343. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State1

1827. Prior to receipt Deptel 14202 I had again spoken with Chehab last night, indicating now that the [Secretary-]General had published his report3 setting forth our views on withdrawal it was all the more necessary to move swiftly on issuing communiqué. Again Chehab referred to his concern as outlined Embtel 1790.4

This morning I saw Foreign Minister Takla who had cleared draft text of communiqué with certain modifications both with Chehab and Prime Minister Karami. Our next telegram5 sets out English translation of draft communiqué from French text collated with an Arabic text which Takla also handed me. Department will note there are several significant drafting changes designed no doubt with a view to Karami not placing himself by implication in a position of having approved request of previous Lebanese Government for our landings here.6

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Takla said his government thought communiqué should be issued unilaterally by US, but with a simultaneous release in Lebanon by government radio and by communication to Lebanese press. I said I would ask Department’s instructions on this point and on substantive changes in draft text.

As to question of date and hour, I suggested that possibly we could release communiqué as of noon Washington time Monday October 6. Foreign Minister replied he would prefer to check that out first with Chehab and Karami and would let me know. They are still seriously concerned with psychological effect of such an announcement coming at a moment when Christian general strike is still in full swing and government is on eve of releasing its decree calling for surrender of clandestine weapons.

I shall continue to press for a rapid decision on this point, but would appreciate Department’s urgent comment on Lebanese amendments.7

McClintock
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/10–358. Secret; Priority.
  2. Telegram 1420 to Beirut, October 2, instructed McClintock to make it clear to Chehab that the longer the decision to begin the final withdrawal was delayed, the harder it would be to meet the target date of withdrawal by the end of October. (Ibid., 783A.00/10–158; included in the microfiche supplement)
  3. See Document 337.
  4. In telegram 1790 from Beirut, October 1, McClintock reported that Chehab and Takla were reluctant to agree to the release of the communiqué outlining the withdrawal until after the publication of an impending decree by Chehab calling for the surrender of unauthorized arms within a stated period of time. (Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/10–158)
  5. Telegram 1829 from Beirut, October 3. (Ibid., 783A.00/10–358; included in the microfiche supplement)
  6. Paragraph 2 of the communiqué as revised in Lebanon reads as follows: “The United States sent its forces to Lebanon in the special circumstances generally known. Furthermore, the United States took steps in the United Nations with a view to having it adopt effective measures to preserve the independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon and thus facilitate the withdrawal of the American forces.” (Telegram 1829 from Beirut)
  7. The Department replied, in telegram 1447 to Beirut, October 4, that it could not accept the revisions to the draft communiqué proposed by the Lebanese Government. The revisions, the Department felt, would radically alter the nature of the communiqué and put the circumstances under which U.S. forces entered Lebanon in an unclear light. Since the communiqué was to be released unilaterally by the United States rather than jointly, the Department intended to use the language originally proposed, with some modification to meet Karame’s sensibilities. (Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/10–358) McClintock discussed the Department’s position with Chehab that evening. He reported that Chehab was still sorely disturbed over the probable effect on the Christian population, but conceded that the announcement proposed by the United States could be made on October 8, as there would then be a responsible government with, he hoped, a vote of confidence. (Telegram 1843 from Beirut, October 4; ibid., 783A.00/10–458) Both telegrams are included in the microfiche supplement.