279. Memorandum of a Conversation, New York, August 18, 1958, Noon1
SUBJECT
- Situation in Lebanon and Jordan
PARTICIPANTS
- Foreign Minister Fawzi—United Arab Republic
- The Secretary
- Ambassador Lodge
- Mr. Rountree
Dr. Fawzi stated his concern regarding the Norwegian draft resolution2 which, he said, had been under active discussion by him with [Page 492] the Norwegian and other delegations. He did not think it adequately met the question of withdrawal. Until there were some more specific indications regarding withdrawal of US and UK forces, there would be serious problems for all of us. While American forces were in Lebanon, there was always the danger that “your boys and our boys” would become involved in difficulties which might spread against the wishes of both sides. From the UAR viewpoint, one half the problem involved the question of withdrawal itself and the other half public opinion. He wished the Secretary’s advice as to how the situation might be met.
The Secretary reviewed at some length the reasons for the presence of US and UK forces in Lebanon and Jordan. He said that it was difficult to capture in the precise words of a resolution the spirit that would be required to meet the situation adequately. We had, in fact, listened to the views of a number of delegations and had already made many concessions to those views. He thought the resolution in its present form provided a good basis upon which we could find a solution, provided there was the intention on the part of the UAR not to interfere in Lebanon and Jordan.
The Secretary said that in contrast to Lebanon, Jordan is an artificial state. You cannot do what is perhaps the natural thing, which is to have it divided up and absorbed by the surrounding countries. We therefore need an understanding that the UAR will accept the rather special position of Lebanon and Jordan.
Our purpose is to get out if it is your purpose to keep your hands off, the Secretary declared. If this condition exists, the problem can be solved quickly. If the UAR has fruitful talks here with the United States and the United Kingdom, it should make possible a resolution which you would not oppose. A bitter fight here would be very bad. In drafting a resolution like this it is difficult to find the right words. But if the UAR keeps its hands off we can get out.
Dr. Fawzi then alluded to what he described as “one minor point” in the resolution: the paragraph referring to the United States and British troops and their withdrawal. Dr. Fawzi thought the paragraph makes it appear that the General Assembly would approve of their presence there.
The Secretary commented that this paragraph is only a historical reference and does not imply approval. Mr. Lodge recalled that the word “presence” was in and we dropped it in the belief, which we got from Ambassador Engen (Norway), that this would meet with UAR approval.
Dr. Fawzi observed that the idea of endorsing the US–UK presence is still there by implication.
[Page 493]As far as Lebanon is concerned, the UAR is ready to accept the presence of observers and to throw as much light as possible to show that it is not interfering. The UAR, Dr. Fawzi said, will offer friendly advice to Lebanon to calm the situation down, particularly after Chehab is in.
As regards Jordan, the UAR accepts the fact that arrangements—that is observers and UN presence—should be made to ensure there is no interference by the UAR or anybody else. The UN presence had better not be in Amman, Dr. Fawzi thought, because if it is there it will be regarded as being the government.
As regards Jordan’s future, Dr. Fawzi went on, if it is a fact that Hussein can be safe in his own country, well and good. If some desire him to go to the UK to finish his studies, well and good.
We cannot envisage, Dr. Fawzi said, any union with Lebanon or Jordan if the people do not want it—and we do not want Lebanon. Dr. Fawzi said that Egypt would never have wanted Syria if the people in Syria had not wanted to join with Egypt. If Jordan wishes to continue as a nonviable state for a while, we shall say nothing, Dr. Fawzi said, “Jordan is either too much of an expense for us or else it is too much of a danger to us.” It seems, Dr. Fawzi observed, that her association with Iraq is the most logical course, but it is up to the Jordanians—the UAR cannot force them. The UAR wants neither too great a burden nor too great a danger.
The Secretary observed that the US pays 50 million dollars to support Jordan. The moment we stop, the Secretary said, the situation collapses.
