62. Message to Robert B. Anderson, at Athens1
No. 60
Cairo, February 1,
1956.
- 1.
- … This message will cover the essential points and details will follow subsequently.2
- 2.
- I explained deep sense of urgency President feels regarding making some progress toward settlement. I had returned for purpose of urging PriMin to speed up work … Ali Sabri [is] doing … so that Anderson could take back to Washington with him paper, read and approved by PriMin, setting forth his position on the various problems of settlement, apart from the Negev. I showed PriMin possible draft of such paper on which he made little comment beyond objecting to statement that Egypt would remove all restrictions from vessels entering the Gulf of Acaba with comment that there would be no reason for them to be entering that Gulf. He agreed that … Ali Sabri could work upon an agreed draft which could be brought to him where he will be resting (he is leaving Cairo for four days rest tomorrow morning).
- 3.
- PriMin went on to say that he did not wish in any way mislead us and he hoped that we understood what he had told us many many times, namely that agreement on these minor issues was of no consequence without agreement on two major issues, the Negev and the timing of announcement of settlement.
- 4.
- PriMin then said he had grave sensitive matter to raise. For last five days dispatches have been received by Egyptian newspapers from New York or Washington reporting that Egypt and U.S. were working to reach an agreed position on settlement with Israel. PriMin can censor such dispatches in his own country but feels that some will appear elsewhere in the Arab World and will oblige him to deny the story. The Arab leaders might take advantage of this [Page 120] occasion to request assurances of a sort which he would prefer not to be obliged to give and which would make settlement even more difficult. He asked that I transmit to Washington his extreme concern over this danger to the success of all of our negotiations.
- 5.
- At Gene Black’s request I also discussed with PriMin current negotiations over IBRD loan. This discussion will be fully reported to Black. Briefly the PriMin’s position is that if he is to commit the tremendous amount of Egyptian financial resources involved in the first five years of work he must be absolutely certain that at the end of that time money to continue that project will be available. No letter of intent can really give him this assurance, for he insists upon regarding the Bank as having political character since the Board of Directors is made up of representatives of different nations who must vote as their Govts instruct them to. He agreed to talk to Black further probably Thursday3 but it is clear that he still has his mind set upon loan agreement.
- 6.
- Several times in course of discussion PriMin reiterated that he had no intention of aggressive action. As a final gesture, he made this most important suggestion: Within two months, he would be able to make military move which should conclusively demonstrate this fact. At that time he should be strong enough militarily so that his forces could defend Egypt proper without the necessity of fighting delayed campaign in the Sinai Peninsula. Once that position is reached he would be willing to withdraw almost all his regular forces from Sinai Peninsula.
- 7.
- Drafted 2030Z Jan 31.
- Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Secret. The source text bears a notation that Dulles saw the message on February 1.↩
- See Document 67.↩
- February 2.↩