425. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs (Bell) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)1
SUBJECT
- Developments in the Philippines
All developments with respect to the Philippines have been overshadowed by the tragic death of President Magsaysay. In view of this event I recommend the following with respect to our policy toward the Philippines.
Presidential Election
As was to be expected, the death of Magsaysay has exacerbated political maneuvering for the Presidential and Vice Presidential nominations. The principal contenders for the Nationalista nomination are President Garcia, and Senators Laurel, Sr., Rodriguez, Puyat, [Page 715] Sumulong,2 and Recto. While none of these men, from our point of view can take the place of Magsaysay (with the possible exception of Sumulong), none of them with the definite exception of Recto would give us too serious difficulties if elected.
Horace Smith has reported that Senator Laurel has told him that he will be available if the “elder statesman” in the Nationalista Party wished to draft him. I am inclined to believe that Laurel wants the nomination and that he can get it. I also believe that he would be the strongest candidate the Nationalistas could put up. His bitterness toward the United States has abated considerably during the past three or four years. He is an idealist and while not enthusiastically pro-American, he is intelligent enough to realize that the best interest of the Philippines lies in close cooperation with the United States. I believe that his personal prestige among Philippine Congressmen would give him a much better chance of getting Congressional approval of his policies than Magsaysay was able to obtain. Probably his greatest liability from our point of view is his ambition for his son, Jose, Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives .…
President Garcia has gained somewhat in power and prestige by succeeding to the Presidency. He will certainly make a bid for the Nationalista nomination. Prior to his election as Vice President he was viewed as pro-American and was considered an able senator. He is not a man of strong principles and is willing to compromise for political benefit. He is wise enough to know that at least during the political campaign he will have to endorse the Magsaysay program including close cooperation with the United States on foreign policy if he is to win. He may harbor some racial prejudice against Caucasians. Although he followed the “Recto line” at the beginning of his term as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, he shifted his position after being called down by Magsaysay. Although nominally head of the Philippine Negotiating Panel on the Bases, he did not actively participate. …
Senator Rodriguez, President of the Philippine Senate, is probably too old to get the nomination. He is a moderate and would probably have the support of the Nationalista old guard provided he does not have to come into open opposition to Senator Laurel.
Senator Puyat is an able businessman but new to politics. He is pro-American and would be eminently satisfactory from our point of view. However, it is unlikely that he has the strength in the Nationalista Party to get the nomination unless a deadlock develops among the stronger candidates.
Senator Sumulong is very highly respected, able, intelligent, and sympathetic to the United States. He could be expected to follow the [Page 716] Magsaysay program. From a point of view of integrity, I believe I would place him above any other member of the Philippine Senate. However, his chances for the Vice Presidential nomination are much greater than for the Presidential nomination.
Among the Liberal candidates, a caucus of Liberal Party members have already indicated they will support Jose Yulo. He is reputed to be a man of intelligence and integrity. He has been an advisor to Roxas, Quirino, and, in a sense, to Magsaysay. He probably has the greatest strength of any potential candidate in the Liberal Party and I believe would be satisfactory from our point of view. He is a wealthy man and one of the more economically orthodox leaders of the so-called sugar interests. He might be less than enthusiastic about Magsaysay’s rural reform program. He unquestionably has much greater ability in the field of economics than did Magsaysay.
Senator Paredes3 is 73 years old. He recently switched parties and therefore lacks support from some disgruntled political leaders but he is reported to have enormous popularity in Northern Luzon. Some reports state that with Magsaysay’s death the Ilocanos look to him for leadership.
Congressman Macapagal,4 a former Philippine Foreign Service Officer, has been Chairman of the Philippine House Committee on Foreign Affairs. He is pro-U.S. and anti-Communist, young, vigorous, somewhat vain and would be satisfactory from our point of view.
All of the above have some chance to become President or Vice President. I will see that you have more extensive biographic material on them as soon as possible.
Of the leading contenders, Recto is the only one that would prove really disastrous. You are already aware of his background and views. It is our opinion that Magsaysay’s death rather than helping Recto’s chances, has made it highly improbable that he can be elected. The intense emotional feeling with respect to Magsaysay and the Magsaysay legend, which is bound to arise, put Recto, as the most vitriolic and vocal critic of Magsaysay, in an extremely difficult position. In view of the emotional atmosphere now existing in the Philippines, it is unlikely that any candidate could be elected President of the Philippines unless he endorses Magsaysay’s program and policies. It would be virtually impossible for Recto to do this.
