Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

141. Memorandum of Discussion at the 284th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, May 10, 1956¹

Washington, May 10, 1956

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1 and 2.]

3. U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments

Governor Stassen indicated that his report to the National Security Council on the recent disarmament negotiations in London would be divided into three parts. The first would be retrospective, the second would discuss where we now stood, and the third would include future areas of concentration of disarmament activity.

In retrospect, one of the chief objectives of the U.S. delegation to the London meetings was to concert our policies with the Anglo-French policies, so that the British and French delegations would not officially table their own disarmament plan, many portions of which were unacceptable to the United States. As a result of negotiations with the British and French, the latter not only modified their disarmament plan, but agreed to put it forward as a working paper rather than as a fixed position of their governments.²

The next big problem was the issue of the relation of German reunification to disarmament. This involved many consultations with the British and French, and Governor Stassen said that he had flown to Paris to deal particularly with the French on this subject. As a result of many conversations, it was finally agreed among the three Western powers that we would agree to commence a program for reducing the level of U.S. forces down to 2,500,000 prior to an agreement with the Soviet Union on a settlement of German reunification in freedom. However, it was the agreed position of the three Western powers that we would not reduce our forces below this level until the German reunification problem was solved along our lines. This agreement provided the basis for the four-power declaration on the German problem.³ The net result of these negotiations with the British and French was that there was no divisive issue among the four Western powers—the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Canada.

Governor Stassen then moved on to the second portion of his report—namely, where we were at the present time. As for the Soviet position, Governor Stassen observed that, apart from the effort to divide the four Western powers, the real Soviet position, when thoroughly probed, consisted of the following three points: First, the Soviets were very firm indeed in opposing President Eisenhower’s Geneva plan for aerial inspection and reconnaissance; the depth of their suspicion of this plan showed up very clearly. Secondly, the Soviets were rigidly opposed to any tying-in of the issue of German reunification and the reduction of armaments. Thirdly, the Soviets had made their most significant advance in our direction when they came forward with a much more open, detailed and satisfactory program for ground inspection. They had even agreed that this ground inspection system should be in place and operative before any of the powers began to reduce the level of their forces. Parenthetically, Governor Stassen declared that the U.S. delegation had made clear that if the Soviet Union could be prevailed upon to make as great an advance in the matter of aerial inspection as they thus had on ground inspection, there was real likelihood for progress in the control of armaments. Another significant advance in the Soviet position as it currently stood was their abandonment of the “ban the bomb” prerequisite in their disarmament program. Governor Stassen speculated that the Soviets at long last had realized that there was absolutely no hope of ever inducing the United States to agree to an immediate and outright banning of nuclear weapons.

Moving to the third portion of his report, Governor Stassen first indicated that when the United Nations Disarmament Commission met again in the middle of June, the United States would be in pretty good shape for the sessions.

As to the future development of U.S. policies with respect to disarmament, Governor Stassen emphasized that he was not now seeking from the National Security Council any decisions as to the character of our policy. He was merely going to point out that, from the point of view of U.S. policy on disarmament, there were five major areas on which our activity should be concentrated.

• First, we must try to wear down Soviet opposition to President Eisenhower’s aerial inspection plan. We would have to be gradual in this effort, but we must try to make every effort to move the Soviets out of their position of rigid opposition. At this point, again parenthetically, Governor Stassen indicated his skepticism as to the complete stability of the present leadership in the Soviet Union.
• Secondly, there are many indications that the Soviets are presently going to make a considerable reduction in the levels of their own conventional armed forces. Indeed, it was from their hints to him that the British had derived their view to which Secretary Dulles had referred in his earlier report this morning to the Council.⁴ In any event, Governor Stassen pointed out the importance and the difficulty of the U.S. response to this probable Soviet move.
• Thirdly, there seemed a clear prospect that if the Western powers and the Soviets continue much longer without any significant agreement respecting the control of armaments, other governments will make the decision to develop their own stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, it must be an objective of the United States to try to get ceilings imposed on the development of further stockpiles of nuclear weapons and induce nations not now having such stockpiles to agree to abstain from manufacturing nuclear weapons and to devote their fissionable materials to peaceful purposes only. It seemed to Governor Stassen as much in the Soviet interest as in our own, to prevent the multiplication of stockpiles of nuclear weapons throughout the world.
• Fourthly, and closely connected with the above point, the United Kingdom, having made the decision to forge ahead with the building of a stockpile of nuclear weapons, is somewhat concerned lest controls on the development of nuclear weapons come into effect before the UK has built its own stockpile to a point which would assure it of a position as the third power in terms of nuclear capabilities. At this point the President interrupted to indicate that if the controls did come into effect before the British had a sufficient stockpile of these weapons, the United States could provide the British with sufficient weapons to assure them of a secure third position in the world. Governor Stassen agreed that this might be done, but went on to point out our need for British support in the effort to curb the mushrooming of nuclear weapons throughout the world. He was also anxious, he said, to get Soviet support to place a ceiling on further expansion of nuclear weapons stockpiles.
• His fifth and last point, said Governor Stassen, was concerned with psychological factors and the factor of U.S. leadership. He said he believed that the time had come for the President to seize the leadership on a program which might be described by the slogan “atoms-for-police”. The object of this program would be to make use of nuclear power to prevent the occurrence of aggression anywhere in the world. Some portion of the weapons in the nuclear stockpiles of the several nations should be earmarked and set apart for support of the resolutions of the United Nations against aggression. The idea was to provide an atomic shield against aggression. Quite apart from its central purpose, such a program would have the advantage of freeing certain nations, such as Turkey, from the heavy burden of maintaining a large military establishment. The resources which nations like this were now compelled in self-defense to devote to building up their military forces, could be diverted to vitally needed economic development. Thus the atoms-for-police program would be an important factor in countering the Soviet economic offensive aimed at the underdeveloped nations of the world.

