Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

226. Memorandum of Discussion at the 373d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, July 24, 1958¹

Washington, July 24, 1958

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1.]

2. The Situation in the Near East

Mr. Gray presented an oral report on the results of discussion by the NSC Planning Board of U.S. courses of action designed to prevent the United States from appearing to oppose Arab nationalism and to counter hostile radio broadcasts in the Near East. (A copy of Mr. Gray’s briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting, and another is attached to this memorandum.)² Mr. Gray then called on the Secretary of State for an oral briefing on the situation in the Near East from the diplomatic and foreign policy standpoint.

Secretary Dulles said the situation in Lebanon seems to be as satisfactory as can reasonably be expected. Since U.S. forces entered the country, rebel activities and foreign promotion of such activities had substantially decreased. Relations between the Lebanese and the U.S. forces have been good, and no violent incidents have occurred. Mr. Robert Murphy was presently in Lebanon talking with President Chamoun, General Chehab, and rebel leaders, in an effort to bring about early elections to choose a successor to Chamoun. While the elections could be held at any time after today, Parliament would probably not be convened for at least another week. The Secretary thought that if a successor to Chamoun could be elected and if the United Nations effort could be stepped up, the situation would become better and in fact reasonably secure. In the UN Security Council a Japanese Resolution had been vetoed by the USSR, which had been the only member to oppose it. However, the Secretary General of the United Nations had said he would carry out the spirit of the Resolution under the general authority granted him by the Charter. Accordingly, the Secretary General was actively recruiting additional personnel for the United Nations in Lebanon in order to throw the mantle of the United Nations around Lebanon and make it a United Nations ward. The United States was maintaining good working relations with the Secretary General.

Secretary Dulles thought the situation in Jordan was not quite as favorable as in Lebanon. The United Kingdom had requested that U.S. forces be introduced into Jordan to stand beside the British forces and take over much of the supply effort. Such a move would involve the question of over-flights of Israel, to which Israel was objecting. The Secretary had discussed this question yesterday with the Israeli Minister, and had an appointment with the Israeli Ambassador today. Meanwhile, efforts were being stepped up to improve communications facilities in Jordan. For example, it was hoped that a 50-mile stretch of road between Aqaba and Amman could be put in shape so that adequate supplies could be moved by sea and land. At present, adequate supply was dependent upon an airlift. Secretary Dulles added that this morning the internal situation in Jordan had improved. The King had indicated that there was no real need for U.S. forces in his country, but he continued to want U.S. forces in Jordan as a symbol of U.S. interest. Secretary Dulles said he did not wish, however, to leave the impression that Jordan was secure. The situation remained dangerous, with a large part of the army of doubtful loyalty and with large numbers of Palestinian refugees capable of mob action. Nevertheless, the immediate

situation leading to Western intervention had been met; that is, a careful plot to take over the Government of Jordan along the lines of the Iraqi coup seemed to have been thwarted or postponed.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

Israel is deeply concerned over the situation in the Near East. The Israelis feel that the presence of U.S. forces in Lebanon and U.K. forces in Jordan gives them more protection for the time being, but they are fearful of future developments. If a coup occurred in Jordan, it is not clear what the Israelis would do. Secretary Dulles said that he had asked the Israelis this question and a definitive answer would be forthcoming shortly. The Israeli interim reply had stated that chaos in Jordan would invalidate the armistice agreement between Israel and Jordan, and leave Israel free to take the action necessary to its own security. This was a highly dangerous situation which might result in the renewal of Arab-Israeli hostilities.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

The Director of the U.S. Information Agency referred to Mr. Gray’s report of the Planning Board’s discussion on jamming of hostile radio broadcasts. He wished to point out that if Radio Cairo broadcasts were jammed, there might be additional tension and agitation among the West Bank refugees in Jordan. If these refugees were suddenly deprived of their accustomed Cairo broadcasts, then resentment against the government in Amman would be increased, possibly enough to tip the scales toward revolt. This consideration should be carefully weighed before any decision to jam Cairo broadcasts.

