Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

247. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State¹

Beirut, August 1, 1958—4 p.m.

891. During my call this afternoon on General Chehab, he said he informed President Chamoun this morning that his immediate program involved two fundamental objectives;

1. A new government must be formed forthwith. Parliament by its act yesterday had repudiated Prime Minister Sami Solh who had politically opposed Chehab’s election and in consequence, a new cabinet was necessary. He said that although Chamoun made no commitments and was preoccupied with finding a formula how to let Sami Bey out without loss of face, he had impression that Chamoun as a practical politician would agree to a change in government.

2. Next problem was the Basta. General could now no longer tolerate Basta continuing as a focus of infection. Revolution there should have to be eliminated by one means or another. However, he was hopeful insurrection could be terminated through negotiations. He said Saeb Salaam, self-styled “Commander-in-Chief”, had become “tres sage” and was seeking to have a talk with the General. Chehab hoped therefore revolution in all parts of country might speedily come to an end.

General again raised possibility of Chamoun “taking a trip” (vide paragraph 2 Embtel 869).² I referred to Secretary’s press conference yesterday in which he had alluded to possibility of Lebanon and Jordan being represented at SC “summit” meeting August 12.³ I wondered if possibly President Chamoun might attend this meeting as head of state. At first Chehab was hesitant, saying Moslem element in country would be deeply suspicious of leaving it to Chamoun to discuss an international guarantee for Lebanon. However, upon reflection he said he thought it might be possible provided Chamoun were accompanied by representative Moslems as members of Lebanese delegation. It was clear General quickly saw possibilities of getting Chamoun out of the country in rapid course but with necessary political safeguards for his action in New York.

Reverting to question of declaration from US on withdrawal of US forces (Embtel 869), I observed to Chehab it was a fortunate coincidence that yesterday Secretary in his press conference had said “whatever our views may be, we would not stay in Lebanon after we had been asked to withdraw by duly constituted Government of Lebanon.” General said this was exactly what he had in mind and was very pleased at tenor of Secretary’s remarks. I left with him translation in French of pertinent excerpts and requested he have his staff give him resume of entire press conference⁴ from wireless file text.

Comment: I am much encouraged by change in General’s attitude during past few days. This is the first time in almost three months he has on his own initiative talked in a determined way on eliminating insurrection from the Basta. He is also warming to his new responsibilities. In particular, he is heartened by a new vigor and pride in all ranks of Lebanese Army which he said with glowing eyes “is now the old army as it used to be.” With his increasing confidence and assurance of unified support from armed forces, I have feeling Chehab will bring an end to insurrection quickly.

McClintock

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/8–158. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Cairo, London, Paris, and USUN.
2. Document 244.
3. For the transcript, see Department of State Bulletin, August 18, 1958, p. 269.
4. For the transcript, see ibid., pp. 265–272.