Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

280. Memorandum of a Conversation, New York, August 18, 1958, 3 p.m.¹

New York, August 18, 1958, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Resolutions

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Ambassador Lodge
• Mr. Reinhardt
• Mr. Freers
• Foreign Minister Gromyko
• Mr. Soldatov
• Soviet Interpreter

Mr. Gromyko opened the conversation by saying that he thought it was useful at this time to exchange some views concerning the work of the current Session of the General Assembly.

He recalled that the Secretary had expressed his opinion that it would be worthwhile to find a basis for constructive decisions.² In return, he had put forward the Soviet considerations especially regarding their resolution³ which had just been submitted that day. Subsequently, the Norwegian resolution⁴ has been submitted. Since Mr. Dulles had indicated interest in the possibility of doing things on a constructive basis, he wanted to make clear that the Soviet attitude was that the Norwegian resolution was completely negative and the Soviet Union could not give it support. Everyone, including the US,

UK, USSR and the Arab countries, concurred that what was involved was an immediate withdrawal of US and British troops from Lebanon and Jordan. In the Norwegian resolution, one condition after another was piled up. Therefore, the Soviet Union not only could not support it but resolutely rejected it. The Soviet resolution provided for the immediate withdrawal of troops from Lebanon and Jordan. If the United States truly favored withdrawal, there should be no objection to this. The Soviet resolution also envisaged a definite role for the UN in the matter. Gromyko recalled that he had spoken to the Secretary in their earlier conversation about strengthening the UN Observer Group in Lebanon and sending a UN Group to Jordan. The presence of UN representatives on the spot would remove any concern about external interference in the affairs of Lebanon. What was there in such a position that was not acceptable to the United States?

The Secretary had said the situation was more complicated in Jordan. There was no reason to prevent the immediate solution of this question. The presence of a UN Group in Jordan would solve this problem. Furthermore, this General Assembly would have its say with regard to the question of non-interference from the outside. How does this not accord with the views of the United States and the United Kingdom? These considerations were being put forward with the thought in mind that it might be possible to achieve a mutual understanding in accordance with everyone’s views.

The Secretary said that, as he understood the situation from his earlier talk with Mr. Gromyko, he did not feel that there was a very great difference between us. He did feel that the Norwegian resolution conformed to the principles we had discussed. The principal differences between us seem to be two. The US contemplated that any withdrawal of troops would have to be fitted into two other things. One, a declaration by the Arab countries, particularly the UAR, reaffirming the principle of non-interference in the affairs of other states. We understood from Foreign Minister Fawzi that the UAR did not object to this. There was, however, no such declaration in the Soviet resolution. Two, while the Soviet resolution does seem to recognize a certain connection between US and British withdrawal and the establishment of a strengthened UN Group in Lebanon and Jordan, there is the implication that the Soviet Union’s plan calls for troops to come out immediately. Of course, it would take some time to set up a UN Group. Such a Group, however, is a common element in our positions and brings us closer together. Since there is no objection by the Arabs to a declaration of non-interference in a UN resolution, there seems to be no basic objection from any quarter to what the US has in mind. In considering the relation of withdrawal of troops to the establishment of UN machinery, it is not possible to withdraw without seeing how the machinery would function. There is a connection between the two, and there could be no serious objection to this. The Secretary said he did not see the differences that seemed to underlie the strong Soviet position against the Norwegian resolution.

Gromyko replied that when the Soviets talk about a definite role of the UN and the necessity of having an Observer Group, they do not have in mind that there should be any delay in the withdrawal of American and British troops. Since there was no UN Group in Jordan, one should be set up immediately and sent within a few days. Experience showed that observers could be on the spot in several days—five or six days and even earlier as far as the capital itself was concerned. If there were agreement, observers could be sent simultaneously with the withdrawal of troops. Agreement could be reached and expressed in one or perhaps two resolutions. The Soviets did not want to derogate from the role of the UN in this situation. There should be no difficulty in coming to agreement on the thesis of non-interference in internal affairs. There would hardly be any delegate of the Arab countries directly concerned who would not support this. It was Gromyko’s understanding, however, that they would do so only if a solution were reached satisfactory to all concerned, which appeared a reasonable viewpoint to him.