Mr. Allen said that from the public relations point of view, it would be a very bad thing for the United States to get involved in Jordan. The United States had a convincing story on Lebanon and we have some hope of coming out of the Lebanese situation with honor and dignity, but our position is not the best even in Lebanon. In Jordan, public support for the government is no greater—and possibly less—than Iraqi public support was for the deposed Iraqi regime; so that foreign intervention is difficult to justify before world opinion. If we support King Hussein, a monarch with no roots in the country and among the people, we will be in a very bad position. Jordan was an artificial creation resulting from World War I, with no history. Recently the Senate in the Sudan had unanimously condemned U.S.–U.K. action in the Near East. Mr. Allen was afraid if we stay on this wicket, the USSR will beat us to death in public opinion. We must adjust to the tide of Arab nationalism, and must do so before the hotheads get control in every country. The oil companies should be able to roll with the punches, and will in fact be on a firmer foundation in Iraq in the future than under the old regime.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

Mr. Gray then called on the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for an oral briefing from the U.S. military viewpoint. General Twining said the situation in Lebanon was calm. Lebanese snipers had been firing at our planes near the airport, but there had been no casualties from enemy action. Cooperation between U.S. and Lebanese armed forces had been satisfactory. The Lebanese Army was reluctantly seeking to bring the rebel forces under control, but this operation was not proceeding as rapidly as was desirable. The rebels were still unmolested in the Basta, their stronghold in Beirut. The landing of U.S. forces in Lebanon had taken place in accordance with a contingency plan (code name: Blueback)³ prepared in May. The original plan had provided that the Marines and the Army would establish lodgment in Beirut, and that U.K. forces would also enter Lebanon. However, a political decision had been made that the United Kingdom would not participate in the Lebanon landings and the plan had been adjusted accordingly. General Twining then caused two maps to be displayed, one showing the disposition of U.S. forces in Beirut and adjacent areas, and the other showing the disposition of U.S. forces in the Near East. General Twining said there were about 6000 Marines in Lebanon, about 1700 Army troops adjacent to the Beirut airport, and a contingent of Army support forces which would bring the Army total to 2500. In connection with the map showing the disposition of U.S. forces in the Near East, General Twining pointed out that a Marine landing team was enroute to the area from Okinawa. U.S. airborne forces in Germany and in the United States had been alerted. The U.S. Navy had two attack-carrier striking groups in the Mediterranean. General Twining said that the logistic support for the operation in Lebanon had been provided by transport aircraft which had now returned to the United States. Tankers and refueling planes had remained in the area. The airlift capabilities of U.S. forces in Europe and MATS capabilities were being used. About 20 per cent of our SAC forces had been placed on 15-minute alert, and a large proportion of the remaining SAC forces had been put on a relatively short alert. Air defense command units had also been put on a short alert. U.S. jet planes recently made a low-level demonstration over Jordan which had apparently been effective. British forces in Jordan had been airlifted from Cyprus. The United States had assisted the operation in Jordan by airlifting oil.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

The National Security Council:⁴

a. Noted and discussed the subject in the light of:

(1) An oral briefing by the Secretary of State from the diplomatic and foreign policy viewpoint.

(2) An oral briefing by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the U.S. military viewpoint.

(3) An oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence from the intelligence viewpoint.

(4) An oral report by the Chairman, NSC Planning Board, on the results of discussion by the Planning Board of possible U.S. courses of action designed to prevent the United States from appearing to oppose Arab nationalism, and to counter hostile radio broadcasts in the Near East.

b. Noted that the NSC Planning Board would prepare as a basis for discussion at the next Council meeting a list of relevant policy issues arising out of the present situation in the Near East, together with arguments for and against taking various possible courses of action.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]

Marion W. Boggs

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Boggs on July 25. The full text of the discussion of item 2 is scheduled for publication in volume XII.
2. included in the microfiche supplement.
3. The correct code name was “Blue Bat.” See Document 40.
4. Paragraphs a and b that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1951, approved by the President on July 28. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95)