Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

235. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Delegation at the Baghdad Pact Council Meetings, at London¹

Beirut, July 26, 1958—3 p.m.

158. For the Secretary from Murphy. McClintock and I saw Chamoun this morning at President’s request. He said (Embtel 698)² that as he had half anticipated General Chehab had not moved against Basta despite assurances given to Admiral Holloway and ourselves yesterday. General now claims he will commence operations some time this afternoon. Chamoun said that following our interview yesterday he had implored Chehab “to act like a man”; and indicated to us this morning that he would not make up his mind definitively re pushing Chehab for presidency before Monday. He still hoped general could somehow generate sufficient determination to undertake military action against the Basta before that time, but it was clear Chamoun viewed prospect with immense skepticism.

President said there was further intelligence of Syrian intervention. He claimed he had received word at 10:30 last night of Syrian penetration close to Tripoli. Troops in uniform had been identified wearing Arab headdress instead of Syrian peaked cap, and a tank, he said, had been located at Tripoli airport. We asked if he had immediately communicated this intelligence to UNOGIL. Chamoun smiled contemptuously and said they were so ineffective it would not have been worthwhile.

We agreed that since neutralization of Basta is largely a police action, it might prove useful if gendarmes should compose striking force with Chehab to backstop it by armor and artillery. Failing that, at least Admiral Holloway might consider taking up with his forces certain guard positions now held by gendarmes with view to releasing them for police action against Moslem insurgent quarter. We shall discuss these possibilities with Holloway shortly.

We discussed with President contents Deptel 487³ repeated London 1040 and found Chamoun unhappy but resigned at first three paragraphs thereof. I gave Chamoun careful account of my talk yesterday with Jumblat (Embtel 715)⁴ and said we also from our own observation concurred in feeling it would be unwise to move against Jumblat in present circumstances (Deptel 487). Chamoun said he disagreed because he was convinced eventually military action would have to be taken in the Chouf, but he would accept our views at present.

In closing, Chamoun said we need not worry about elections next Thursday. Once his own mind was made up (and he still favored Chehab if latter could be brought to action), he felt it would be possible for decision to be taken in Parliament July 31.

After seeing Holloway, we hope to have another talk with Chehab⁵ and then continue circuit by consulting once more with Chamoun.

McClintock

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/7–2658. Secret. Repeated to the Department of State. The source text is the Department of State copy.
2. Document 232.
3. See footnote 6, Document 229.
4. In telegram 715 from Beirut, July 25, Murphy reported that he had met in the Chouf with Druze opposition leader Jumblatt. Jumblatt was strongly in favor of prompt elections for president, but skeptical that such elections would take place while U.S. forces shored up Chamoun’s position. Murphy concluded that Jumblatt did not contemplate aggressive military action, and recommended against the military operations which Chamoun had been pressing for in the Chouf. He felt that Jumblatt, like most other Lebanese political figures with whom he had spoken, would be thankful if the crisis could be resolved by an internal solution. (Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/7–2558; included in the microfiche supplement)
5. Murphy and McClintock met with Chehab that evening and found him again unwilling to take military action against the Moslem opposition force in the Basta. To do so, he argued, would lead to a renewal of rebel activity and postpone the presidential election. Chehab added that he felt Chamoun would not hold the elections as planned unless the United States put heavy pressure on him. (Telegram 744 from Beirut, July 26; Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/7–2658; included in the microfiche supplement)