423. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)1
Washington, February 27,
1957.
SUBJECT
- Philippine Base Negotiations (U)
- 1.
- Reference is made to a memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense dated 11 January 1957,2 subject as above, which requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, within their sphere of responsibility, with regard to the Report of the Bendetsen Mission— Philippine Military Bases Negotiations of 1956. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are submitted herewith.
- 2.
- The concept of collective security is basic to our national security policy. Dependence of military strategy on the physical availability and the right to use a network of overseas bases to support this concept is too well known to be elaborated upon here. The U.S. world-wide position in this regard is a matter of concern to all, up to and including the highest office of our Government. Currently, ways and means are being sought to maintain an adequate world-wide system of overseas military facilities and to preserve world leadership and friendship with our allies, including the Government of the Philippines. In any subsequent negotiations with the Philippine Government, we should strive to convince its representatives of our mutuality of interest and the U.S. need for bases in furthering resistance to Communist aggression.
- 3.
- The military necessity for bases and permission to use them when needed is, from the viewpoint of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a compelling reason for reaching a settlement of the problems presented in the Bendetsen Report. The problems presented therein are largely political. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that issues of this nature will always be exploited in the Philippines and elsewhere for partisan political purposes. Nevertheless, maintenance of U.S. bases in foreign territories in peacetime is always contingent on the host countries’ consent, which is in turn dependent on the prevalence of an atmosphere of goodwill and an appreciation of the mutual need for the bases. The situation in this respect appears to be deteriorating in the Philippines. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe, therefore, that it is in the U.S. interest to take positive steps toward achieving greater mutuality in our defense relationships. While it is recognized that no single U.S. action in this regard will still all the criticism of extremist elements in the Philippines, it is the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [Page 711] that the establishment of a U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Board, as proposed by Mr. Bendetsen, is an important initial step which should be taken now to lend substance to this concept. Discussions within the Board might serve not only to aid in the resolution of many of the current so-called “tangible” issues, but also to remove from the area of public controversy those and other issues, tangible or intangible, which may arise in the future. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are in general agreement with the solutions to “tangible” issues proposed by Mr. Bendetsen.
- 4.
- The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on appropriate intangible issues are contained in the subsequent paragraphs.
- 5.
- Criminal Jurisdiction. The strategic military need for U.S. bases in the Philippines and the necessity to retain them to support U.S.-Philippine posture in Asia is of such importance that in the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff some compromise on the issue of criminal jurisdiction should be permitted if required for successful completion of negotiations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that compromise on this issue could have an important bearing on the morale of U.S. military personnel and might seriously threaten existing status of forces agreements throughout the world. In the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the solution proposed by Mr. Bendetsen would probably not have that effect. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would view with concern any further concession in this regard which would afford lesser protection to U.S. military personnel.
- 6.
- Retaliation in the Event of Armed Attack. U.S. world-wide commitments were summarized in a memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to you, dated 23 May 1956.3 Appendix “A” thereto indicated that in addition to NATO, the United States is committed to come to the defense, if attacked, of Rio Pact countries, of Berlin in accordance with Tripartite Declaration with the United Kingdom and France, of Korea and of Japan. Although not spelled out in the text of the formal agreements, the United States also is obligated for similar action in Taiwan and the Penghus, with the case of Middle East countries desiring assistance now being debated. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the strategic importance of the Philippines to the defense of the United States is of at least equal, if not more, importance than that of many of the foregoing commitments, which in some cases are based on political or economic factors rather than strategic. In view of our traditional ties with the Philippines and the understanding that we would support them if attacked, the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not object to the revision of the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty to bring it into consonance with the North Atlantic Treaty in this regard.
- 7.
- Correlation of the Three Defense Agreements. The Bendetsen Report reflects an uncertainty as to the objective the Philippine Government is seeking by correlation of agreements and it is suggested that this aspect be further explored. Since duration of Military Assistance Agreement is dependent upon Congressional enactment of an annual Mutual Security Act or an extension thereof, correlation of the Military Assistance Agreement with the Military Bases Agreement should be avoided.
- 8.
- Wartime Use of Bases. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur with the agreed upon State-Defense “package” wherein it makes this problem the subject of “military consultation and cooperation”. However, this consultation should take place at the level of the U.S.-Philippine Defense Council established by exchange of notes dated 23 June 1954, pursuant to Article III of the Mutual Defense Treaty. It is the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that any agreement which would limit wartime utilization of the bases or which would give to the Philippine Government a veto power over their use would not be acceptable.
- 9.
- Duration. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that the U.S. position which was approved by the Departments of State and Defense proposes that when a need for bases in the Philippines no longer exists, negotiations may be initiated for termination of the Military Bases Agreement. The determination of the base requirements is a responsibility of the Joint Chiefs Staff.
- 10.
- Other Intangibles. It is noted that the Bendetsen Report makes certain recommendations for solution of other intangible issues, such as taxation, customs and the like. Because of the relationship these matters bear to the morale and standard of living of U.S. military personnel serving in the Philippines, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that, without precluding administrative action to correct any malpractices which may exist, every effort should be made to preserve the protection U.S. personnel now enjoy under the existing agreement.
- 11.
- In conclusion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the strategic importance of the Philippines is such that the U.S. must make a sincere effort to recognize Philippine sensitivities on the bases issue. Although the specific details relating to implementation of certain of the recommendations in the Bendetsen Report are responsibilities of the military departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that, within these limitations and subject to the foregoing remarks, the recommendations of the Report should be carried out expeditiously.
- 12.
- The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, did not participate in the action of the Joint Chiefs of Staff outlined in this memorandum.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: