Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

52. Letter From the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Deputy Representative on the United Nations Disarmament Commission (Stassen)¹

New York, August 11, 1955.

Dear Governor Stassen: Herewith some comments on your letter to me dated August 5, 1955:²

Paragraph 1 appears satisfactory.

As regards Paragraph 2, it would be necessary to know of what the “small technical panel” would consist, how many persons, what states of origin, how selected, how brought into existence, how paid, and what type of professional competence would be demanded (industrial, military, scientific, etc.). It also raises the question as to how objects of control are to be selected—what type and number, whether military or non-military, nuclear or conventional.

Paragraph 3 appears satisfactory, subject to the reservation that I am not positive that I am acquainted with all previous United States positions. It also is not clear what effect this “inactive status” will have on former United Kingdom, French and Canadian positions. If you plan to get three-power agreement to this before August 29, you run the risk of serious delay.

As regards Paragraph 4, I suggest that it would be important to consider membership for at least one Latin American country and possibly an Asian country.

I see no mention of bilateral talks, which I think are of fundamental importance.

I am afraid that the Soviet Union may try to use either Paragraph 2 or 4 to delay and confuse the issue and thus cause us to lose the position of unprecedented advantage that the President’s aerial photography proposal at Geneva has won for us.³

In disarmament talks in the past, there have been two great problems: The first was Soviet intransigence and the manifest unfairness of Soviet plans. The other has been the tenderness of the British and French towards Soviet proposals and a consequent readiness to take Soviet schemes uncritically and at face value.

At one stroke the President ended all this. The advantage which this has won for us must be maintained. This means in essence a strategy of keeping constantly focused on his proposal, of forcing the pace, of getting a decision in the Subcommittee, in the Commission, and then in the General Assembly–all at the forthcoming Tenth Session.

Our allies are, in effect, committed to the Eisenhower plan—or could easily become so if you bring this up first. Nothing, therefore, must be done to give the allies the chance to wriggle away or to let the Russians change the subject.

In one way or another we must “worry” the aerial photography proposal like a dog with a bone.

I am thinking in terms of: 1. A report to the Disarmament Commission certainly not later than November 1; and 2. the text of a resolution on the aerial photography plan which the Subcommittee and the full Commission would support and co-sponsor when it came into the Assembly.

This resolution should then be adopted by an overwhelming vote and would become the new World Disarmament Policy—which nations would ignore only at the price of world condemnation.

It may be doubtful that you will get an agreement with the Soviet Union either in bilateral or five-power talks. But I think you will get agreement from them through the pressure of world opinion—providing it is applied vigorously and skillfully.

I know from conversations with you that you are aware of the need for speed, and I thought that it would be helpful to set before you some of the problems as they have become evident to me here and in London.

With kind regards,

Sincerely yours,

H.C. Lodge, Jr.

1. Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission. Secret.
2. Stassen’s letter to Lodge, August 5, is identical to the one he wrote to Dulles, supra.
3. For excerpts of Eisenhower’s “Open Skies” proposal at the Geneva Conference, July 21, see Document 48. The full text of his proposal is printed in volume V, pp. 450–453.