Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

227. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State¹

BeirutJuly 24, 1958—4 p.m.

658. From Murphy. As indicated Embtel 621,² I have had a number of interviews with varied sectors of Lebanese political opinion relating to Middle East situation in general, to opinions on US landing in Lebanon, and to an internal political solution of Lebanese problem. Following are highlights of these conversations:

1. Maronite Patriarch Meouchi, the Patriarch who for 14 years was a priest in the US and at one time was an American citizen, celebrated mass which I and McClintock attended early Sunday morning. We later breakfasted with the Patriarch who is one of the most political prelates I have encountered. His view is infected by an overbearing hatred of President Chamoun. In his calmer moments, the Patriarch revealed a Munich-type of mind advocating appeasement with Nasser and a “positive” neutral stance for Lebanon. Although he was coy in indicating preference for any particular presidential candidate, he did say he thought it was now impossible for General Chehab to be elected president (although he revealed that Chehab comes to him frequently for counsel). Drift of his argument was in favor of electing former President Bechara el-Khoury. My general impression of the Patriarch is that he is partisan and up to his armpits in the campaign against Chamoun. He would accept a compromise candidate such as Hitti.

2. Prime Minister Sami Solh: This pleasant if wily old ex-magistrate, obviously a seasoned politician who because of his position as a Sunni-Moslem, is useful to US, although he has been “excommunicated” by the Moslem Mufti. The Prime Minister was delighted at our landing and feels most Lebanese agree with him. I would estimate that he is pretty well at the end of his career.

3. Turkish Ambassador, Cevdet Dulger, a diplomat of long experience in the Moslem world. He has a refreshingly simple approach to all problems in Middle East: “The Arabs are moved by only two considerations—fear or money. What you should do is to buy them off. For two million dollars you could have done as much in Lebanon as you do much more expensively with an entire fleet.” Dulger says the same reasoning applies to all other Arab states. Public opinion in Iraq, for example, he dismissed as non-existent, but repeated his formula, force and funds.

4. Greek Catholic Archbishop Nabaa: This prelate is subtle, intelligent and very well-disposed toward the west. He has recently returned from a visit to Lourdes, Brussels and Rome. Unlike the Turkish Ambassador he felt Lebanese solution must involve issues of principle and that next president must be a man of probity and good character. He thought Jawad Boules was candidate who would come closest to filling the bill.

5. Archbishop of the Greek Orthodox Church, Saleeby. This staunch old prelate is extremely pro-American and proud of the fact there are more than 4000 of his relatives living in the US. He is coming to Washington next year on a leader grant and, as Embassy has pointed out, has his miter in the ring to become the next Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Antioch with headquarters in Damascus. Saleeby, whose congregation is the next largest to Maronites among Christians of Lebanon and which he says contributes 40 percent of all tax revenues to the government, pledged support of Greek Orthodox Lebanese for any presidential candidate US would indicate.

6. Opposition leaders Abdullah Yafi and Hassan Oueini: Through intermediary of former State Department officer, Colonel William Eddy, who speaks fluent Arabic, I met these two “moderate” leaders of opposition at a neutral house. They were fervent in professing friendship for the west and the US but insisted their quarrel was only against Chamoun. In consequence, they deplored US landing. Their view of Nasser and how his relations with US had covered gamut of ups and downs was very much as might have been described by Cairo Radio. They were frankly astonished when I set the record straight on our dealings with Nasser over recent years. They professed desire to see insurrection ended and US forces depart. Their hatred of Chamoun seemed intense.³

7. Middle-of-the-road politician Raymond Edde: Edde, whose younger brother is Minister of Finance in the present Cabinet and whose father was a President of Lebanon under French mandate, gave a fairly well-balanced account of how insurrection began and course of events. An indication of incredibly fragmented political structure here is that he called his so-called “national bloc” party largest single entity in Parliament controlling 4 seats out of 66.

8. Maronite Archbishop Abed of Tripoli: A valiant old bishop well-known for being anti-patriarch and pro-Chamoun. He described conditions in Tripoli where he said many of Christian element were camped near his bishopric in a posture of self-defense. He described conditions in Moslem quarter of city as appalling. Significantly Moslem Mufti had come to his house for asylum. Bishop indicated he had some influence over rebel leader Rashid Karame and thought he could still persuade him to course of moderation.

9. Third force leader, Henri Pharaon. This wealthy, Greek Orthodox landowner and financier, who was one of early organizers of anti-Chamoun movement and a leading instigator of general strike which led to insurrection, is now concerned largely with saving his own skin. However, for the record, he protests our landing and had in his pocket a telegram for SC protesting it as a violation of Lebanon sovereignty. He seemed, however, willing to be persuaded when we pointed out errors in this conclusion, and volunteered to withdraw his telegram. Pharaon impressed me as an intelligent twister who wishes to hedge his bets and to come out on willing [winning?] side.

In addition, I saw entire Latin American diplomatic corps last night at residence as McClintock has arranged weekly briefing of the Latinos, much to their delight. This is a give more than take proposition.

One thing which struck me because it is only unifying through [thought?] in all these interviews was agreement on imperative necessity of holding presidential elections soon. Whether center, opposition or extremely loyalist, all were in agreement on this point. Chamoun in our last conversation told us he felt confident parliament could convene before end of this month and succeed in electing a president who, he thought, would be able to carry out this pro-western foreign policy.

We were impressed yesterday evening by a new sense of confidence in Chamoun. He said several times, “My mind is now at ease because I know independence of Lebanon is saved.” He seemed very sure of himself in stating he thought a new president could shortly be elected. As for his own returning self-assurance, he said as we were leaving that he would still be a power in Lebanon even though he would not be president.

One other general conclusion I draw from these interviews is that increasingly important opinion in Lebanon is accepting fact ours is not an occupying force. I also have feeling most Lebanese welcome our presence here and feel it will make it possible for them to reach a political solution. They are also becoming convinced of sincerity of our statements when we say we are not here to impose a president upon them.

Meanwhile, Admiral Holloway and we are continuing our work on General Chehab and his officers to prepare for eventual military action against immediate focus of infection in Beirut should that prove necessary after presidential elections.

McClintock

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.13–MU/7–2458. Secret.
2. Document 219.
3. Murphy cabled a fuller account of this meeting to the Department in telegram 657 from Beirut, July 24. (Department of State, Central Files, 110.13–MU/7–2458; included in the microfiche supplement)