. . . . . . .
[Page 717]Bases Negotiations
During your absence we made some progress toward arriving at a position with respect to the Military Port of Manila, the Subie Naval Reservation and mining at Clark Field. As this was all to be done directly with Magsaysay, we now have to review our basic policy with respect to these issues. Although Garcia probably will be immersed in political maneuvers from now until the election in November, he may conclude despite such preoccupation that it would be to his advantage to show that he can work with the Americans by attempting to settle some or all of the bases issues. If the Magsaysay program becomes, as we believe it will, a major issue in the campaign, Garcia might be able to line up sufficient support to settle the bases issues on terms we could accept. His opposition could, on the other hand, adopt the tactic of obstructing his moves in order to prove he wasn’t the man to deal with the United States. The extent to which we can and should push ahead on the bases problems will depend largely on the attitude Garcia adopts, on the degree to which we may desire to give him a boost, and on the amount of support he may develop.
Our bases problems can be divided into four general categories: 1) Adjustments that we have been committed to do or should have done long ago, 2) relinquishment of lands that we do not need, 3) acquisition of lands that we need, and 4) “intangibles” such as Philippine demands with respect to jurisdiction, duration, retaliation, etc. I would propose that we move ahead with those adjustments which we can undertake more or less unilaterally. These would be 1) arrangement for mining at Clark Field, 2) flying the Philippine Flag, and 3) establishment of a date for the AF to get out of the Military Port of Manila. Action on these items would eliminate sources of friction, and lend stability to the political situation by demonstrating our continued interest in good Philippine relations. After these actions had been announced, the ground would be laid for resolution of those problems which would require Philippine agreement; and we could proceed to take them up with Garcia if at that time it seemed wise to do so.
The next item which would require attention is Olongapo. The Navy is prepared to give up the town and the vast tract of land north of it if the Philippines will move the people out of some 400 houses south of the proposed town boundary and give us base rights in two areas of land across the bay about equal in total size to the area to be relinquished. As discussions on Olongapo would lead us into the question of a property settlement and thence to the intangibles, we will have to approach it with caution. The difficulty with getting into property questions at this time is that the Air Force is [Page 718] still not sure what it wants and has no funds to make use of additional land at this time. Unless the trade of land at Olongapo can be accomplished without reference to other property problems, we would be faced with the problem of asking for an agreement in principle on additional land requirements from a very unstable and probably transitory government. Such an agreement if achieved might be of little value and in achieving it we would be forced into discussion of the troublesome intangible issues (jurisdiction, retaliation, etc.) at a time when the Philippine Government would have very little flexibility in dealing with them.
Whether or not it develops that any progress on the bases issues can be made beyond the unilateral items suggested above (or Olongapo if it can be handled separately), we will have to consider relinquishing base rights at areas we have not used since the war. By contrast with the reduction in size of bases now in use, continued retention of these long unused areas is of little if any bargaining value. If the Air Force continues for long to be unable to specify and utilize additional land areas it wants, there would be little point to continuing to hold unused bases in view of the irritation they cause.
In any case we can move ahead with the development under the ICA program of Mactan Air Base and the Aircraft Control and Warning Sites as Philippine installations on property paid for by the Philippine Government.
If Garcia appears amenable, we should also set up the Mutual Defense Board as soon as possible. (We should not, however, jeopardize eventual realization of this objective by raising it before the ground is well laid.)
Philippine Claims
With Garcia as President, we need to place less emphasis on the political implications of any announcement of our decision on the Philippine claims. I therefore believe that instead of approaching the Philippines with only the claims which we are able to give them some satisfaction we should go back to our policy of making an answer to all claims at one time and that this should be done through the Foreign Office as soon as possible without reference to political campaigns.
Possible Memorial for Magsaysay
An extremely vague proposal made at last week’s OCB meeting that we undertake to promote some appropriate memorial, such as a scholarship fund or even a statue to Magsaysay, seemed to meet with general approval. The idea has been referred to the Philippine OCB Working Group which will meet March 26 to come up with recommendations.
[Page 719]I do not believe that our other policies toward the Philippines need re-examining at this time.
[Here follows discussion of an unrelated subject.]
- Source: Department of State, SPA Files: Lot 61 D 26, Philippine Elections 1957. Secret.↩
- Senator Lorenzo Sumulong of the Nationalist Party.↩
- Quintin Paredes, formerly a member of the Liberal Party, had recently switched allegiance to the Nationalist Party.↩
- Diosdado Macapagal, member of the Liberal Party.↩