Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Volume X, Part 2

378. Memorandum of Discussion at the 461st Meeting of the National Security Council⁰

Washington, September 29, 1960.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1–3.]

4. U.S. Policy Toward Turkey (NSC 5708/2; NSC Action No. 2215–c; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated June 3, 1960; NSC Action No. 2255–b; SNIE 33–60; NSC 6015; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated September 27, 1960)¹

Mr. Gray presented the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 6015. (A copy of Mr. Gray’s Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another copy is attached to this Memorandum.)² In the course of his briefing Mr. Gray read Paragraphs 4 and 5 of NSC 6015 dealing with the orientation of the Provisional Government of Turkey and asked whether Secretary Dillon wished to comment on this problem.

Secretary Dillon said that when the Provisional Government of Turkey first assumed power it had announced that it would continue the pro-Western orientation of the government which it replaced. Subsequently, the Provisional Government, after it learned something about the complexity of foreign affairs and after it had investigated the activities of the preceding government, began to consider the possibility of a slight change in Turkish orientation in the direction of greater receptivity to Soviet overtures. However, an important meeting of the Committee of National Union (CNU) held two or three weeks ago decided that Turkish pro-Western orientation should be continued. Mr. Dillonsaid that the Turks had been dealing with us on a more “forthcoming” basis since the CNU reached this decision.

After describing the economic sections of NSC 6015, Mr. Gray asked whether Mr. Scribner wished to make any comment. Mr. Scribner said he did not have much to add. A great deal of pressure had been required to induce the Menderes regime to take the steps necessary to put the Turkish economy in order. The Menderes regime had not been in power long enough to complete these steps but the present Provisional Government of Turkey seemed to be carrying on the reforms undertaken by the Menderes government in the economic field. Secretary Dillon remarked that the Provisional Government had been able to eliminate certain unnecessary public works projects which had been personally linked to Menderes.

Mr. Gray then described the split in Paragraph 42 of NSC 6015 dealing with the possibility of reducing NATO-approved force goals for Turkey.

Mr. Staats said the Budget position had been well described by Mr. Gray. Budget agreed that an overall review of Turkish force goals would take place whether or not a provision for such review appeared in NSC 6015. However, Mr. Staats felt no damage would be done by providing for this review in the paper. He felt there was a danger that Turkish force goals may be unrealistically high. The main argument against Paragraph 42 as proposed by Treasury and Budget had been that Turkey would not make as much effort to reach the NATO-approved force goals if there was provision for their review. Mr. Staats felt, however, that this argument might be turned around; it could be said that Turkey would not make much effort to achieve unrealistically high force goals which were not specifically subject to review. Mr. Scribner said the U.S. had provided assistance to Turkey averaging $277 million a year for the last five years. The new five year military assistance plan contemplated an increase in assistance to Turkey up to $400 million a year. Mr. Scribner doubted that we would be able to provide this level of assistance and doubted whether Turkey could absorb this amount. From a reading of NSC 6015 it appeared that such a high level of assistance could not be provided for Turkey unless international institutions or countries other than the U.S. shared in giving the assistance. He was concerned lest the goals be set so high as to be unobtainable, with the result that shortfalls would be inevitable. He felt that setting the goals at too high a level would defeat rather than advance the objectives of our assistance to Turkey.

Secretary Gates felt it was difficult to disagree with the wording of the Treasury–Budget proposal which read “consider the possibility of reduction.” He felt the question to be considered was what are the NATO requirements. These requirements were at the present time under review by General Norstad. Moreover, NSC 6015 in Paragraph 44–a–(6) spoke of “reducing or eliminating non-essential military elements.” Secretary Dillon said the State Department agreed with the remarks of the Secretary of Defense. Consideration was constantly being given to the possibility of reducing force goals. Moreover, Paragraph 42 proposed by Treasury and Budget emphasizes ability to absorb. In Mr. Dillon’s view, ability to support is also an important consideration. Paragraph 42 contains the implication that the U.S. should not provide any assistance which Turkey cannot itself support. Turkey, however, will not be able for a long time to come to support the kind of military force it should have. Finally, Mr. Dillon believed that it was not wise to single out Turkey as the only country to which we applied a provision calling for consideration of the possibility of reducing force goals.

