147. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Cargo) to the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox)1
SUBJECT
- New Approach to the Palestine Refugee Problem; Report on May 24 Meeting in Assistant Secretary Jones’ Office
Mr. Jones would appreciate your looking over the attached NEA proposal at your earliest convenience. We consider that in general the NEA initiative deserves our support. We should appreciate an indication of your agreement to the consensus of the meeting, as reported herein below, or any reservations you may have concerning this project.
Report on May 24 Meeting
Mr. Jones expressed regret that due to the situation at the UN you were unable to attend, especially as he hoped we were about to embark on a major new initiative with regard to the refugee problem. He then called upon Ambassador Reid, who is here on consultation, to present his views on this matter. The Ambassador said that he was in general agreement with the NEA outline plan, particularly as it took into consideration most of the points he had wished to raise.
Ambassador Reid said that in his opinion there were four major considerations pertinent to the gaining of Israel’s acceptance of any proposed solution. The first was whether Israel will agree to negotiation on the refugees as a separate issue, apart from an overall peace settlement. The Ambassador was encouraged in this regard by remarks which Ben Gurion made to Senators Gore and McGee, and subsequent indications that the Israelis are willing at least to consider negotiating a separate refugee settlement.
The second factor related to the Arabs’ compensation plans and the Israeli counterclaims for property left by Jews who were forced to leave Arab countries, particularly Iraq & Yemen. The Ambassador was certain that the Israelis would insist on a definite tie-up between these two sets of claims.
The third factor related to the “moral guilt” for the refugee problem. The Israelis would insist that in accepting any proposed solution they not be singled out for blame.
[Page 323]The fourth major consideration related to the phasing of repatriation and resettlement. The Israelis would not be inclined to agree to accept an even modest number of refugees on a phased basis unless the Arabs, concurrently with the implementation of this repatriation, took steps actually to resettle on a permanent basis at least an equal number of those refugees who were not going to be repatriated. The Israelis fear that without such a condition they would be put in the position of having to accept X thousands of refugees, with the remaining refugees continuing to constitute a huge pool of potential repatriates who would continue to be stirred up and used as a political weapon by Nasser. Ambassador Reid said that apparently the Government of Israel is now thinking in terms of the possible repatriation of about 200 thousand refugees. (Mrs. Meir mentioned the figures of 150 or 200 thousand to Senator Fulbright recently.)
The Ambassador then listed a number of other factors which he thought to be of particular concern to the GOI. They are: 1) the security aspects of any repatriation program; 2) Israel’s desire always to be in a position to receive up to one million additional Jews, mainly from the USSR; 3) the question of Israel’s bargaining vis-à-vis the Arab and the theory held by many in the GOI that to appease the Arabs is folly and that the only workable policy is that of a tough line and 4) the genuine desire of the GOI for real peace in the area.
Commenting on Phase One of the attached plan, Ambassador Reid said that use of an American to conduct the preliminary sounding operation in Israel would be much more effective than the use of another national. He said that Ben Gurion would greatly prefer, for instance, a “Bob Anderson type Mission”,2 on a direct USG–GOI basis, to a mission under cover of the PCC, particularly if the latter mission were to be undertaken by a non-American.
There followed a lengthy discussion of the NEA draft plan and of some of the points raised by Ambassador Reid. With regard to the question of Israeli counter claims on compensation, it was generally agreed that these should not be allowed to be brought into the negotiations on the settlement of the refugee problem per se. These claims are essentially extraneous to this problem and should be dealt with in the subsequent negotiations on an overall peace which we hope would follow a settlement of the refugee issue.
It was further agreed that offering the refugees a third alternative, i.e., the right to opt for resettlement in a non-Arab country (point 2. C.3 in the attached plan) would be vital to the success of the operation. Even assuming Israel agreed to take back as many as 24 thousand refugees a year for an undetermined number of years, the Arab host [Page 324] countries simply could not absorb on a permanent basis all of the remaining refugees. This is particularly true in the case of the quarter million refugees now in the Gaza strip. It was suggested that for those refugees who elect to resettle elsewhere than in Israel or one of the present host countries, Nansen-type passports be issued to enable them to resettle as expeditiously as possible in areas where labor is needed.
We, noting that our views represented only IO’s initial reaction to the NEA draft plan, said that we were heartened by the evidence of this new initiative and wished to cooperate in every way. We remarked that depending on circumstances it might not be very wise to have anything like a “Lausanne-type Conclave” with the Arabs and Israelis take place during the heat of a US Presidential campaign, as the proposed timetable calls for. It was agreed that the suggested timetable might be stretched out somewhat but that there should be no undue delay in commencing with the first phase.
We also mentioned the possible difficulties that might be raised by the French should we and the Turks agree on a major PCC initiative. We said there is no such thing as a secret PCC meeting and that the Israelis would find out about any sounding sortie immediately such a plan were [was] discussed at a PCC meeting. Mr. Jones proposed that the Turkish representative on PCC could, acting in his capacity as Chairman, simply announce at a regular meeting that he had been instructed by his government to undertake some explorations of the current attitudes of the parties. Whereupon the US representative would commend the Turks for their splendid display of initiative. “What could the French possibly do”, Mr. Jones remarked.
We inquired of Mr. Jones the extent of support for a major new initiative that he believed would be forthcoming from the highest levels of the USG. If we were assured that such an initiative would have solid backing, even in an election year, then it might be well to discuss further Ambassador Reid’s suggestion that the sounding operation be undertaken by an American official, thus presumably increasing our chances of success insofar as the Israelis are concerned. This would also have the advantage that we could undertake the first phase entirely on our own, avoiding probable difficulties with the French and informing the PCC at an appropriate time later in the process. Mr. Jones observed that the Secretary would probably approve of the initiative proposed by NEA, i.e., an initiative within the UN framework and in which the US could not be easily and publicly identified as the motivating force.
[Page 325]Note: It is our understanding that while in Athens recently Mr. Jones secured the agreement of Turkish Ambassador Kural to undertake a PCC-sponsored mission, and that later Foreign Minister Zorlu gave his informal approval to this proposition.
It was agreed tentatively, subject to your concurrence, that we should move ahead with the first phase of the NEA plan. Should that for any reason fail we would consider a “Bob Anderson type Mission”, probably after the new administration is installed. It was agreed that the very least we could obtain from this undertaking would be a clear demonstration that one or another, or both, of the parties directly involved had willfully obstructed constructive efforts towards a solution. Thus in any event we would be in a stronger position vis-à-vis Congress on the Palestine issue.
Mr. Jones asked us privately after the meeting whether we thought USUN, particularly Mr. Barco, would agree to an attempt to implement this plan. We reminded Mr. Jones of the Mission’s reservations about our engagement in any major initiative in the absence of a firm commitment on the part of the highest authorities to follow through regardless of the possible domestic political consequences. We suggested that in the course of refining this plan Mr. Barco be called here for further consultation.
Mr. Jones requested that this entire matter be treated with the utmost discretion and that knowledge about the new initiative be disseminated on a need-to-know basis only.
- Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 72 D 294, PCC May–June 1960. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Palmer.↩
- For documentation on the Anderson Mission to the Middle East, January–March 1956, see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. XV, pp. 1 ff.↩
- Confidential. Drafted by Meyer on May 24.↩