The Secretary recalled that he had said in the previous conversation with Gromyko that the important thing was to know whether or not the UAR wants to take over Lebanon and Jordan. This question could not just be determined by a resolution. Failure of the UAR to accept the principle of non-interference would amount to a suspicious circumstance, but even if it did accept it, there was no assurance that it would abide by its promise. The important thing was to make sure that the Governments of Lebanon and Jordan could be confident in their own minds that their two countries would be let alone. UN presence would serve as a reminder that no violation of pledges could occur without those responsible being caught. If these two things he had been talking about took place the US would withdraw quickly. This could not be done in 15 minutes, of course. The initial contingents had been combat troops, but various support elements had followed them up. It would take some time to carry out the withdrawal, but if there were a genuine feeling that the UAR intends to keep hands off and if the UN were present, there could be no reason why the US withdrawal would not take place expeditiously. The Secretary mentioned that in his earlier talk with Gromyko he had indicated he saw no reason why the UAR would want to take over Lebanon. It would be a direct liability to her. If the UAR wanted Lebanon it would at least have to face war with Israel. There was a balance of Christians and Moslems in the country. Disruption of this balance would make the country a real liability for the UAR. The Secretary thought that the UAR would stay out if there were a UN presence in Lebanon. The US wanted to get its troops out. It had not, as alleged, sent them there to keep Chamoun in power nor to attack Iraq. There was no other reason for their being there except to keep the Republic of Lebanon from losing its independence. Once it was satisfied this danger did not exist, it would manufacture no pretext for delay but would leave promptly. Mr. Gromyko should understand that all sorts of resolutions could be passed, but if war broke out in the Middle East it would be difficult to keep world peace. Thus we must work to make a settlement that will be effective.

Gromyko observed that there was a difference between the internal problem of the area and the external problem which should be the subject of UN concern. He would deal only with the latter and the Soviet Union would only approach the problem of the Middle East and of Lebanon and Jordan from this point of view. With regard to the role of the UN no one wished to minimize this role or its significance. The US stressed it, so did the USSR, and the British and the Arabs. Why was it not possible to come to agreement? The question of the UN’s role could be linked with the main question of the withdrawal of troops. A UN group could be sent to Jordan within 4 or 5 days. This would reflect the general feeling here. It should be possible to reach an understanding on this score with the Arab delegations. Mr. Dulles, however, went further. He discussed future plans of the UAR. Mr. Gromyko said he had no information about any plans of the UAR. This was going a bit far. It was a hypothetical approach and could hardly be productive.

The Secretary replied that, as he had said before, the important thing was to be satisfied that there existed no destructive purposes. If this could be achieved, there was really not much difference between the Soviet and US positions. The Soviets spoke about immediate withdrawal and related it to some kind of UN action. The situation in Lebanon was not quite this simple. There was, on the other hand, some relation as far as Jordan was concerned between withdrawal and the international situation. If Jordan disintegrated a very serious situation would result. The problem of Jordan could not be easily and quickly dismissed. It would not be solved just by sending a handful of observers to Amman. Thus, there was a reason for dealing with withdrawal from Jordan in such a way as to achieve sufficient order and stability there to prevent the Israelis’ claiming that the Armistice Agreement had been dissolved. Withdrawal from Lebanon was less complicated from this standpoint, but it would be necessary to pay some attention to the views of the Governments of Lebanon, both the outgoing and the incoming one. They are entitled to get some help. We could not accept the view that they are not entitled to help, but we could accept the possibility that help could be worked out in other ways. It was necessary to have the situation worked out through dealings with the other Arab countries. The Secretary General would be negotiating with them and their cooperation would be necessary in order to obtain the use of their territories to get assistance to Jordan. All this was not a problem that could be solved simply in 4 or 5 days.

Mr. Gromyko remarked that it was necessary here to differentiate between two questions—the internal situation which concerned only the Government of Jordan, and the external situation. With regard to the internal situation, how was he to understand the question outlined by Secretary Dulles? Was the UN somehow to play a part in the internal affairs there? As to the external situation, it was possible to achieve a satisfactory solution aimed at securing the political independence and territorial integrity of Jordan. There were two considerations involved. First, the UN group, apart from other functions it may have, would supervise the situation along the frontiers of Jordan. Would not that be a guarantee even against interference? Second, declarations or statements would be made by other states regarding non-interference. Would not these aim at the same purpose? This would solve the question of the preservation of Jordan as a state. This being the case, the question of the Armistice Agreement would not, in his opinion, arise at all.

The Secretary said that the sending of observers to Jordan would certainly help preserve the territorial integrity and the political independence of that country. Nevertheless, it was obvious that the group could function only in agreement with the Government of Jordan. Just what they did agree to he did not know. The Secretary repeated that he felt there was no basic difference between the American and Soviet positions, except perhaps that the Soviet delegation wanted the US to agree in advance to withdraw regardless of whatever would happen and the US wanted to see what would happen before it withdrew.

