254. Editorial Note
On August 5, Chairman Khrushchev addressed the final letter to President Eisenhower in the series of exchanges which began with Khrushchev’s letter of July 19 proposing a five-power summit conference to discuss the Middle East. In his August 5 letter, which was a response to the August 1 letter from Eisenhower, Khrushchev repeated his arguments concerning the responsibility of the United States and the United Kingdom for the crisis in the Middle East, but switched the thrust of his proposal to a call for an emergency session of the U.N. General Assembly to discuss “the question of the withdrawal of troops of the USA from Lebanon and troops of Great Britain from Jordan.” [Page 430] Khrushchev stated that the Security Council had become subservient to the United States and did not represent a proper forum for such a discussion. For the larger questions of war and peace, he proposed that preparations begin for a separate summit conference of the great powers to “facilitate the creation of trust and mutual understanding between states and aid in a more rapid thawing of the ice of ‘the cold war’.” Similar letters were addressed on the same day to British Prime Minister Macmillan and French President De Gaulle.
The text of the letter to Eisenhower was conveyed to the Embassy in Moscow on August 5 and was transmitted to Washington in telegram 336, August 5. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/8–558) Copies of the three letters were sent to the U.N. Secretary-General and were circulated to the members of the Security Council on August 5 as U.N. doc. S/4079. The full text of the letter to Eisenhower is printed in Department of State Bulletin, September 1, 1958, pages 342–346, and excerpts are printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pages 1019–1021.
Khrushchev’s proposal was received in Washington as an opportunity to seize the initiative on the issue in the General Assembly. Assistant Secretary of State Wilcox recommended in this vein to Acting Secretary of State Herter shortly after Khrushchev’s letter was received. (Memorandum from Wilcox to Herter, August 5; Department of State, IO Files: Lot 65 D 30, Special Meeting—1958) Lodge concurred from New York, and proposed that the United States seize the initiative at the outset of the emergency session by introducing a resolution which would contain a positive proposal to meet the constructive aspects of Arab nationalism. (Telegram 218 from USUN, August 5, ibid., Central Files, 396.1/8–558) Herter called Dulles in Brazil at 6:40 p.m. to get his response. Dulles felt that, while the United States was not bound to accept the Soviet proposal, it should welcome a General Assembly meeting and not be afraid of it. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Paper, General Telephone Conversations; included in the microfiche supplement)
Herter’s discussion that afternoon with British Minister Lord Hood revealed, however, that the British were concerned about a General Assembly session called to consider Jordan and asked the United States to delay in responding to the Soviet proposal. (Memorandum of conversation, August 5; Department of State, Central Files, 320/8–558) Herter raised the British concern in a meeting with Eisenhower shortly thereafter, but the recommendations from Dulles, Lodge, and Wilcox, and the public release of the letter by Khrushchev combined to dictate a quick public response if the United States was to seize the initiative at the United Nations. Eisenhower also felt that, since the United Kingdom had the right under its treaties to go back into Jordan, the British government would not be embarrassed in the [Page 431] General Assembly. (Memorandum of conference with the President, August 5; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries; included in the microfiche supplement)
Accordingly, Eisenhower responded to Khrushchev’s letter by releasing a statement at 7:30 p.m. on August 5 in which he welcomed Khrushchev’s agreement that the problems which had been under discussion in the exchange of correspondence should be placed before the United Nations. He expressed regret that Khrushchev had rejected discussion in the Security Council, but added that a meeting of the General Assembly for the purpose of the discussion was completely acceptable. He was instructing the United States Permanent Representative to the Security Council to request such a meeting. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, page 1002.
Permanent Representatives Lodge and Sobolev each introduced resolutions in the Security Council on August 6 calling for an emergency special session of the General Assembly. (U.N. docs. S/4056/Rev. 1 and S/4057/Rev. 1, respectively) The Soviet resolution called for consideration of the question of the immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops from Lebanon and U.K. troops from Jordan, but the Security Council on August 7 adopted the United States resolution which simply made reference to the lack of unanimity among the permanent members of the Security Council, and called upon the General Assembly to assume responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security with respect to the questions at issue. (U.N. doc. S/4083; all of these resolutions are printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pages 1022–1023, 1027–1028) Lodge reported on August 6 that the British position with respect to a special session of the General Assembly “had come around completely,” and that the British now hoped that the General Assembly meeting might create conditions which would enable them to withdraw from Jordan. (Department of State, Central Files, 320/8–658)