In concluding his report, Governor Stassen expressed the belief that the program he had outlined was consonant with the views both of the President and of the Secretary of State on the subject of disarmament. He also indicated that subsequent development of a U.S. policy and program for armaments control would be formulated in complete collaboration with representatives of the responsible departments and agencies. Governor Stassen closed by stating that, despite the fact that the Soviets would continue to make propaganda out of the disarmament problem, they are at long last aware of the suicidal character of a nuclear war. In short, they are beginning to see the problem of a general war with nuclear weapons much as we see it in the United States.

After Governor Stassen had finished, the President expressed the thought that while the atoms-for-police proposal was an interesting one, it would have to be very carefully defined and developed. Where, for example, would one store the atomic weapons set apart for use in the event of aggression? From what bases would these weapons be launched in the event aggression occurred? Moreover, entering upon an atoms-for-police program would still require as a prerequisite an adequate inspection system in the nations which had stockpiles of atomic weapons. We would still have to have reasonable assurance of Soviet good faith. Nevertheless, the President assured Governor Stassen that all those around the table were well aware of what a difficult assignment he had and has. Everyone was also clearly pleased that the United States did not lose anything at the recent London discussions, and that the possibility existed that avenues of hopeful exploration for the future had been opened.

Admiral Radford expressed very great interest indeed in Governor Stassen’s proposal respecting atoms-for-police. The notion of using nuclear weapons to prevent aggression had been part of the thinking of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since 1954. Admiral Radford, however, expressed, as he had many times in the past, his great concern that occasions might arise when aggressions occurred and the armed forces of the United States would not be permitted to use atomic weapons to meet such local aggression. He therefore again pleaded for a clear decision permitting the use of atomic weapons in defense against local aggression. If such a decision were not forthcoming, the Defense Department would have to continue an expensive program providing our armed forces with both conventional and nuclear armament. Accordingly, the right to use atomic weapons in instances of local aggression was still the key question, and the National Security Council could not continue to straddle it. The problem is not what we do in global war, but whether we can use nuclear weapons in military situations short of global war. We must be clear whether or not our armed forces can use nuclear weapons in this latter type of situation. Accordingly, Admiral Radford repeated his view that Governor Stassen’s fifth point was by all odds the most important point. Certainly atomic weapons could be effectively used in defense against local aggression. But we must have the courage to make the decision to do so.

Secretary Wilson said that he had been watching “this business” for three years now. We have moved ahead considerably in emphasizing the importance of air power. It had been quite a severe struggle. General Ridgway represented a serious problem with his demands for a much larger ground force. Despite everything, Secretary Wilson believed that General Ridgway could readily justify his views on our ground forces, on the simple basis of our military commitments worldwide.

Admiral Strauss said he would like to be heard briefly on the subject of Governor Stassen’s fifth and last point. He said he had first heard the expression “atoms-for-police” some two years ago from a man named Marshall in New York. Since that time the idea of using our atomic capabilities as a shield against aggression had formed a consistent part of our thinking. Accordingly, if we were now suddenly to adopt the atoms-for-police tactic, making it look as though it were a brand-new idea, this course of action would be certain to give color to the presumption that hitherto we had been thoroughly selfish in our attitude toward our atomic weapons capabilities. Admiral Strauss repeated that the United States had always thought of its nuclear stockpile as a means of defending the free world against Communist aggression.

Governor Stassen acknowledged the reality of the danger alluded to by Admiral Strauss, but noted the need for additional impact on a program for using atomic weapons to prevent aggression. The slogan and program of atoms-for-police was a device for packaging an idea so that it would penetrate throughout the world. What was needed was an impact for this program similar to that provided by the President in his atoms-for-peace speech.