Gromyko wondered what possible happenings there might be and what time period was envisaged. He suggested that the talk be concentrated more specifically on the time element in order that there might be a better understanding.

The Secretary replied that the reference in the Norwegian resolution to a report by the Secretary General by September 30 meant that we expected that there should be something substantial to report by that time.

Gromyko remarked that during a previous conversation the Secretary had spoken of the possibility of US withdrawal without a request from the Government of Lebanon to do so. Now the Secretary did refer to such a request and was talking in terms of a longer period. Reference was made to “happenings”. Reference to “obscure happenings” and “unknown happenings” made it difficult for the Soviets to agree to our position. They felt that all this not only led to unnecessary delay but would not improve the situation. Thus they felt it was necessary to reach agreement on the question of withdrawal, which would be useful to the great powers and to the peace of the world—that is, if everyone were interested in assuring peace. Gromyko said he had the impression that, while Secretary Dulles’ line of reasoning touched many aspects of the situation, in the end it was limited to the provisions of the Norwegian resolution. If all this reasoning were simply leading up to the Norwegian resolution then he believed the scope of the usefulness of the talks had been narrowed down.

The Secretary pointed out that, as Gromyko undoubtedly knew, the Norwegian resolution had gone through much rewriting. There had just been another change this morning. There was nothing any more sacred about its language now than there had been a few days ago. Its principles seemed sound to us. The resolution reaffirmed the dangers of indirect aggression. It asked the Secretary General to make arrangements to uphold the principles of the Charter with respect to Lebanon and Jordan. This might involve the people on the frontier or it might not. The Secretary General would have to come to a conclusion on this. The Secretary had made a declaration for the US that it would withdraw as soon as the Government of Lebanon requested it to do so, when the Secretary General had made the arrangements called for by the resolution or if the General Assembly itself called for the withdrawal. The provision for a report by September 30 presupposes that something would happen by that time. The language of the resolution had been changed many times. The US was not stubborn about its views. He believed that our basic ideas were not very different from what Gromyko had suggested. He hoped something like the Norwegian resolution would form a basis upon which we could all agree.

Gromyko remarked that he had already voiced his opinion about the resolution and if he spoke at greater length would only be repeating himself.

The Secretary stated that it seemed that Mr. Gromyko desired a mechanistic formula in the present situation. On the other hand, the United States supported a formula involving the principles of the United Nations. The Soviet resolution calls for a withdrawal of troops without delay.

Gromyko interrupted to say that he meant in a reasonable time, of course.

The Secretary continued if a suitable resolution were passed and talks held with the UAR and we were convinced that the situation was a stable one with regard to interference from the outside—, we would begin to reduce the size of our forces there. We had already made some reductions. There was no desire on our part to continue the present level which served no useful purpose. It was not possible, however, to talk about a specific date of withdrawal. We did not know what the Secretary General would do or what he would recommend.

Gromyko said that while the Soviet resolution called for withdrawal without delay of American and British troops the Soviets naturally understood that this could not be done with rocket speed. The technical problems would require some small space of time. The withdrawal should, however, be carried out without delay and without its being surrounded with many conditions as provided in the Norwegian resolution. It was his opinion that Secretary Dulles was not correct when he expressed the view that there was not much difference between the US and Soviet positions. The Soviet resolution would be more productive since it was based on general agreement and settlement in the interests of all concerned. He did not lose hope that Secretary Dulles would think over the considerations he had put forward and that the US would, on its own part, seek to contribute toward finding a solution in the interests of all concerned, the Soviet Union included.

The Secretary remarked that no resolutions are perfect and that it is difficult to capture in them exactly what was intended. If the Soviets wanted the US and the British out, the Norwegian resolution would do it better than the Soviet one. When he examined the Norwegian resolution he did not see much that the Soviets objected to. The solution would be difficult if the Soviet Union injected a mechanistic resolution. Scheduling progress by ten days here and ten days there would not work. Much depends on what the Secretary General does and what the UAR does. If arrangements between them are effective, the Soviets would see US troops moving out in a hurry. The Soviets had to do something on faith. If these arrangements were made, they would see results in a few weeks.

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1097. Secret. Drafted by E.L. Freers. The source text indicates that the conversation took place in the U.N. building.
2. See Document 268.
3. See footnote 8, Document 267.
4. See footnote 3, Document 278.