76. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan1
390. Arab Ambassadors here are pressing to ascertain what actions US, UK and France would take under Tripartite Declaration if Israel cuts Canal at Banat Yacub and Syria fires on workmen, precipitating general hostilities. Department has pointed out that [Page 141] impossible to say in advance what precise action would be taken or even what type would be needed and appropriate in hypothetical case.
During discussions with Eden, Secretary referred to UN Resolution No. 378 V of November 17, 1950, which provides that in case of aggression States involved shall, not later than 24 hours after outbreak of hostilities, make public statement proclaiming readiness, provided States with which it is in conflict will do same, to discontinue all military operations and withdraw all military forces to its own territory. Side refusing to comply would doubtless be considered aggressor. Presumably if both sides fail to comply, both could be considered at fault and blockade or other measures could be invoked against both.
In discussion with Jordanian Ambassador yesterday, Department made strong plea for prompt acceptance of Jordan Valley Plan by GOJ.2 He was reminded that engineers on both sides had agreed on technical aspects of plan, that Israeli Government had accepted it officially, that Nasser had agreed four months ago to try to obtain Arab acceptance “during next two months”, that Jordan would gain most from plan and that Lebanese, who had least interests in water aspects, were opposing it for selfish reasons at expense of fellow Arab States. If GOJ could make some public statement of acceptance, hedged with whatever reservations GOJ might deem necessary, for political reasons, retaining its position on or right of repatriation of refugees and re acceptance by other Arab States, US would have better basis for urging Israel to defer unilateral action pending further efforts to obtain general agreement. He was also reminded that Tripartite Declaration did not require action by us unless one side attempted to change boundaries by force and that cutting of canal by unarmed workmen might not be construed as such attempt. This did not mean we would condone unilateral action by either side to divert waters which had traditionally served Jordan Valley. We would, in fact, do what we could to prevent Israeli action. However, Israel might well declare that canal at Banat Yacub was called for by Jordan Plan, that Israel could not wait indefinitely for Arab agreement, and that Israel intended to take only that portion of water which Arab engineers had agreed was Israel’s share. If Syrians started shooting, SC might decide, on same principle as Tiberias Resolution, that while Israeli initiative was improper, Syrian retaliation was out of proportion to offense or that Syria should seek other remedy than resort to force.
Moreover, all Arab Ambassadors here have been reminded that during four months since announcement of large Egyptian arms deal, [Page 142] US has not permitted Israel to acquire single rifle bullet in US. This restraint by US, in face of heavy Israeli pressure, should be fully appreciated by Arabs even if source of Egyptian arms were disregarded since Tripartite Declaration refers to arms balance and introduction of fast jets into Middle East seriously affected that balance. When fact that arms and technicians reaching Arabs are of Commie origin is also taken into account, US restraint during four months has been truly remarkable. Arabs cannot expect US to continue much longer to show this restraint unless they give us something to work with.
It was suggested to Jordanian Ambassador that he should not reveal full details of this conversation to his Arab colleagues since 1) they would exaggerate reports and imply that US would be complacent if Israel dug canal and 2) extremist like Zeineddine3 would promptly try to prevent any helpful action by GOJ.
Jordanian Ambassador appeared impressed by considerations mentioned and said he would report to his Government promptly. He is disturbed by possible demonstrations by refugees and by uncertainty whether Nasser would support his Government’s action.
Shuckburgh has been informed of foregoing and has agreed to authorize Ambassador Duke to consort with Mallory in effort achieve positive action by Jordan. It is recognized that in view of recent experience, pressure by UK might be counterproductive at this moment but Eden has agreed that all appropriate efforts be made to put across Jordan plan. Best way to prevent action by Israel will be to show progress in negotiations.
Addressees authorized use foregoing as appropriate but principal effort can be made by Mallory and subsequently Lawson. Syrians and Lebanese should probably not be roused at this stage.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 683.84A/2–456. Secret. Drafted and approved by Allen who signed for Dulles. Repeated to London, Paris, Tel Aviv, Beirut, Damascus, Cairo, and Baghdad.↩
- No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.↩
- Dr. Farid Zeineddine, Syrian Ambassador to the United States.↩