Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Volume X, Part 2

377. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

SecDel/MC/7

New York, September 21, 1960.

SECRETARY’S DELEGATION TO THE FIFTEENTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

New York, September 19–24, 1960

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Mr. Achilles
• Mr. A. Guy Hope
• H.E. Mr. Selim Sarper, Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister

SUBJECT

• Turkish Internal Affairs

Foreign Minister Sarper expressed his gratification at being received by Mr. Herter. He declared the Government of Turkey is anxious to continue its close and friendly cooperation with the U.S. Government. He looked forward to working with our representatives in the General Assembly and was happy to note that his old friend Ambassador Wadsworth is now the Chief of the U.S. Mission to the U.N.¹

Mr. Sarper indicated his awareness that there had been considerable interest and speculation among Turkey’s friends about the meaning of the coup d’etat and the establishment of a provisional government. He noted that the coup had come off without any bloodshed or other violent action of the kind which had accompanied the upsetting of regimes in countries near Turkey, and stated that there had been a good deal of pent-up emotion which might have taken a more violent turn. He was happy to report that some fifteen days ago the Committee of National Union had chosen correctly between the two roads open to it² and he felt optimistic about the future course of Turkey in both its domestic and foreign affairs. He commented particularly that General Gursel had shown himself firm in electing a proper and moderate course for his country.

From the first, Mr. Sarper said, the CNU and the provisional government had reiterated Turkey’s continued support for its NATO, CENTO and bilateral alliances. He felt confident these were firm undertakings from which there would be no retreat.

On elections, the Foreign Minister said that there had been considerable speculation in the world press and he thought the Secretary should have the true story. When General Gursel, on assuming power, had talked originally of holding elections within three months after the May 27 coup, Mr. Sarper had gone to him pointing out that this was an impossibility and could only create misunderstandings when the CNU realized the difficulties of writing a new constitution, holding trials of members of the former regime, and taking the necessary organizational steps to hold elections. He had anticipated that postponement was inevitable and that there would be world reaction unfavorable to General Gursel and his colleagues because people would think that they had gone back on their promise because they enjoyed the taste of power. General Gursel had recognized the validity of this point and had agreed that it would be desirable to set the elections definitely for the anniversary of the coup, May 27, 1961. However, the professors who were drafting the constitution had run into the usual difficulties encountered by academic people with their heads in the clouds, and their work was too slow to allow elections by that date. However, Gursel had undertaken to have elections soon enough thereafter to permit transfer of power on October 29, 1961 to the duly elected permanent administration. In the meantime, a “sort-of parliamentary body” was being established to advise the CNU. There would be two representatives from each vilayet (province).

Turning to the trials of members of the Menderes government, Mr. Sarper said he was offering comments because he knew of our concern about this subject. The Secretary, noting that he was reassured by Mr. Sarper’s optimism about the correct road which the Turkish Government was selecting, said that the U.S. interest in the trials is a somewhat narrow one. We are concerned that arrangments which we entered into with the previous administration should not be treated in the trial as a part of activities considered detrimental to Turkey and publicized in such a way as to cast reflections on our alliance. Mr. Sarper said that Ambassador Warren had already spoken to him along these lines³ and that on instructions from General Gursel he had discussed the matter with the Minister of Justice. He undertook to stress the point again with the appropriate officials.

The Secretary inquired about the charges which would be brought against the officials of the Menderes administration. Mr. Sarper said that the basic charge would pertain to violation of the constitution, but would also include murder (killing of the students), attempted murder (of Inonu), attempt to provoke civil war (relating to the distribution of uniforms and the creation of an unauthorized militia and to the subsidizing and free transportation to workers in Izmir for troublemaking purposes), and abuse of power (relating to corruption on the part of five or six cabinet members). Mr. Sarper declared the trials, which he expected to open at the end of the first week of October, would be as fair and humane as possible. Within the limits of space (600 people or so), representatives of foreign embassies and the Turkish and foreign press would be permitted to attend along with the close relatives of the accused. Nine professional judges, some military, would sit. (In order to avoid undue influence on them, the names of the judges were not being made public; they would be elected from a panel.) Each defendant would be permitted to have three attorneys. The Chief Prosecutor would be a professional attorney. Proceedings would be broadcast. Despite speculation and false statements about capital punishment, no decision had been taken and in the nature of things it could not be until the degree of guilt had been judicially determined.

Mr. Sarper turned to the question of the Turkish debt consolidation. He said that the Minister of Finance was coming to Washington on September 22 to explore in an informal way, without any specific proposal to be advanced at this time, the possibility of the reconsolidation of the Turkish external indebtedness, perhaps to include the billion dollar debt which had not been included in the OEEC debt settlement program agreed to in 1959 (that settlement having included less than $500 million). He stated that the previous administration had known very well that it could not meet the debt schedule set up in the OEEC negotiations, which required Turkey to pay $140 to $150 million a year. Turkey needed $400 million annually to carry on and could only earn $200 to $300 million. It seemed to him illogical that the U.S. and other friends of Turkey should be making funds available with the one hand while requiring them to be paid back into the other. If the U.S. should prove receptive to a consideration of ways and means out of this dilemma, the Government of Turkey would consider approaching European creditor nations along the same line, talking to France, Germany and Italy bilaterally, then to the U.K. and perhaps finally to the OEEC.