General Twining noted that SACEUR and the JCS kept Turkish force requirements under constant scrutiny. Turkey had been making a great effort to achieve NATO-approved force goals and had been making considerable progress in that direction. General Twining was anxious to see Turkey reach the NATO force goals if Turkey could absorb sufficient assistance to enable her to do so. Secretary Dillon said he had been assuming that a training program would enable Turkish forces to learn how to handle the new equipment they would receive.

The President asked what Turkey thought about its force goals. Did Turkey want to continue building its forces up regardless of the situation? General Twining replied that the new government was not interested in building Turkish forces to unrealistic levels. Secretary Dillon said that Turkey wanted a smaller, harder-hitting force. Turkey has informed General Norstad that it will not be able to meet the NATO-approved force goals and that the latter must be revised. Mr. Dillon added that State objected to Paragraph 42 because of its emphasis on Turkish ability to absorb and support the military program without any mention of requirements.

Mr. Scribner said he believed the increases in assistance to Turkey envisaged in the five year military assistance plan were unrealistic. Secretary Gates pointed out that these increases simply brought Turkish assistance back to the level at which it had previously existed. Mr. Scribner said he believed U.S. assistance to Turkey over the last ten years had averaged about $250 million a year. Secretary Gates pointed out again that Paragraph 44–a–(6) would seem to solve the problem since it referred to “reducing or eliminating non-essential military elements”. Mr. Scribner thought it would be unwise to establish force goals which would not be attainable either because of Turkish inability to absorb the requisite assistance or because of our inability to provide enough economic assistance in support of military assistance.

The President thought that in revising Turkish force goals, it would be necessary to consider Turkish economic capacity as well as the amount of assistance which nations other than ourselves could contribute to Turkey. Secretary Dillon said Paragraph 42 would not be objectionable to him if it read as follows: “In reviewing NATO-approved force goals for Turkey, consider the possibility of a reduction in those goals in relation to Turkish ability to absorb and the overall ability of the NATO alliance to support the military program.” There was no objection to the revision suggested by Mr. Dillon.

Secretary Dillon said he wished to bring out two more points. First, the State Department’s latest information was that a recent CNU meeting had postponed the elections in Turkey until October 1961. Second, the Development Loan Fund was making progress on the project for building in Turkey a new steel mill which would produce 360,000 tons of steel a year. This steel mill would be a joint enterprise with DLF, U.S. private interests, the Turkish Government, Turkish private interests, and French private interests all putting up a share of the money. Chase Manhattan Bank and the U.S. steel companies were cooperating. Mr. Dillon believed the steel mill project was very significant for Turkey.

The National Security Council:³

a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 6015; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon, transmitted by the reference memorandum of September 27, 1960.

b. Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 6015, subject to the following amendment:

Page 17, paragraph 42: Delete the brackets and the footnote thereto, and revise to read as follows:

“42. In reviewing NATO-approved force goals for Turkey, consider the possibility of revision in those goals in relation to NATO requirements, as well as to Turkey’s ability to absorb and the overall ability of the NATO Alliance to support the military program.”

Note: NSC 6015, as amended by the action in b above, subsequently approved by the President; circulated as NSC 6015/1 for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government; and referred to the OCB as the coordinating agency.⁴

[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]

Marion W. Boggs

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Boggs on September 27.
1. NSC 5708/2 is printed in Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. XXIV, pp. 720–727. NSC Action No. 2215–c, approved April 9, instructed the NSC Planning Board to revise all current NSC papers for the incoming Presidential administration. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) The Executive Secretary’s June 3 memorandum, which recommended revision of NSC 5708/2, is Ibid., S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5708. NSC Action No. 2255–b, approved July 6, instructed the NSC Planning Board to revise NSC 5708/2. (Ibid., S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) SNIE 33–60 is printed as Document 371. A copy of NSC 6015, “U.S. Policy Toward Turkey,” September 14, 1960, is in Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 6015. The Executive Secretary’s September 27 memorandum, which transmitted the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is Ibid., NSC 5708.
2. Not printed.
3. Paragraphs a–b and the Note that follows constitute NSC Action No. 2311. (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Actions by the National Security Council)
4. NSC 6015/1 is printed as Document 379.