83. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State1

414. Discussed with Ambassador Duke approach HKJ outlined Department’s 390.2 He has received no instructions. In view Prime Minister’s3 February 10 trip Cairo and Riyadh, considered desirable see him prior thereto. Requested predeparture appointment which given noon today.

In course discussion reviewed broad JVP problem. He had not received report HKJ Ambassador’s discussions Department February 3 and asked for fill-in. He showed understanding and said he was aware of Syrian preoccupation Banat Yacoub statements re possible hostilities.

I asked him if HKJ might not undertake effort obtain acceptance JVP. He replied that as new government in office only one month he foresaw no possibilities.4 I asked if it might not be possible make some declaration that matter continues under study. He replied in direct and plain language that Israelis apparently wished force agreement for their own purposes or to use Banat Yacoub as means of instituting hostilities. As between these two alternatives and if the US could not restrain Israelis he had no hesitation in saying it would have to be the second. I asked whether hostilities between Syria, Israel and Egypt would call for Jordanian participation. He replied that involvement of either Syria, Egypt or both would involve Jordan. Even if the government wished to stay out it would not be able to withstand public opinion.

I reviewed again the final negotiations in Cairo and the apparent good will of Nasser in support JVP, suggesting he might wish discuss with Nasser on Friday.5 Suggested moreover that meeting of Arab Chiefs of State which he is promoting would be excellent place obtain Arab acceptance. He said (without much conviction) might be possible to arrange include discussion plan on agenda. However, meeting would not take decisions but would lay down policies for executive to follow. He said that given approbation of Nasser and Saudi Chiefs State meeting could be arranged for mid-March.

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Comment: Samir Rifai is often verbose and can avoid commitment by flood of rhetoric which I somewhat expected this morning. I was surprised at brevity and directness his replies and statements. Have informed Duke.

Mallory
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/2–856. Secret. Repeated to Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv. Received at 3:45 p.m.
  2. Document 76.
  3. Samir Rifai.
  4. Samir Rifai’s government assumed power on January 9, 1956.
  5. February 10.