Office of the Historian

127. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations1

Washington, February 25, 1960—8:05 p.m.

706. Dept appreciates full and frank comments SYG on Middle East situation contained USUN’s 797.2 Suggest you so inform Cordier or Bunche if SYG absent and in your discretion make following points as appropriate: [Page 273]

1.
While UAR build-up continues to be chief unstabilizing factor in current NE situation, reports available USG indicate moves so far defensive in character. Passing UAR February 22 anniversary and subsequent quieter tone Cairo press give hope that tension may have passed its peak.
2.
We nevertheless believe situation requires close watching and have informed both UAR and Israel we believe both sides should show restraint in actions and public statements and cooperate fully with existing UNTSO machinery.
3.
Confronted by Nasser’s inflammatory statements and large-scale UAR mil activity, GOI has in our opinion shown commendable restraint. We have so informed Israelis, expressing hope GOI would continue avoid responses which might exacerbate situation. While difficult assess precise motivations UAR build-up, we inclined believe they compound of (a) genuine concern at reports Israeli moves; (b) desire guard rear in event Iraqi developments or strong Israeli reaction Nasser’s recent speeches Syria; (c) reaction recent Demilitarized Zone tension and concern at Israeli “designs” on Jordan Waters.
4.
View foregoing we inclined believe it preferable not send communications (USUN 798)3 or make public comment of type which might provoke sharp reaction of either side when instead situation should be allowed cool. However, we have great faith in SYG’s judgment and believe he should play situation as he sees fit.
5.
In same vein, we uncertain in present circumstances whether any dramatic gesture, such as SYG trip area of which GOI apparently thinking, likely prove helpful. Continuing SYG contact with Israel and UAR reps we believe most useful as well as generally reassuring, so is cautionary message which we understand SYG has just sent Fawzi. We are inclined to doubt whether anything beyond quiet diplomacy would be advantageous at this juncture. We would of course carefully consider any suggestions the SYG has for reducing tension. SYG should know that this offer includes readiness consider requests he may have for specific diplomatic backstopping of his initiatives.
6.
While circulation Von Horn report may produce some reaction, particularly on part Israelis, we see some merit in SC members having info re Demilitarized Zone situation which has been contributory factor in current tension.
7.
We continuing counsel both parties exercise restraint and emphasizing we do not believe either side contemplating offensive action.

Dillon
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.00/2–2460. Secret. Drafted by Brewer, cleared by Jones and Ludlow, and approved and signed for Dillon by Cargo. Repeated to Tel Aviv and Cairo.↩
  2. Telegram 797, February 24, reported that at the end of the Security Council luncheon that day Hammarskjöld stated that the situation on the Syrian/Israeli DMZ had reached an impasse. (Ibid.)↩
  3. Telegram 798, February 24, reported a discussion with Hammarskjöld on various aspects of the Suez transit question. (Ibid., 986B.7301/2–2460)↩