Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

336. Memorandum of a Conversation, Waldorf Astoria, New York, October 12, 1956, 3:30 p.m.¹

USDel/MC/37

New York, October 12, 1956, 3:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Spaak (Belgium)
• Mr. Robert Rothschild (Chief of Cabinet of Mr. Spaak)
• U.S.
  • The Secretary
  • Ambassador Lodge
  • Mr. Phleger
  • Mr. William R. Tyler

The Secretary told Mr. Spaak he had heard that Mr. Pineau was in a rather better frame of mind. Mr. Spaak looked extremely dubious and said he was very much worried about Mr Pineau’s attitude. The Secretary then said that the question now was what was going to happen this afternoon at the closed session of the Security Council at 5:00 o’clock. He said that the Secretary-General of the United Nations would make a report to the Council and would state that agreement had been reached on six points of principle, and he would then mention four or five additional points concerning the operation and mechanism for provisional conservatory measures to keep the Canal going pending the working out of a final solution, which would probably take a considerable time. He thought it most important that agreement be reached today so that the Foreign Ministers should not disband without having made any progress.

It was also important to know what would happen after the meeting—what procedures would be followed as a framework for negotiation with Egypt, and what provisional or “conservatory” measures could be agreed to ensure free and secure navigation in the Canal during the period of negotiation. He hoped that Mr. Spaak might be willing to stress the importance of agreement being reached on these subjects. If this were achieved, tomorrow morning might be spent in drafting a resolution which would then be approved in public session in the afternoon, and this would mean that the Anglo-French resolution would not have to come to a vote. Mr. Spaak observed that Mr. Pineau’s position was very difficult vis-à-vis the French National Assembly, and that he must have something to go back with which his government could defend. The Secretary said it was tremendously important that the Egyptians should make a move. So far they had only spoken confidentially about points on which they might be willing to agree but had put nothing down on paper. Mr. Pineau would not be in a very happy position if he were to go back to France and only be able to say that some progress in the Egyptian position had been made orally, but that he had in fact nothing to show for it.

Mr Spaak said that there was also the question of what the Russians were going to do. Mr. Shepilov had kept very quiet so far and had not shown his hand; he thought that Mr. Shepilov would probably emerge to the surface again today and would speak. The Secretary said he thought that everything depended on whether the Egyptians were willing to move independently of the Russians if they really wanted an agreement. In answer to a question by Mr. Spaak, the Secretary said he thought that the Egyptians did want an agreement if they could in fact remain in control of the Canal.

Mr. Spaak then asked the Secretary what he thought would happen if no progress was made here in New York. The Secretary said that was the very question which we had been asking ourselves. Mr. Spaak said that he thought that in any case the British and the French would not have recourse to armed force. The Secretary said that he was perhaps not so sure about this. He referred to the overwhelming vote of the resolution at the Conservative Conference on October 11.² He said that right at the start the British had started building up their armed forces on a basis which suggested that they were in fact going to undertake military action, but that subsequently they had somewhat shifted the character of their build-up. However, he could not feel sure that all danger was past.

The Secretary went on to say that he did not feel it had been wise for the United Kingdom and France to go to the Security Council as they had. He had talked about this with Eden and Lloyd on his last day in London, and Eden had agreed that the manner and timing of the approach to the Security Council ought to be carefully considered and deliberated. The Secretary had hoped that SCUA would first be set up as an operating organization so as to strengthen the position of the 18 vis-à-vis the Egyptian Government and increase the chances of some provisional cooperation being worked out pending a final solution. However, hardly had his plane left the airport on his way back to Washington on Friday evening, September 21, when the British and the French decided to announce that they were going to the Security Council. Ambassador Lodge then gave an account of how he had been called by the British here in New York on that very evening and informed of the decision. He had not been given the opportunity to exert any influence to attempt to restrain the decision itself, but he had at least been able to persuade the British and the French not to announce the fact before the Secretary had had time to reach the State Department on Saturday morning.

The Secretary went on to say that he had reminded Mr. Lloyd here recently that in May 1953, the British were in the Suez Canal zone by right of Treaty, that they had 88,000 troops in the area, that they had started evacuating their women and children and that their plans involved taking Cairo and Alexandria. In actual fact, they were being so harassed by Egyptian guerrilla action and assassinations that they had decided to withdraw their troops and had concluded an agreement with Egypt in 1954. He had told Mr. Lloyd that he wondered how the British chances of military success could be better today than they were then. The trouble was that once you embarked on a military operation, it had a tendency to spread and you could never be sure where it would end.

The Secretary concluded by repeating his conviction that it was of great importance that some progress should be recorded here and now, and his hope that Mr. Spaak would see his way to participate in the debate and urge that agreement should be reached. Mr. Spaak sighed noncommittally and said he would be glad to see what he could do. He brightened up, however, as he said that Mr. Dulles was now a very popular person with “men of the left” in Europe. The Secretary observed that it was perhaps because of this that he was being called the “Rock and Roll” Secretary of State in the European press.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/10–1256. Secret. Drafted by Tyler.
2. On October 11, the British Conservative Party, during its annual conference, voted overwhelmingly in favor of an emergency resolution, endorsing the government’s “resolute” policy throughout the Suez Crisis. (The Times (London), October 12, 1956)