63. Message From the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) to the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant (Russell), at Athens1

1.
Re your message No. 64, February 1,2 talks with British have thus far had little direct relationship Anderson’s mission, although utmost importance of outcome mission emphasized. Various elements problem of finding solution Arab-Israel dispute discussed, but no new considerations have emerged. Most significant feature has been substantial doubt held by British as to Nasser’s reliability. It generally felt that his attitudes re Anderson mission and Black mission might be strongly indicative whether West can, in fact, hope to work with him.
2.
Both sides equally concerned possibility outbreak hostilities and, in accordance decisions taken, joint studies now underway to consider what might be done to put teeth into Tripartite Declaration. Items under consideration include (a) advisability establishing through UN moral or legal basis for subsequent action if required; (b) desirability seeking now respective US-UK legislative authority or endorsement for such steps as may be required to bring about cessation hostilities; and, (c) military potentialities of both sides to act in emergency. We also considering movement Sixth Fleet to Eastern Mediterranean, dispatch smaller ships to Middle East Naval Command in Red Sea area and other measures which would without fanfare demonstrate availability of force. Essential objective would be to make it clear that we would move to stop hostilities regardless of who was at fault. Believed this would be most effective deterrent.
  1. Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518; Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Outgoing Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Top Secret. Drafted by Rountree and cleared in draft by Byroade, Hoover, and Dulles. Regarding Russell’s presence at Athens, see Document 53.
  2. Russell at Athens had asked Hoover to send “summary those sections Eden talks which bear on this [Anderson] mission.” (Ibid., Jan. ’56—memos, etc.)