Dr. Fawzi thought that the change-over should be reasonable, not sudden.
The Secretary said that the problem of Jordan’s future seemed to him almost insoluble. Perhaps, he thought, there is a future with Iraq. The Israelis believe that Iraq is dominated by the UAR. The Secretary commented that he did not know whether they would differentiate between Iraq and the UAR or not.
Dr. Fawzi said he did not know what direction Jordan will go, but thought there was a need for a breathing spell. We must not be in too much of a hurry. If we make clear to the Israelis and the Arabs, and if the UN makes it clear, and if the two Big Powers—the US and the Soviet Union—make it clear that they will not tolerate any aggression from either side, then there can be no such aggression. Dr. Fawzi said that he had told this to Gromyko (USSR) the other day, and he did not dispute it.
The Secretary observed that paragraph A of the joint draft3 covers
this.
[Page 494]Dr. Fawzi said the UAR wants direct contacts outside the GA parallel to the action of the GA. It would be good, he mentioned, if we could envisage an agreed draft resolution—neither East nor West—something which would not make this an area of the cold war. We should not delay.
The Secretary said we should not tinker with this resolution any more in order to please the Latin Americans or India. The important thing is to get an agreement with the UAR. You tell us you will keep hands off, and we can get our troops out. The Secretary said he had been observing international events since the Hague Conference of 1907 and had become somewhat cynical about the words that governments use. The Secretary said he had concluded that countries usually operate in accordance with what they think is to their own best interest. It seemed to him that the best interests of the UAR are to keep hands off Lebanon and Jordan.
There are not big enough stakes in Lebanon and Jordan, according to the Secretary, to take the risks of starting a war. He knew that the US wants nothing. While the UK once wanted to establish a base in Jordan, the Secretary was convinced they want nothing now.
Dr. Fawzi affirmed that there is nothing the UAR wants. We accept observers and all the guarantees, he said.
Dr. Fawzi observed that he had had no indication at all of how long the troops would stay and the date of their withdrawal.
The Secretary replied that the heart of the matter is: what is the attitude of the UAR? If the UAR does not keep hands off, the UN cannot find enough troops to stop them. But if the Secretary General could act quickly and the UAR does not interfere, we would pull out right away. We can be well under way by September 30.
Dr. Fawzi asked if all the troops could be out by September 30.
The Secretary said no, since it takes longer to get out than it takes to get in; it may take at least 30 days to get them out.
Dr. Fawzi said that he wanted an approximate idea.
The Secretary said he could not be precise. Chehab doesn’t want anything drastic done about troop withdrawal until after September 24th. After that he probably would not object to our definitely beginning to withdraw. If the United Nations acts and we get the UAR’s assurances, it could happen quickly.
Dr. Fawzi said he needed a parallel understanding with the United Kingdom.
The Secretary said we know that it has been UAR money and UAR direction coming from Cairo and from Damascus which has been behind much of the present situation. The UAR can exert a big influence to quiet things down and make it easier for us to get out, and make it easier for Chehab to want us out.
[Page 495]Dr. Fawzi said there is no point in his denying or admitting what the Secretary said about UAR activities. There is no point in saying things about other interventions which have taken place. The main thing is to end this confusion. We want to work in a constructive spirit, Dr. Fawzi said. We want the United Kingdom’s assurances too because if they cannot withdraw, it will make your withdrawal difficult.
The Secretary said we are not committed to a concurrent withdrawal with the United Kingdom but we have agreed to consult and we believe that the United Kingdom is sincerely anxious to get out.
Dr. Fawzi said he thought a third resolution is the best answer in the United Nations.
- Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1097. Confidential. Drafted by Rountree and Lodge. The source text indicates that the conversation took place in the Secretary’s suite in the Waldorf Towers. The text of this memorandum of conversation was transmitted to the Department in Delga 655, August 18. (Ibid., Central Files, 320/8–1858)↩
- See footnote 3, supra.↩
- See footnote 4, supra.↩