Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

59. Letter From the Acting Secretary of Defense (Robertson) to the Deputy Representative on the United Nations Disarmament Commission (Stassen)¹

Washington, August 23, 1955.

Dear Mr. Stassen: In Secretary Wilson’s letter of August 10,² he promised to forward the recommendations of the Department of Defense which you had requested with respect to certain military aspects of the position of the United States Delegation in the forthcoming Disarmament Subcommittee talks. These were:

(a) Whether or not the force levels proposed by the United States in 1952³ should be withdrawn during the forthcoming sessions of the Disarmament Subcommittee, or whether they may be allowed to remain in force as tentative or preliminary objectives for relative ultimate armed force personnel ceilings;

(b) A detailed definition of the term “complete blueprint of our military establishments” which could be submitted by the United States in amplification of the President’s proposal at Geneva;⁴

(c) Comment on an approach which the United States might take to the Disarmament Subcommittee meetings outlined in your letter to the Secretary of State of 5 August 1955.⁵

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have examined these problems and their views, in which the Department of Defense concurs, are contained in two memorandums dated 19 August, subject: “Disarmament Policy Planning” and “Disarmament”. Copies of these documents are transmitted herewith. The first of these memorandums, subject: “Disarmament Policy Planning” deals with items (a) and (c) above, while the second memorandum entitled “Disarmament” is concerned with item (b). With reference to this latter problem, you will note that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have drafted an outline plan⁶ which is considered to be a practical step toward implementation of the President’s proposal. The detailed definition of the term “complete blueprint of our military establishments” which you requested is contained in paragraph 2 a of the latter memorandum and, as indicated, this definition has been developed as an integral part of the Outline Plan and should not be utilized out of context. It is considered that a United States proposal based on the outline suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff would, within the requirements of national security, demonstrate convincingly to the world the absolute sincerity of the President’s Geneva proposal and the genuine desire that it be implemented as an initial step toward world peace.

I would appreciate your affording the Department of Defense the opportunity to comment on the detailed position papers which may be prepared, based on the recommendations transmitted herewith and those of other governmental agencies.

Sincerely yours,

Reuben B. Robertson, Jr.⁷

[Enclosure 1]

Memorandum From the Joint Chief s of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)⁸

Washington, August 19, 1955.

SUBJECT

• Disarmament Policy Planning

1. In accordance with the request contained in your memorandum, subject as above, dated 10 August 1955,⁹ the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their views regarding the specific problem outlined in subparagraph a of the first unnumbered paragraph of that memorandum and regarding the proposals contained in the letter from Mr. Harold E. Stassen to the Secretary of State,¹⁰ which was enclosed with your memorandum.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have on two occasions expressed the view that the United States should neither propose nor accede to a proposal for the establishment of a specific ceiling on the level of armed forces. Reference is made to their memorandum to the Secretary of Defense of 20 May 1952, subject “Numerical Limitation of Armed Forces,”¹¹ and of 9 March 1955, subject “British Proposal for Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments.”¹² In the May 1952 memorandum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff set forth certain considerations which led them to conclude that, from the military point of view, it would not be in the best interests of the United States to introduce in the Working Committee of the Disarmament Commission a proposal for fixed numerical ceilings for the armed forces of the United States, United Kingdom, France, USSR, and China. They stated then that, if for overriding political considerations, the proposal were to be introduced, it should be clearly regarded and handled as a political expedient suitable for use only as a counter proposal to the Soviet proposition for reductions on a percentage basis, and not one suitable for implementation. In the March 1955 memorandum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in commenting upon a British proposal for fixed numerical ceilings, referred to their previously expressed views and stated that those views were considered to be equally applicable to this proposal.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that some form of numerical limitation on armed forces will inevitably constitute one of the components of any comprehensive system for the reduction and control of armaments and of armed forces. However, the disarmament arrangement presently under consideration by the United States Government for introduction in disarmament discussions contemplates no reduction in armed forces prior to the resolution of certain of the major issues causing international tension. Rather, the arrangement now being considered envisages a Leveling Off of armaments in a first phase as a goal in itself, which might be followed by a gradual reduction of armament and armed forces to be contingent upon a parallel resolution of international issues. It would, therefore, seem inconsistent to continue to support or adhere to proposals for reduction of armed forces to fixed numerical ceilings, since this could involve the United States in commitments to details which might apply to later phases of the concept now under consideration regarding which the United States position has not yet been developed. Further, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff have previously noted, the ceilings thus far proposed have been determined arbitrarily and bear no relation to strategic considerations or to the specific security requirements of any state. When originally introduced, the figures were suggested only as a working formula to provide a basis for discussion with the full recognition that, in fixing limitations on the armed forces of states, a number of factors, demographic, geographic, political and economic would have to be considered. Since then, and without any real development and application of the foregoing factors, these figures, originally selected at random, have tended through usage to acquire an aspect of realism and to be viewed as definite and acceptable goals.

