Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

47. Message From the Secretary of State to Robert B. Anderson, at Athens¹

Washington, January 28, 1956.

1. For reasons I have mentioned in previous telegrams, I believe we are unlikely to have a better time than the present for working out the terms of a settlement. Many Israeli leaders believe that Israel’s security is imperiled; that as soon as the Arab states have assimilated the Soviet arms they will strike; and that, given no new factor in the situation, Israel’s interests may best be served by dealing a crippling blow to the Arabs before they have gained military superiority. Eban states some of them realize such a move would be an act of suicidal desperation but says it would be a compulsion of Israeli character. To some extent such statements are made for purpose of inducing U.S. to assist Israel in maintaining military superiority (a policy which we are convinced would only drive the Arabs further into the Soviet camp) but there can be no doubt that IDF is strongly urging such a policy upon the Israel Government and, if there is no continuing solid prospect of a settlement, the Israel cabinet might well give its approval.

2. If Nasser is sincere in his statements to you expressing his desire for a settlement, I see no reason why he could not cooperate in maintaining the momentum of the present discussions along the lines of my two previous tels to you.² In any event, I believe we must do everything possible to that end. Admittedly, the Egyptians will need to give the details of the various problems careful study but they have already said that most of them would present no difficulties. There would appear to be no reason why decisions on them could not be made as easily at this time as at the end of six months, with the understanding there would be no publicity. The knowledge that these discussions were going on expeditiously at a high level would enable us to place the most effective possible deterrents upon the Israelis.

3. More specifically, it seems quite possible that Israel will resume work at Banat Ya’acov around March 1 unless there is realistic progress toward a settlement. Paras 3 h and i your message number 34 January 28³ are particularly disquieting in this connection. Discussions of the kind mentioned in my two previous telegrams would, I believe, constitute sufficient progress to serve as a deterrent. I fear that arrangements of the kind mentioned in your telegrams of January 28 would not.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Outgoing Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Top Secret. Drafted by Russell and approved by Hoover after discussion with the Secretary.
2. Documents 39 and 42.
3. Supra.
4. Supra and Document 45.