Office of the Historian

146. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State1

Tele Aviv, May 19, 1960—9 p.m.

1118. On May 17 Mrs. Meir gave a small dinner for Senator Fulbright2 with the Prime Minister and myself as the only guests. During a conversation which lasted some four hours the following general subjects were raised:

1.
Israel’s assistance to newly developing countries on basis of equals to equals and importance of the West doing more in Asia and Africa—along general lines Ben-Gurion’s presentation to the President.3
2.
The Summit and the question of why Khrushchev had sabotaged the conference. Whether it was due to Stalinist elements in the presidium, the influence of the Red Chinese, or other internal matters. I took occasion to mention that whatever the outcome the unity of the West had never been closer. (Senator Fulbright indicated to me earlier in the day that the President’s statement4 seemed to him to be “a very good” one.)
3.
Refugees:

Ben-Gurion talked without interruption for about an hour raising many of the points he mentioned to Senators Gore and McGee (Embtel 514).5 Specifically he covered:

(a)
The developments leading to the foundation of the state including Israel’s original willingness to accept the UN partition plan (November 29, 1947) in spite of strong objection to the status of Jerusalem.
(b)
The attack of the Arab armies on May 15, 1948, why the Arabs left and the moral issue involved in light early actions of Mufti re Arabs in Palestine and subsequent ones of Nuri Said in Iraq and Yemen authorities in effect ordering the Jews to leave these countries. (He added these Jews came with little and lost most of their personal effects and property.)
(c)
Ben-Gurion’s ideas re settlement of refugees in fertile lands of Iraq and Syria.
(d)
General assessment of relations among several states in the area. Unlikelihood of progress towards peace given Nasser’s present course (notably his recent speech indicating Jews would meet same [Page 320] fate as crusaders) and lack real attention of Nasser to needs of people. Here Ben-Gurion handed to Senator Fulbright extracts from Cairo radio and from some of Nasser’s statements.

Ben-Gurion stressed refugees being used inhumanely as political key of which might ultimately be used to destroy Israel and that minds of refugees were being indoctrinated by negative Cairo propaganda. (He also noted number of refugees who left not the same as number of refugees now.)

Ben-Gurion concluded by saying why—if Nasser really wanted a measure of tranquility and ultimately peace—was he spending so much on armaments. Probably he had not mentioned this to the Senator. But he, Ben-Gurion, knew the figure because as Defense Minister he had to.

Senator Fulbright replied carefully and at length. Specifically he indicated:

(a)
That he was in Israel only to learn.
(b)
That the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and increasingly Congress were becoming impatient relative to continued outlays for UNWRA (“over $200 million”) which did not produce some progress or solution.
(c)
That he had talked with an Arab in Cairo6 “not Nasser” and asked him what he thought of an impartial and objective commission such as the PCC or some other body trying to solve the problem of the refugee question on basis repatriation and compensation.

He presumed Israel obviously would not agree to anything endangering the security of the state but that the principle of the right of repatriation was important. On compensation it seemed only fair that Israel’s counter claims against Iraq, Yemen, Jordan and UAR be taken into account.

Senator Fulbright added that he had no particular idea on this or the formula that might be involved, but that it would of course require that any voting by the refugees on whether they wished to return be guaranteed by the UN or some impartial authority.

Mrs. Meir interjected that even supposing Israel “just for the sake of discussion” might be willing to take back 150,000 to 200,000 refugees how could they be sure that Nasser’s propaganda would not compel most of the refugees to come back and would not the refugees coming back, in effect, be a “Fifth Column”.

The Senator replied he had no means of evaluating the latter but obviously “all bets would be off” if improper pressures were brought to bear on the refugees when they were making a choice.

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Senator Fulbright continued that it seemed to him that the day of white man’s supremacy was over and that many nations whom we had thought could not develop were in fact doing so. Specifically he thought that the UAR with Soviet aid was progressing, that domestic matters were of concern and that it was important to try and tackle the refugee question now—and not wait on fundamental changes in the UAR—in the interest of area tranquility.

4.
The picketing of the Cleopatra and the Hays–Douglas amendment.

The Senator reviewed his thinking and indicated that he had received the strong backing of the Department (to which I nodded emphatically). He stressed that both the picketing and the amendment were in his view, and in that of the Department’s as he understood it, counter productive; not the way to handle delicate foreign relations. He added that he had spent the better part of a day following a call from Secretary Anderson voting out a bill from his committee without a similar rider (Hays–Douglas) that would have destroyed the effectiveness of legislation on the IDA. He pointed out that some of “your people” like Senators Douglas and Javits are not really acting in Israel’s best interest. Mrs. Meir jumped in to say that they were not their people but US citizens. Senator Fulbright smiled and said he meant to say your “partisans”. He effectively made the point with Ben-Gurion paying close attention that other instances such as the debate in the Senate could one day adversely affect American opinion relative to Israel and that Javits in the end cautioned about adding the rider to the IDA bill.

At the airport the following morning the Senator said he still thought some formula might be found re the refugees consistent with a free election which would also respect Israel’s concern over security. He added if Ben-Gurion’s view on danger of refugees as potential Fifth Column an accurate assessment—it of course very difficult problem and he was not overly optimistic. Nonetheless he thought some of Ben-Gurion’s points re Israel’s skill in settling refugees (from Arab countries) is good argument that Israel could in fact settle some of the refugees.

(Department may wish repeat this telegram Amman, Beirut, Cairo and London.)

Reid
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100–FU/5–1960. Secret. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, London, and Jerusalem.↩
  2. Senator Fulbright visited Israel, May 16–18, as part of a trip to the Middle East.↩
  3. See Documents 132–135.↩
  4. For text of this statement, May 16, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61, pp. 154–155.↩
  5. Document 104.↩
  6. See Document 257.↩