Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

195. Policy Recommendation Prepared by the Chairman of the Delegation to the Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission (Stassen)¹

London, May 9, 1957.

PART I OF THREE PARTS

Responding to the request of the Secretary of State,² Chairman USDEL forwards an appraisal in concrete terms of the inseparable elements of a partial agreement for first steps which we estimate would be acceptable to France and the Federal Republic of Germany, other states with a significant nuclear military potential, the USSR, and the UK. It constitutes a program which will advance the priority US objectives as stated by the Secretary of State:

a) To prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to many additional states;

b) To increase the safeguards against attack upon the US;

c) To begin to open up the soviet Union and to open Eastern Europe;

d) To improve the basis for subsequent and separate negotiation of political settlements and evolution of conditions in Eastern Europe in accord with the US national interest;

e) To generally lessen the dangers of a nuclear war and facilitate the mantenance of peace.

It will maintain very great US military capability.

The concrete inseparable terms are consistent with the fundamentals of present NSC decisions and present instructions to the USDEL, and do require supplementary instructions on important items.

1. The agreement for partial measures would include specific authority for a signator to suspend partially or completely the commitments and obligations taken, upon written notice by it to the control organization of either an important violation by another signator, or a written notice by it of action by a non-signator which prejudices the security of the notifying state and thereby requires the partial or complete suspension of commitments. This provision to include a procedure for advance notice of intention to suspend so that an opportunity for prior correction of the adverse condition may be afforded.

2. All signators (except the US, UK and USSR) to agree that they are prohibited from the manufacture or use of nuclear weapons.

3. The US, UK and USSR (states which have nuclear weapons in their possession on the effective date of the treaty and which continue under the terms of the treaty to possess such nuclear weapons) agree that they are prohibited from use of nuclear weapons except:

a) in individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter if an armed attack occurs of such nature and magnitude that, in the decision of the using state, the attack cannot feasibly be repelled without the use of nuclear weapons; or

b) the attack includes the use of nuclear weapons or

c) in accordance with a decision of either the UN General Assembly or the UN Security Council.

4. The USSR, UK and US to take a further commitment that after the installation of an effective inspection system to verify the fulfillment of this commitment (estimated as July 1959), the three will devote all future production of fissionable material exclusively to non-weapons purposes, and will transfer to non-weapons purposes any fissionable material not already contained within nuclear weapons; and will commit themselves to cooperate in the design and installation of such a necessary inspection system.

5. Upon the establishment of satisfactorily functioning inspection system and the cut-off on production of nuclear materials for weapons purposes, the USSR, UK and US will commence agreed equitable proportionate transfers of fissionable materials in successive increments from previous production over to internationally inspected and supervised non-weapons purposes, including stockpiling either national or international; provided, however, that these transfers shall be carried out to only a limited degree and each of the three will be maintaining a very substantial nuclear weapons capability insofar as the terms of the treaty for the partial agreement is concerned.

6. Upon the effective date of the treaty (estimated as July 1958), the USSR and US and other states concerned will move promptly to install and begin to operate an aerial inspection system in accordance with the approved Eisenhower method in initial zones, including

a) all of the Soviet Union north of the Arctic Circle (including the Murmansk Kola Peninsula and Dikson areas) and all of the Soviet Union east of 108 degrees East Longitude (from Lake Baikal to Bering Straits); and an equal geographic area of Alaska, Canada, and Western US.

b) all of the Soviet Union west of 27 and one-half degrees East Longitude (Minsk-Zhmerinka line) and all of the territory of Europe between 2 and one-half degrees East Longitude and 27 and one-half degrees East Longitude and between 42 degrees, 20 minutes, North Latitude and 63 degrees North Latitude. (Labelled as the Russian and European zone for convenience in this cable).

7. In addition, upon the effective date of the agreement, the parties will move promptly to establish ground control posts in Soviet bloc and West within the aerial zones, including appropriate radar equipment for added warning safeguards against the potential of great surprise attack.

8. In addition, ground control posts will be promptly established in the area of the Soviet Union west of 35 degrees East Longitude and in the UK, and at the embarkation ports of eastern US.

9. Three months after the effective date of the agreement (estimated as October 1958), signators would furnish blueprints of military forces and armaments, exclusive of nuclear weapons.

