he be unprepared on these issues …. To accomplish this end we would advise him I have decided to return either now or in two or three days to participate in final staff work already arranged and for secure Nasser’s approval of their conclusions on these questions.” (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I)
5. Message 43 of January 29 from Cairo to Athens, informed Anderson: “Appreciate sense urgency but from this end cannot see how slight delay involved would be damaging. So far as Nasr concerned, some delay would in fact be psychologically desirable.” (Ibid.)