255. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State1
943. From Murphy. McClintock and I made farewell calls today on Malik, Chamoun and Chehab.
Malik had nothing constructive to offer except a memorandum written off the top of his head including such a choice item as: “I hope and trust that the intervention of the US in Lebanon will not amount to a victory of the rebellion and therefore of Nasserism and communism in Lebanon.” Text will go forward by pouch.2
Chamoun charged me with taking a personal message to President Eisenhower to express his heartfelt thanks for prompt action by US which had saved independence and integrity of Lebanon.
Chamoun indicated that for time being at least he and cabinet had decided there would be no change in government. Reason put forward by President was that any “caretaker” government which might replace that of Sami Solh would probably ask for immediate withdrawal of US forces. This would plunge country into anarchy with threat of renewed violence in civil war. It was a risk he said he could not take.
(Comment: Chehab said later he had explicitly told President yesterday that he did not intend at once to ask for US withdrawal. Our feeling is Chamoun is torn between two emotions: 1. His reluctance to cast adrift Sami Solh; and 2. His stark inability to find another Sunni Moslem politician who would accept Prime Ministership during next five weeks.)
My talk with Chehab was most satisfactory. In fact, I am increasingly impressed each time I see the General with his eminent common sense (cf. penultimate paragraph Embtel 2832)3 and with his position of being above considerations of ward politics which so embitter and embroil Lebanon political scene.
Chehab said he had sought in vain to secure agreement of Chamoun to appointment of an interim government. He confirmed impression given us by President that Chamoun now intends for both himself and Sami Bey to stick it out in office until September 23. Chehab made no bones of his misgiving that this decision by Chamoun would prolong insurrection. Although in general country [Page 433] was much quieter than before elections, the fanatic elements in such places as Tripoli and the Basta were outside control by moderate leaders including Rashid Karame and Saeb Salaam. Chehab took at face value Salaam’s assurance to me (Embtel 936)4 that insurrection would continue until Chamoun leaves.
As for withdrawal of US forces, Chehab said he had couched his statement to nation in terms deliberately designed to leave him elbow room in respect of time and manner in which our troops would be phased out. Chehab said he certainly did not wish American forces to depart until he had security situation well in hand and had made good progress in solving difficult problem of collecting arms with which Lebanon now saturated. Chehab likewise said he was convinced even leaders of Moslem opposition did not desire withdrawal of US forces until peace had been restored although, as a sop to their mob, they had to make public statements clamoring for our departure. I had certain impression from Chehab he will not want removal of our forces or make any form of request in that direction for some time to come. In response to my question he said he would be willing to concert with Adm. Holloway on a possible phased reduction in our troop strength.
Queried as to his attitude on UN observers, Chehab said he thought they might have a practical role to play, particularly in assuaging fears of Christian element when US troops begin reembarkation. He thought UN observer force might usefully stay on a while longer after period of US withdrawal. He seemed to have no precise thought one way or another on possible build-up of UN observer strength.
Queried as to nature of government he would seek to form after taking office, Chehab said he wanted an inconspicuous government made up of people truly devoted to trying to heal wounds and restore national unity. He made a quiet point in describing the characteristics he sought in a new Foreign Minister being a man who would not only understand the Arab world and relations with the occident but who would also have roots at home and understand his own people.
Chehab was explicit in his thanks of US intervention both military and political. He was kind enough to say that without my efforts here elections would not have taken place and although he expressed regret he was the man chosen, he left no doubt in our minds that he intended to do his duty and to carry out that duty in his own way.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/8–558. Secret. Repeated to Cairo, London, Paris, and USUN.↩
- Not found.↩
- The reference is in error and has not been further identified.↩
- Telegram 936 from Beirut, August 5, reported on Murphy’s meeting on August 4 with opposition leader Saeb Salaam. (Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/8–558; included in the microfiche supplement)↩