10. Within the following nine months after furnishing the blueprints (estimated July 1959), the USSR and the US would (in the manner outlined by the US JCS in the Secretary of Defense letter of October 30, 1956)³ place in internationally supervised national storage in disarmament depots 15% of the major designated armaments reported in their blueprints, including nuclear weapon-delivery vehicles, and would reduce their armed forces to two and one-half million and would bring the level of their military expenditures down by 15%.

11. Other states signators would make similar (but not precisely the same) agreed reductions under similar reporting and verified inspected conditions.

12. All signators specifically recognize the essential requirement of an effective inspection system to verify and guarantee in the case of all states alike the fulfillment and observance of each commitment, each signator undertakes to cooperate in the thorough reciprocal installation and implementation of such inspection, and the continued operation of such inspection is an essential requirement for the continuation of the commitments under the agreement.

PART II OF THREE PARTS

Further responding to the request of the Secretary of State, Chairman USDEL forwards Part II of an appraisal in concrete terms of the inseparable elements of a partial agreement for first steps which we estimate would be acceptable to France and the Federal Republic of Germany, other states with a significant nuclear military potential, the USSR, and the UK, and which will advance the priority US objectives as stated by the Secretary of State.

13. Upon the completion of such initial year reductions each state would file a certificate that it had carried out the reduction, and mobile inspection teams would then have access to the objects of control in all areas of the signator states to verify the fulfillment of the reductions.

14. Upon the initiation of the aerial inspection and the installation of the ground inspector posts in the areas indicated in Part I, (estimated September 1958) (and the commitment of the USSR to the other inseparable provisions of this report) all states involved would be prohibited from maintaining or from stationing nuclear weapons in that part of the Soviet Union and that part of Europe included within the Russian-European aerial inspection zone.

15. During the year of fulfillment of the reduction of worldwide levels of armaments and armed forces of the Soviet Union and the US by 15% for armaments and to the force level of 2.5 million, (estimated as July 1958 to July 1959) both would also reduce the armaments and armed forces which they had located in the Russian and European aerial inspection zone by 20%.

16. At the end of the first year’s reduction in armaments, armed forces, and military expenditures (estimated as July 1959) progressively expand the aerial inspection system beyond the original two zones, into a series of additional zones culminating in the complete coverage of the Soviet Union and (if the political situation permits) China, and, reciprocally of the Free World areas including the US and the UK. The ground control posts to also be progressively expanded and increased to complete effective coverage.

17. During the year of fulfillment of the reduction of worldwide levels of armaments and armed forces of the Soviet Union and the US by 15% for designated armaments and to the level of two and one-half million for forces, including the parallel 20% reduction of the armaments and armed forces which the Soviet Union and the US had located in the Russian and European aerial inspection zone, make an agreed reduction in air bases on both sides within the Russian-European aerial inspection zone of a magnitude of approximately 10%.

18. Upon the effective date of the partial agreement treaty (estimated as July 1958) all signators would be committed to a temporary suspension for 12 months of all nuclear tests and during such 12 months to cooperate in the design of an agreed inspection system which would support the nuclear materials cut-off commitment, and which would also verify either an agreement for limitation on the amount of fissionable material released per year into the atmosphere by the three in future tests, or to verify a continued limited suspension of tests. The agreement to be so drawn that a failure to agree upon and to install the inspection system involved for these two commitments or the failure to agree on either a limitation of tests or further suspension of tests beyond the 12 months would automatically result in no legal commitments against tests after the 12 months.

19. If the first year’s reductions in armaments, armed forces and military expenditures are verified to the satisfaction of the permanent members (including the US) of the armament regulation Board of Control, then, and only then, (estimated as July 1959 or later), a second reduction of armaments and armed forces and military expenditures of the USSR and the US to be arranged, but only with the US consent, and not, in any event, going below a force level of 2 million, and to be further conditioned upon the assurance of application of the treaty and the inspection system to all essential, significant military states and areas, and therefore requiring prior solution of the political problems in a manner satisfactory to the US insofar as they apply to this subject.

