Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

237. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State¹

London, July 28, 1958—3 p.m.

Dulte 4. In conversation before lunch Sunday Defense Minister Sandys and the Prime Minister raised with Secretary subject of joint military planning in Middle East operations.² In ensuing discussion they suggested that if not joint planning at least planning liaison would be desirable. As British idea presented in rather general terms, Secretary said he would study question on basis written exposition which Macmillan undertook to send him. Some hours later following letter received from Prime Minister:

“July 27, 1958. Dear Foster:

Our talk at luncheon clarified my mind a great deal. This is how I see the position. If, in spite of the French complication, the Russians accept a meeting of the Security Council, then I think it unlikely that desperate action will be taken by Nasser or the new Iraq Government to precipitate a crisis in the Middle East. We might look for a few weeks’ pause before any further serious trouble develops–such as a coup in Jordan or a move against the Western interests in the Gulf.

If under one pretext or another the Russians decline a meeting this will mean that they have decided to hot up the cold war in the expectation that they will gain more from this than from a temporary pacification.

If the first happens and there is to be a meeting in a fortnight or so, we must work out together, with great speed and concentrated effort, both a short-term plan for Lebanon and Jordan and a longer-term plan for the Middle East generally. It may well be that we shall not be able to make much practical progress with our longer-term ideas at this first conference; but it is most important that we should be seen to be taking a liberal and forward-looking view and should not appear merely to be concerned to protect our own Western interests.

If, on the other hand, there is no conference, the cold-war pressures will be accentuated. Just, therefore, as the State Department and the Foreign Office should be working together on a political plan for the conference, so we should also be engaged in intensive joint planning (mainly on the military side) for the second situation in case it should arise. I am not suggesting that we should undertake any fresh commitments at this stage, or that any operations we may have to undertake should necessarily be joint operations. But we ought to make sure that each of us knows what the other has in mind, and that all our plans, whether joint or separate, fit together.

I am quite happy about the machinery for political consultation and planning. For we [are] well accustomed to working together either through normal diplomatic channels or through the special machinery in Washington. (I confess that I am not so happy about the military side. Ought this to be concerted in Washington and, if so, by what machinery? Or ought it to be done through Admiral Holloway—either at his advance headquarters, or at his rear headquarters in London? Perhaps, as there must be a substantial political element in all this, it would be best done in Washington. You will know best. But that it must be done, and urgently done, I am sure you will agree.)

Yours ever, /s/Harold Macmillan”³

Whitney

1. Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Top Secret; Priority. The telegram was marked in the Department of State for Presidential handling, which indicates that it was sent to the White House for Eisenhower.

2. According to a memorandum of this conversation, prepared by Greene, Macmillan and Sandys expressed concern to know in advance of any additional military moves the United States might undertake in the Persian Gulf, should events deteriorate further in the Middle East. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1061)

   Dulles reported separately on his discussions in London with Macmillan and Lloyd in Dulte 1 from London, July 27. In that telegram, Dulles noted that he and Macmillan shared a concern that if the Soviets backed away from a heads of government meeting, on whatever excuse, “we will be facing a period of increased difficulty and danger, especially in the Middle East.” Dulles concluded that he and Macmillan agreed that “we need urgently to find more effective machinery for joint planning—military, political, economic and psychological—to face this risk, if the Soviets reject our UNSC proposals.” (Ibid., 6 Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204) Both documents are included in the microfiche supplement.

3. Dulles acknowledged Macmillan’s letters with a brief note to Macmillan on July 28, which indicated that he was consulting with Washington and would respond later. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204)