Secretary Humphrey said he wished to go back and discuss briefly the point that Admiral Radford had earlier made on the necessity for a decision on the use of nuclear weapons by the United States to deter or counter aggression. Secretary Humphrey said that Admiral Radford’s point was of tremendous importance to the United States from the financial and budgetary point of view. It was quite possible that Admiral Radford’s proposal might tie into the anticipated Russian announcement of the unilateral reduction of the level of the Soviet armed forces. Should we not, therefore, give very great thought as to how far the United States can go in matching this Soviet move? Could we not reduce numbers and increase the mobility of smaller U.S. forces, and at the same time assure that these forces would have the right to make use of their nuclear armament? Such small U.S. mobile forces, thoroughly equipped with nuclear weapons, should be our objective.

The President informed Secretary Humphrey that the matter was not nearly so simple as he imagined. For one thing, the United States would be obliged to overcome the strong opposition of some of the governments of its allies to the use of bases in their territory for launching nuclear attacks. While, said the President, he agreed with Secretary Humphrey’s general theory, we could not overlook all the political problems which were involved in it. We must proceed so that we are sure of retaining the friendship of the free world.

Secretary Humphrey said he too understood the President’s point; but could we not have as our own objective the proposal that Admiral Radford had made and that he, Secretary Humphrey, so strongly supported? He therefore counselled that we clarify our position on the use of atomic weapons for the Joint Chiefs of Staff so that they could take the necessary steps in the direction of the ultimate objective of smaller, more mobile U.S. forces equipped with atomic weapons and in a position to use these weapons in the event of peripheral aggression.

Admiral Radford said that he also recognized the political problems to which the President had pointed. Nevertheless, he said, it would make an enormous difference to us if, through a decision on the use of nuclear weapons, we could reduce the number of our soldiers around the world.

Governor Stassen commented that in addition to the points made by the President there was also a danger in this plan that if the United States continued to stress the reduction of ground forces we might have a much tougher time inducing the Soviet Union to agree to the reduction of strength in the air. To this Secretary Humphrey replied that he could not see why we had to be involved with the Russians. Could we not proceed unilaterally to cut the levels of our conventional armed forces? Why did we have to wait for the Russians to do it? He again advocated clarification of our instructions on this subject to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, so that they could go ahead with such a program.

The President again warned that such a course of action should not be carried out in a hurry. The United States must move very slowly in this area. Even so, we had already made real progress in convincing our friends of the validity of our views on the use of atomic weapons. For example, the NATO powers were now clamoring that we share atomic weapons with them; whereas only a couple of years ago they had recoiled in horror from all thought of employing nuclear weapons.

Secretary Hoover said that he was aware that Governor Stassen had been devoting a great deal of thought and energy to the further development of American policy on the control of armaments. He hoped he would make a report to the responsible departments and agencies and would continue to work with them in further formulations of the U.S. position. He suggested that, in any case, there should be a thorough analysis of any forthcoming U.S. position on disarmament before this Government became committed to any new aspects of its disarmament policy, either publicly or internationally.

The President expressed his agreement with the suggestion made by Secretary Hoover.

The National Security Council:⁵

a. Discussed the subject in the light of a report by the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament on the recent disarmament negotiations.

b. Noted the President’s directive that the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament, utilizing the President’s Special Committee on Disarmament Problems, prepare at an early date a report⁶ on the U.S. response to a possible Soviet announcement of a unilateral reduction of conventional armed forces and a reduction in or withdrawal of Soviet forces in East Germany.

c. Noted that further recommendations as to additions or modifications in U.S. policy on control of armaments would be developed by the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament, utilizing the President’s Special Committee on Disarmament Problems, for Council consideration prior to any public discussions or international commitments regarding such additions or modifications in policy.

d. Noted that the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament would continue, in conformity with the President’s letter of August 5, 1955,⁷ to advance understanding and support at home and abroad of established U.S. policy on control of armaments, utilizing the cooperation of the departments and agencies concerned.

Note: The actions in b, c and d above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament for implementation.

S. Everett Gleason

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on May 11.
2. See footnote 2, Document 127.
3. Introduced at the 86th meeting of the subcommittee on May 4, it said that progress from one stage to another on disarmament “must depend upon the satisfactory execution of the preceding stage and upon the development of confidence through the settlement of major political problems.” For text, see U.N. doc. DC/SC.1/PV.86, pp. 2–4; Annex 10 to U.N. doc. DC/SC.1/46; or Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, vol. I, pp. 625–626.
4. Reference is to Dulles’ report to the NSC on the meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in Paris on May 4 and 5. For documentation on this meeting, see volume IV, pp. 51 ff.
5. Paragraphs a–d and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1553, approved by the President on May 16. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Actions) See also the Annex to NSC Action No. 1553, approved as a supplementary policy to this action on November 21, Document 165.
6. See Document 143.
7. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/8–555)