Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

342. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State¹

Beirut, October 2, 1958—4 p.m.

1805. As indicated Embtel 1791,² I saw Chamoun this morning, taking a helicopter provided by General Adams to avoid numerous road blocks imposed now both by Phalange and Lebanese army. Chamoun is currently at the Villa of a rich industrialist in a village called Bois de Boulogne near Dhour Choueir.

It took half an hour to move half a mile from where helicopter landed to Chamoun’s villa as road was blocked by 15 large buses and perhaps 75 private automobiles filled with cheering adherents of ex-President. A crowd of almost a thousand people filled garden outside villa equipped with two brass bands and a plethora of automatic weapons. When Chamoun appeared to greet me there was a deafening chant of “we will have no other President than Chamoun”; this refrain continued without interruption for the full hour of our interview, punctuated by numerous shots in the air. According to gendarme captain who met me, similar scenes have gone on almost continuously over past ten days. He estimated average daily visit of adherents to Chamoun’s residence at around 5, 000.

Chamoun was obviously excited and pleased at the adulation. How any man could think calmly amid such din or reach objective conclusions is a mystery to me. However, Chamoun did make certain very emphatic points:

(1) Chamoun still held to his word that he pledged full support Chehab as President of Lebanon. It was his pressure on Parliament which had resulted in Chehab’s election and he was still ready to do everything within reason to make Chehab’s regime a success.

(2) Christian and to some extent a certain Moslem opinion had been outraged by Chehab’s selection of new Karame government. Karame epitomized rebel from the barricades whom everyone knew had taken Syrian arms and money and who would follow a policy not only of going along with Nasser but of placing Moslems in places of preference in public administration. Other members of Cabinet such as Takla (“spineless”), Helou (“a Jesuit”) and Najjar (“a Druze chosen to please Jumblat”) could not under any stretch of imagination be regarded as representing half of Lebanon’s population. Chamoun made a gesture toward the mob outside and said “this is proof of how they feel”.

(3) Chamoun had counseled Chehab that in first six months at least of his administration he would be wise to appoint a neutral government whose composition could offend no one. He mentioned such names as Daouk, Moslem former Ambassador to Paris, as a possible Prime Minister, and such other neutral but respected figures as Alfred Naccache and Jawad Boulos.

(4) Failing his first preference for a purely neutral transitional government which would serve to appease passions and make possible an eventual revision of electoral law to widen representation in Parliament prior to eventual new elections, Chamoun would reluctantly consent to a Karame Cabinet but one made up of men who would give it a far more representative character. He said several times “I will not impose my veto on Karame, but I would far prefer my first choice of a neutral government”.

(5) If Chehab thought he could ram present Karame Cabinet down throats of Lebanese people [he] was mistaken.

Christians were thoroughly up in arms; the Christian strike was a crippling one; and Parliament would most certainly refuse a vote of confidence for Karame’s Cabinet as now constituted. This might either lead to an attempt at dictatorship by Chehab or to elections which would be tantamount to civil war. In either case Chamoun was prepared to take personal leadership of militant Christians and descend to the plain to fight it out. His forces were less well armed than Moslems but he doubted if Lebanese army would be a surer instrument in Chehab’s hands if it came to fighting Christian mountaineers.

(6) Chamoun said withdrawal of US forces at this time would be a certain means of accomplishing the end of Lebanon and of delivering it to the UAR. He felt departure of our troops at current critical juncture might serve fatally to excite passions on both sides, Moslem and Christian.

I told former President I regarded situation as exceedingly grave. Lebanon now seemed in greater danger of falling apart than even in worst period of previous crisis when the Casbah was Moslem and not Christian as at present. I asked if he wished me to attempt to negotiate with General Chehab. Chamoun said he would be grateful as he believed Chehab trusted me. He said once more to make certain of his three main points: His continued readiness to support Chehab; his preference for a truly neutral government; but his readiness reluctantly to accept Karame.³ As a final point Chamoun said if any one had any illusions he wished to return to power as President that person would be crazy. I agreed.

McClintock

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/10–258. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Cairo, and USUN.
2. See footnote 3, Document 339.
3. In telegram 1816 from Beirut, October 3, McClintock reported that he had met with Chehab and discussed the substance of his conversation with Chamoun. Chehab expressed appreciation for McClintock’s intervention and stated that he felt that developments were moving smoothly toward a tacitly-agreed solution. He expected the strike to end within a few days, and anticipated a compromise regarding the expansion of the cabinet after the parliamentary vote of confidence. (Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/10–358; included in the microfiche supplement)