The Secretary said that he was not acquainted with the details of this situation and assumed that the Minister of Finance would be taking it up with those in Washington who specialized in financial problems. Mr. Sarper said that he wanted to inform the Secretary in advance of Turk thinking about this problem and did not expect any specific comment at this time.

Mr. Sarper said that another problem which was troubling his Government greatly concerned Algeria. He felt that the kind of stalemate which had persisted could not go on and that if the Afro-Asian bloc should produce a sensible solution, Turkey this year would have to go along with it. He had found no flexibility on either side of the question. In talking recently with Tunisians in Ankara, he had heard mention again of a possible federation of Algeria with Tunisia and Morocco. He was not sure how this could work (he compared it with the U.S. having Canada join it without the consent of the U.K.) but thought the Tunisians were serious and that it might offer a new approach to the problem. The Secretary said he was not aware of any such proposal, but responded to Mr. Sarper’s request for advice on the problem by saying he would be glad to ask Ambassador Wadsworth of the USUN staff to consult with the Turks about it. Mr. Sarper said he would like to keep in step with the U.S. on this.

The Secretary inquired whether there was anything new in Turk relations with the USSR. Mr. Sarper responded that very little had happened since the Gursel–Khrushchev exchange of letters.⁴ He had felt that Khrushchev had put his own interpretation on General Gursel’s remarks and had “put words in his mouth”. After studying the matter, the Government of Turkey had thought it advisable to “dot the I’s” and then to publish the exchange of letters. They had waited about a month before publishing them because they had not had an Ambassador in Moscow and were interested in the Russian reaction. What Sarper had attempted to set out was that while the Turkish Government was firmly committed to its NATO, CENTO and bilateral obligations, and intended to remain so, there was an area between this stance and the usual Soviet posture where better “neighborly relations” could be encouraged. He thought the Russians had received this approach favorably and they had made no difficulties about the publication of the letters. He commented that Turkey was genuinely unafraid in its dealings with Russia, and the Secretary complimented the Turkish people for their sturdy and courageous attitude.

The Secretary expressed the hope that problems arising inevitably out of the presence of U.S. military personnel in Turkey would not be allowed to create problems between us. Mr. Sarper said there was a feeling abroad in Turkey that U.S. servicemen were given better treatment in the courts than that accorded to troops of other NATO countries. He wondered if it might be possible to revise the treaty between the U.S. and Turkey to assure that the treatment was equal. Mr. Hope commented that the NATO Status of Forces agreements were uniform among NATO partners and that we had been seeking for some time to get the Turks to implement their undertakings so that U.S. servicemen would receive treatment equal to that accorded to them in other NATO countries. Mr. Sarper wondered if there could not be further discussions about this subject at the Ambassadorial level. The Secretary agreed it might be useful.

Mr. Sarper commented that he thought the Russians had done very well in their propaganda about the U–2 business.⁵ The Secretary thought we would be hearing more about this subject in the next few days. Mr. Sarper said that he had understood that while such airbases as Incirlik and Adana had been mentioned at the Powers’ trial, they had not been identified as being located in Turkey.

In concluding the visit the Foreign Minister said that his role in the provisional government was not an easy one, although it offered many satisfactions. He had been surprised that when Gursel and the CNU dismissed ten Cabinet members recently, he had not been removed from office nor would General Gursel permit him to resign. He stated that he was the prime agitator in the dissatisfaction expressed by the dissident Ministers and indicated that he expected to continue to speak freely. He thought it was a good sign that the provisional government was prepared to accept his criticism and to take considerable guidance from him on foreign policy matters. He hoped the Secretary would help him on his difficult road, for example by seeing that there was favorable press service coverage of his visit with the Secretary and otherwise publicizing his influence with high officials of the U.S. Government.

0. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Hope and approved in S on September 23. The meeting was held at the Waldorf Towers.
1. James Wadsworth was appointed Ambassador to the United Nations on August 27.
2. Presumably a reference to the CNU’s decision that Turkey would continue its strongly pro-Western orientation in foreign policy and limit contacts with the Soviet Union.
3. Warren reported on his discussion with Sarper regarding the fate of members of the Menderes government in telegram 126 from Ankara, July 20. (Department of State, Central Files, 782.00/7–2060)
4. For texts of Khrushchev’s June 28 letter and Gursel’s July 8 reply, see RIIA, Documents on International Affairs, 1960, pp. 418–422,
5. Reference is to Soviet actions in bringing the U–2 incident before the U.N. Security Council and the August 17–19 public trial of U–2 pilot Francis Gary Powers.