Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

128. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel¹

Washington, February 27, 1960—4 p.m.

660. Israel Ambassador Harman twenty-sixth pressed Merchant for US support against what Harman described as UAR’s attack on fairly satisfactory status quo existing Arab-Israel relations since 1957. He cited Suez Canal transit issue, flareup on Syrian frontier, intensification of Arab boycott, revival Arab League efforts discomfit Israel, and present UAR military buildup as planned challenge of situation on which Arabs and Israelis might have worked toward accommodation of their differences.

Harman expressed GOI’s concern with UAR Sinai buildup along lines of Israel Minister’s conversation with Hart Thursday (Deptel 3505 to Cairo).² He added that while GOI still felt Israel had capacity to counter any UAR aggression based on present relative strength it is disturbing that Nasser apparently thinks his own position has improved to point where he can take risk of Israel reaction implicit in his present troop deployment. Nasser’s current bravado pointed up urgency of Israel acquiring arms to preserve present relative balance of strength as requested in Israel’s February 9 Note to USG.

Merchant commented Israel Note now under study both in Department and Pentagon. Latter been asked to supply data on such factors as prices and availabilities. Israel request would be given most careful consideration but of necessity against backdrop of frequently reiterated United States reluctance to become major supplier of arms to Near East.

Merchant said we shared Israel bewilderment and concern re Nasser’s troop movements.³ He reported that we had asked Embassy Cairo to explain circumstances as we saw them to UAR Government. He expressed hope Israel would be able to maintain commendable restraint it had thus far exhibited in face of recent disturbing developments and that any precautionary measures Israel felt necessary to initiate would be made with minimum exacerbation current tension in view.

Re Suez transit issue, Harman said he hoped soon to ask Department’s consideration of direct USG intervention in issue as providing most promising support for Hammarskjold’s personal efforts in matter. He said Hammarskjold’s present study of Astypalea documentation to determine ownership of cargo has very little relevance to principle of freedom of transit which Egyptians had tacitly accepted for Israel freight until early 1959. Merchant pointed out we had made several overtures to UAR both independent of and in support of Hammarskjold’s efforts but would consider taking subject up again in Cairo if we convinced such action would have beneficial effect.

Foregoing based on uncleared memorandum of conversation.⁴

Dillon

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86B/2–2760. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Hamilton, cleared by Jones and Meyer, and approved and signed for Dillon by Perkins. Also sent priority to Cairo and to London and USUN.
2. Telegram 3505, February 25, reported that Herzog had discussed the Sinai situation with Hart and summarized the conversation along lines similar to those reported here. (Ibid.)
3. In telegram 2635 from Cairo, February 24, the Embassy had speculated on the reasons behind Nasser’s behavior, concluding that Cairo was alive with theories, but there were few facts to explain the phenomena. (Ibid.)
4. A memorandum of the conversation and a briefing paper for it are ibid., 784A.56/2–2660 and 784A.56/2–2560, respectively.