335. Editorial Note
On October 12, shortly after the British Chargé in Tel Aviv had discussed Iraqi troop movements with Foreign Minister Meir, Meir summoned Ambassador Lawson to convey her shock and alarm over the Chargé’s presentation. She expressed special resentment at the Chargé’s statement that a forcible Israeli reaction to a dispatch of Iraqi troops would bring the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty into play and the Chargé’s refusal to respond to her questions concerning specifics of the Iraqi deployment, which Meir then readdressed to Lawson. (Telegram 365 from Tel Aviv, October 12; Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/10–1256)
Meir then dispatched a letter to the Embassy which urged United States intervention to prevent the entry of Iraqi forces into Jordan. The letter, according to the Embassy in Tel Aviv, reviewed U.S.-Israeli discussions on the subject and statements made by Nuri Said and the British Foreign Office, and affirmed Israel’s basic principle of maintaining the territorial status quo in the Middle East. It closed with the following plea:
“In view fact we have not received adequate assurances as to size of contemplated force, period of its stay in Jordan, its exact location, and particularly in view of light cast on entire operation by Nuri Said’s statement as supported by British Foreign Office it is considered view of GOI that entry of Iraqi troops into Jordan represents grave infringement of status quo in area and serious threat to Israel. We feel it our duty to express our strongest opposition to contemplated action, and we request your government’s urgent intervention to prevent it from taking place.” (Telegram 366 from Tel Aviv, October 12; ibid.)
[Page 709]On October 14, the Department of State transmitted to Tel Aviv a response to the Israeli Government. The response recalled previous U.S.-Israeli exchanges on the subject, including Ben Gurion’s assurances that Israel would do nothing if Iraqi troops remained east of the Jordan River, and noted that the United States had sought to be responsive to Israeli questions on the troop movement. But difficulties arose when Iraq and Great Britain reiterated policies first stated months and even years ago, compounded by Iraq’s reluctance to release details of its troop movements. The Unites States had assured Israel that the Iraqi troop movement would be defensive in nature and limited to east of the Jordan River, and that Iraqi forces would be small and not carry heavy equipment. The British approach was meant to reassure Israel and there was no reason to believe that the reference to the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty was meant to be threatening. In light of this, the response requested that Israel give further consideration to the matter before reaching a conclusion. (Telegram 303 to Tel Aviv, October 14; ibid.)