20. During the period of fulfillment of the reduction of levels of designated armaments and armed forces of the Soviet Union and the US on the basis of measurement to a level of 2 million (estimated as July 1959 to July 1961), both would also reduce the armaments and armed forces which they had located in the Russian and European aerial inspection zone by an additional 20%.

21. Upon the fulfillment of such second reductions and the verified certification that they have been carried out, including the second reductions of specified other militarily significant states who must as a prerequisite have complied, and the partial political settlements necessary thereto having been reached, the armaments regulation organization to consider, but only with the consent of the US, further reductions, and not, in any event, to consider further reductions to any levels lower than 1.5 million for the Soviet Union and 1.5 million for the US unless and until a supplementary treaty is negotiated and ratified by the usual constitutional processes.

22. In the event further reductions of levels of armaments and armed forces are carried out beyond the 2 million level, during the fulfillment of such reductions, both the USSR and the US would further make parallel inclusive reductions of the armaments and armed forces which they had located in the Russian and European aerial inspection zone, but not in any event under the terms of the treaty, by more than 20%. (Even in these ultimate circumstances at least 40% of US forces would remain in the Western side of the Russian and European zone including Germany, insofar as the terms of the agreement would be concerned).

23. The signators agree that within 3 months after the effective date of the treaty (estimated to be October 1958) they will cooperate in the establishement of a technical committee to design inspection controls (and upon reaching an agreed definition, to install them) to fulfill a commitment that sending objects through outer space and sending unmanned objects over distances in excess of medium range at any altitude, shall be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes, and further designed to verify and insure compliance with a commitment not to build or to install intercontinental ballistic or guided missiles or rockets.

24. The armaments regulation organization administering the system to be established in accordance with Article 26 of the UN Charter⁴ within the framework of the Security Council, and to operate through an executive council or board of control on which the affirmative vote of the US and of the Soviet Union is essential for significant decisions.

25. Such board of control to have authority to establish a system for the advance notification by signators of any intended major movement of armed forces over foreign soil or over international waters or through international air space as a part of the system of protection against great surprise attack.

26. The essential details for the evolutionary development of an effective and sound inspection system are to be worked out in keeping with the foregoing outline and consistent with the studies of the eight US Presidential Task Groups chairmanned by Gen. Bedell Smith, Gen. James Doolittle, and Dr. Ernest Lawrence and others.⁵

27. Authorize the armaments regulation organization through its board of control to establish an appropriate system regulating the export and import of armaments, to take effect after the exchange of military blueprints.

PART III OF THREE PARTS

Further responding to the request of the Secretary of State, USDEL forwards recommendations for the method of negotiation as Part III of this report.

A. The negotiating method of reaching a partial agreement to serve the U.S. priority objectives, as outlined in Parts I and II, would in each instance involve the USDEL advancing initial restricted proposals providing for some bargaining latitude between the present U.S. position and the outlined basis for the negotiated agreement.

B. A parallel negotiating process, centered in the Sub-Committee, conducted with the other Western members as well as with the Soviet Union will continue to be essential, since on each of the major issues each State has tended to take a one-sided first position from a narrow national viewpoint.

C. As tentative agreements are reached on the substance of particular sections the major drafting work to reflect the conclusion into treaty language will be carried out by Ambassador Peaslee working with the Legal Department of the UK Foreign Office and with specific draft language forwarded by each Delegation to the capitals of the Sub-Committee States for approval before incorporation in the draft treaty.

D. When the work reaches an advanced point a formal Sub-Committee report of progress to the UN Disarmament Commission should be made to supplement the informal liaison which the USDEL officers are maintaining with the member states who are not on the Sub-Committee.

E. As this process continues, it will be a special matter for the Secretary of State to conclude as to the point at which the U.S. Senate is to be consulted more thoroughly.

1. Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Disarmament Policy. Secret. Transmitted in telegrams 6122, 6123, and 6124 from London, May 9. (Ibid., Central Files, 330.13/5–957)
2. See footnote 6, Document 192.
3. Document 164.
4. Article 26 of the U.N. Charter provided for the formulation of plans for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.

   Article 47 provided for the creation of a Military Staff Committee consisting of “the Chiefs of Staff of the permament members of the Security Council or their representatives” and listed its general responsibilities.

5. See Document 78.