51. Letter From the Deputy Repesentative on the United Nations Disarmament Commission (Stassen) to the Secretary of State1

Dear Mr. Secretary: In contemplation of the August 29th meeting of the Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission,2 it is suggested for preliminary consideration that the position of the United States should consist of these four principal components:

1.
The formal presentation to the Subcommittee, in accordance with the directive of the heads of governments at Geneva on July 23rd, of the proposals made by all of the four heads of governments at that conference.
2.
A proposal, since all members of the Subcommittee have agreed that inspection, supervision, and control is a vital element of any limitation of armament or disarmament plan, that a reciprocal exchange be arranged for a small technical panel to visit examples of objects of control within each country, and to test sample methods of inspection, within each country, and from these visits, tests, and studies, to endeavor to design and recommend from the technical standpoint the most effective and feasible system of inspection, reporting, and control that might be reciprocally installed, in conjunction with a future limitation of arms or disarmament agreement.
3.
Pending the outcome of the study of the technical exchange panel and of further review by the United States Government, place in a reserved and inactive status the previous United States positions (including particularly the previous United States position for the complete prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons).
4.
A suggestion that a drafting commission for the preparation of a proposed convention for an international armaments commission be constituted, with representation of each of the five members of the Subcommittee, and that this drafting preparatory commission consider the questions of membership in such international armaments commission, voting methods, relationship to the United Nations Security Council and to the United Nations Assembly, duration, right of withdrawal, and other questions involved in the drafting of a convention.

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Each of these four positions can be taken within the existing National Security Council policy.3 Taken together, they would maintain a desirable initiative and a momentum in our work both privately and publicly, and these positions would leave a wide range of flexibility for future United States decisions and would involve no commitment as to the future position on substance.

The second proposal would also serve to test out the willingness of the Soviet Union to come to grips with the problem of inspection.

Dependent upon the response and upon an appraisal of the timing in relation to the total USSR situation, major segments of the substance of the recommended United States policy, such as a willingness for reciprocal cessation of the fabrication of additional nuclear weapons after an effective inspection system is in place, could be decided and announced by the President, the Secretary of State, or Ambassador Lodge. Such additional initiative in the unfolding of United States policy could then be followed up in the Subcommittee and the Assembly as appropriate.

Detailed position papers will be prepared on each of these suggestions, and on other anticipated proposals of the USSR, the United Kingdom, France, and Canada.4

Sincerely yours,

Harold E. Stassen5
  1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up. Secret. A handwritten note on another copy of this letter indicates that Stassen delivered it to Secretary Dulles in person at 11:30 a.m., August 5. (Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission) Stassen also wrote an identical letter to Lodge. (Ibid.)
  2. The four heads of government at the Geneva Summit Conference proposed this meeting in their July 23 directive. For the second item of this three-part directive, which addresses disarmament, see Department of State Bulletin, August 1, 1955, pp. 176–177.
  3. Reference is to NSC Action No. 1419, taken at the NSC meeting of June 30; see Document 45.
  4. Not found in Department of State files.
  5. Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.