Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

142. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 6, 1956¹

Washington, June 6, 1956

SUBJECT

• Proposed British Announcement on Test Limitation

PARTICIPANTS

• Secretary of State
• Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
• Adm. Strauss, Chairman, AEC
• Mr. J.C.A. Roper, First Secretary, British Embassy
• Gerard C. Smith, S/AE

The Secretary advised Sir Roger Makins that the United States did not like the idea proposed by the U.K. Government to announce its present willingness to open negotiations looking to an international test limitation and control agreement.² He stated that it was his understanding that the present rate of testing could be continued indefinitely without any danger to humanity from radiation effects and that the excerpt from the Medical Research Council report³ appeared to support his understanding. The Secretary suggested that the cessation of testing might have a different result from that hoped for by the U.K. He recalled the President’s recent statement that one of the purposes of the present U.S. test series was to develop techniques for reducing the fall-out problem.⁴

Adm. Strauss stated that the maximum permissible level of Strontium 90 which he had been informally advised the AEC had used was below that used by the U.S. by a factor of 100. An informal paper setting out Adm. Strauss’ technical conclusions on the subject of the harmlessness of current testing⁵ was given by the Secretary to Sir Roger Makins. The statement reads as follows:

Commenting on the paragraph attached as Annex A to Sir Roger Makins’ letter⁶ and without having seen the further contents of the report of the British Medical Research Council from which it is excerpted, it can be said that testing could be continued at the present rate, and indefinitely at the present rate, without increasing the exposure of human beings throughout the world to radiation from Strontium 90, above the level cited in the report of the British Medical Research Council (100 micro-micro curies per gram of body calcium), a level which is extremely conservative.

The Secretary then urged most strongly on the British Ambassador that the U.K. not issue the proposed statement. He added that if contrary to his high hopes, the U.K. did not go along with the U.S. request and a decision was made to proceed, he hoped that the U.S. would have opportunity to see the proposed language with the view of possibly suggesting changes.

The British Ambassador asked if the U.S. did not want to propose language changes at this point. The Secretary said no. Thereupon Sir Roger asked what the Secretary and Adm. Strauss would think about casting the British announcement in the following terms:

“As the Prime Minister stated in the House of Commons on December 6, 1955, ‘Her Majesty’s Government are prepared at any time to discuss methods of regulating and limiting test explosions which take account of their position and that of other powers.’”⁷ The Secretary and Adm. Strauss said that this sounded all right and the meeting concluded.

1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Gerard C. Smith.
2. In a conversation with Hoover, Smith, and Makins on June 2, an officer of the British Embassy informed the Department of State informally that the British Government planned to join to its forthcoming announcement of a British thermonuclear test in 1957 a statement indicating its decision to initiate negotiations for a possible limitation of thermonuclear testing. (Memorandum of conversation by Smith, June 2; ibid., Disarment Files: Lot 58 D 133, Nuclear Weapons Tests)
3. A special committee of the British Medical Research Council prepared a report on the hazards of fall-out from test explosions, which the British Government released on June 12. The report is summarized in The New York Times, June 13, 1956, p. 22.
4. For the transcript of the President’s press conference on May 23, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956, pp. 523–524.
5. Not found in Department of State files.

6. Makins’ letter to Dulles, June 4, included a summary of the report of the special committee of the British Medical Research Council. The letter quoted the conclusion of the report on the possible dangers of radiation released in test explosions of radioactive strontium. (Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Weapons—Test Moratorium)

   Annex A to Makins’ letter is a summary of the calculations and assumptions on which the conclusion of the British Medical Research Council was based.

7. In the House of Commons on June 7, Eden included this statement almost verbatim in his announcement of British nuclear test explosions for 1957. (Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series, vol. 553, col. 1283) A memorandum from Gerard Smith to Secretary Dulles, June 7, indicates that Ambassador Makins had just informed him of the contents of the British announcement. Smith added:

   “His Government realized the difficulties in this matter for the United States and had done their best to meet these difficulties by the language chosen.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series)