236. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation at the Baghdad Pact Council Meetings, at London1
Tosec 4. Re Amman 272.2 Following are our preliminary comments on King Hussein’s proposals for recruiting two additional brigades, mutual defense agreement between US and HJK, and new regional defense organization.
As Wright says, proposal to create two additional brigades might have advantages if we desired to maintain Jordan as Free World fortress in Middle East. However, we do not believe it would be in US interests to attempt to do this and in fact we would be happy if some way could be found for us to disengage ourselves from our responsibilities [Page 404] in Jordan with minimum political disadvantage. Under circumstances it would seem to us undesirable to become involved in further heavy commitments, especially since it seems almost certain that sums we would be required to provide to accomplish Hussein’s purposes would be substantially greater than the $8 million he mentions when consideration is given to annual maintenance costs, effect on Jordanian budget of maintaining two additional brigades, etc. It is also by no means certain that existence of two additional brigades would prevent coup against King.
On other hand, until we can see more clearly how situation in the Middle East is going to develop, and because of fact that our prestige is heavily engaged in Jordan, we are probably required to continue to extend considerable degree of support to Hussein. Although it would seem inadvisable to agree to equip two additional brigades, it might not be too disadvantageous to sign a military aid agreement (not a mutual defense agreement) with Jordan whereby a MAAG would be established in Amman and some additional training and equipping of the Jordanian army undertaken by us. This would not, however, establish rationale for withdrawal UK forces. We regard it as highly unlikely that a number of the states proposed by Hussein would be willing to enter into suggested Middle East regional defense organization and we of course do not believe that Baghdad Pact is “finished” as a northern tier defense agreement. Accordingly, we believe that Hussein should be discouraged from further consideration of this proposal.
We were encouraged by Hussein and Rifai remarks concerning recognition of Iraq which should prove useful background for your conversations in London.
Essential thing for Jordan as we see it is that there be eventual political adjustment whereby Jordan, perhaps with some manifestation of UN interest in protecting it against indirect aggression, would cease to be “embattled island in Nasser sea.” We should be working to achieve this, not to build up Jordan’s isolation from Arab world.
Defense requests foregoing be brought to attention Sprague.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/7–2558. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted by Rockwell and cleared by Herter and in substance by Irwin in Defense.↩
- Document 233.↩