129. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State1
852. Indications from several talks, including one during my private courtesy call March four, lead me to believe Ben-Gurion may present to President and Secretary his views on three or four of subjects discussed below. Apparently, he wishes to talk to President on broad and general subjects—east-west relations—perhaps reserving for Secretary matters of more detailed concern to Israel, e.g. Israel’s security.
- 1.
- East-West relations. (A) Soviet foreign policy and relationship of ChiComs thereto; particularly as power of latter grows: possibly causing Soviets turn more to west in five–ten years time. (B) Pitfalls to west of taking Soviet Aesopian language too literally on such questions as peace and peaceful co-existence. (Ben-Gurion told me after Khrushchev’s article appeared in October 1959 issue of Foreign Affairs that it needed “an answer”. Subsequently he read with care articles in January issue by Kennan and Stevenson). (C) Ben-Gurion said yesterday there possibility Khrushchev might suggest at summit need for maintenance of “status quo” in Middle East. This, he thought, could [Page 276] have important effect on Nasser’s thinking if he convinced both west (tripartite declaration) and east would uphold independence of existing countries; thereby further precluding UAR hegemony in area notably re Iraq. (D) Effectiveness of Soviet propaganda, Soviet Times based only on promises, and need for West, particularly US, to pay greater attention to this question in light of substantive assistance US actually supplying.
- 2.
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Middle East. Ben-Gurion believes chances for peace settlement dependent A) on ending of Nasser–Kassem rivalry and B) recognition of status quo and independence existing countries in area, particularly by UAR. Currently, Ben-Gurion thinks Nasser hates Kassem more than Israel and that if Nasser would give up his dreams other Arab states might be willing come to some accommodation with Israel. (Ben-Gurion also makes point of stressing Kassem not a Communist and his refusal to give permit regular CP to become party in Iraq hopeful sign.)
Although he has not mentioned this lately, Ben-Gurion may raise GOI’s continued willingness, in interest of peace, to enter into non-aggression pacts with mutual inspection or to GOI willingness agree neutralization Middle East.
If PCC raised, Ben-Gurion may mention his preference for US taking initiative and alternative of US most discreetly pursuing refugee question through single intermediary. He also probably prepared to say he not unwilling meet Nasser secretly if any real prospect of fruitful discussion or results. (He has made such a statement to me.)
- 3.
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Israel security. Ben-Gurion principally concerned with maintenance of adequate defensive deterrent. While GOI might prevail in event of attack “nothing” can compensate for loss of life, nor can Israel—a small country—afford to lose its best youth.
Specifically, Ben-Gurion referred to approximate UAR superiority in equipment over Israel in order of 3 to 1. His note to USG and current thinking thereon based on: (A) Information that definite agreement in principle reached by USSR to supply UAR with MIG–19s and bombers capable of carrying 10 tons. Delivery date not certain but probably based, in part, on phasing out MIG–19s from Soviet Air Force. (B) The cumulative effect of training some 3,000 UAR officers and technicians in bloc countries; the work of 300–400 USSR officers and technicians in UAR.
Here, Ben-Gurion noted report that sometime ago Nasser had asked for more MIG squadrons. Khrushchev had said “no” and commented that what Nasser needed was not “more squadrons, but better squadrons”. Ben-Gurion said this quite true and represented danger to Israel if Nasser really addressed himself to quality and questions of leadership instead of numbers.
[Page 277]IDF especially needs to be capable of protecting itself against surprise air attack. Ben-Gurion said here it important to have defensive missiles to deal with bombers flying at altitudes of 30,000–40,000 feet and over. The other equipment item he singled out was ASW gear.
In past conversations, Ben-Gurion has referred particularly to high cost of obtaining modern military equipment—almost unbearable for Israel’s economy—and to fact Soviets supply arms to UAR on easy terms with purchase price considerably less than actual value.
- 4.
- Newly developing nations of Asia and Africa. Ben-Gurion feels keenly that Israelis making or can make important contributions to new African and Asian nations; notably Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, French Sudan, Chad, Ethiopia, Burma and in Middle East area to Turkey and Iran.
He stresses that helping newly emergent countries and their leaders to meet the rising aspirations of their peoples for a better life in freedom the central question of our time.
The way the West meets this problem in concert with these nations quite as important as what we do. West needs to recognize that approach (A) must be as “equals to equals” and (B) must take full cognizance of the sensitivities surrounding the yearning for “human dignity”.
Last year, he once mentioned to me that if Israel could have some economic assistance on defensive armaments, he could take care of the financing of Israel’s joint training and other endeavors with nations of Africa and Asia.
Comment: Ben-Gurion may also, of course, not only raise the question of Suez transit, but particularly the importance GOI attaches to Eilat and freedom of passage in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran. In the past he has noted Nasser’s comments re the closing of these waters by judicial means, the Arab League Council’s recommendation or resolution (Cairo’s 2713 to Department)2 to the effect that the Gulf of Aqaba constitutes an internal Arab waterway appears to be a further case in point.