4. For the reasons stated in the foregoing paragraph, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would favor the withdrawal now of the United States position regarding fixed numerical ceilings on armed forces. However, they are not in a position to evaluate all of the factors which bear upon this problem and are therefore unable to judge whether it would be politically expedient for the United States to so withdraw its position, If it is deemed infeasible to take this action, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that, in any international discussions on this subject, the United States take the position that the ceilings proposed be treated as originally intended, i.e., as illustrative, as the basis for discussion, and as a line of departure in developing realistic force level figures should agreement on other substantive features of an arms arrangement be achieved.

5. There are no objections from a military point of view to the proposals contained in the letter from Mr. Stassen.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that detailed position papers will be prepared on each of the proposals contained in Mr. Stassen’s letter. They request that they be afforded an opportunity to comment upon these papers where appropriate.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Arthur Radford¹³
Chairman

[Enclosure 2]

Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)¹⁴

Washington, August 19, 1955.

SUBJECT

• Disarmament

1. Reference is made to your memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 29 July 1955,¹⁵ which requested the preparation of a practical outline to implement the broad concept of the Presidential proposal made at Geneva on 21 July 1955 regarding disarmament, and to your memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 10 August 1955,¹⁵ which requested inter alia a detailed definition of the term “complete blueprint of our military establishments”. A reply to the remainder of the latter memorandum is being provided by separate correspondence.¹⁶

2. In approaching the problems presented in the above referenced memorandums, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were assisted by additional guidance provided by the Chairman with respect to the President’s statement at Geneva. As a result, the following terms of reference for the attached outline plan¹⁷ were adopted:

a. The term “blueprint of military establishments” is defined as consisting of the complete order of battle of all major land, sea, and air forces, and a complete list of military plants, facilities, and installations with their locations.

b. Each nation will station observers at key locations within the other country for the purpose of allowing them to verify the accuracy of the foregoing information and to give warning of evidence of surprise attack or of mobilization.

c. Each country shall permit unrestricted, but monitored, aerial reconnaissance by the other country.

3. Paramount in any consideration of capabilities for “great surprise attack” today are the long-range striking forces of both countries. Consequently, the plan for implementation of the Presidential proposal should provide for safeguards against surprise long-range attack by surveillance of such forces and their support, and measures to detect preparation for such an attack.

4. In view of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that a concept which most nearly satisfies the President’s intent and your request would be an exchange of information in progressive stages from least sensitive to most sensitive, covering those items which are most likely to provide against the possibility of surprise attack. Therefore, there is attached for your consideration an outline plan which the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider to be a practical step toward implementation of the President’s proposal.

5. It is considered that this memorandum, together with the attached outline plan constitutes the detailed definition for “complete blueprint of our military establishments” as requested in your memorandum dated 10 August. This definition has been developed as an integral part of the outline plan for implementation of the Presidential proposal and should not be utilized out of context.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Arthur Radford¹⁸
Chairman

1. Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Inspection—Task Force—Military. Top Secret.
2. Not printed. (ibid., Inspection—NSC)
3. At the 12th meeting of the U.N. Disarmament Commission, May 28, 1952, the U.S., U.K., and French Delegations introduced a tripartite working paper proposing the fixing of numerical limitations on all armed forces. For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, vol. I, pp. 365–372. For additional documentation on the proposal, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 2, pp. 954–955 and 989.
4. Contained in Eisenhower’s “Open Skies” proposal.
5. Document 51.
6. Not printed. (Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Inspection— Task Force—Military)
7. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
8. Top Secret.
9. Not found in Department of State files.
10. Reference is presumably to Stassen’s letter to Dulles, Document 51.
11. Printed as an enclosure to Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett’s letter to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, May 21, 1952, Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 2, p. 941.
12. Not found in Department of State files.
13. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
14. Top Secret.
15. Not found in Department of State files.
15. Not found in Department of State files.
16. Not found in Department of State files.
17. The attached outline plan, not printed, was submitted by the United States to the U.N. Disarmament Subcommittee on August 30 as U.N. Doc. DC/SC.1/31. For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, vol. I, pp. 501–503.
18. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.